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"Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it."
George Santayana1
INTRODUCTION
Taking as its basic premise that gambling is inevitable because
it "is practiced, or tacitly endorsed, by a substantial majority of
I G. SANTAYANA, I LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905).
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Americans,"2 the Commission on the Review of the National Policy
Toward Gambling3 recently suggested an approach that the federal
government should follow in its regulation of gambling activities:
The Commission believes that the States should have the primary
responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may le-
gally take place within their borders. The Federal Government
should prevent interference by one State with the gambling
policies of another, and should act to protect identifiable national
interests.
4
Although this broad recommendation reinforces the role the fed-
eral government has traditionally played in regulating gambling,
the Commission also proposed specific amendments to the cur-
rent federal gambling laws.5 Should Congress act upon the Coin-
2 See COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING,
GAMBLING IN AMERICA 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GAMBLING IN AMERICA]. In 1974, 88
million American adults (61% of the adult population) participated in some form of gam-
bling. Id. at 3. Nearly 19 million adults (13%) engaged only in social betting with friends.
See id., table 4.1, at 59. While 53 million adults (37%) patronized both legal and illegal
commercial gambling forms (see id.), only 16 mill-on adults (11%) patronized illegal gambl-
ing operations exclusively (see id.) and under 10 million adults (7%) gambled exclusively at
legal establishments (see id.). The Commission survey indicated that the total volume or
gross handle of money legally wagered in 1974 was $17.3 billion (id. at 63), an increase of
over $12 billion since 1960 (id. at 77). The estimates of the gross handle of money illegally
wagered range from $5 billion to $39 billion. Id. at 63. In Nevada, gross taxable casino
revenue rose from $200 million in 1960 to more than $1 billion in 1974. Id. The number
of states permitting parimutuel racing increased from 26 to 32 (id. at 77, 105); 13 states
established lotteries (id. at 77); two states instituted off-track betting (id. at 105); and one
state established the first legal numbers game (id. at 77). Nevertheless, there has been little
evidence of a widespread desire to expand casino-type games. Recent polls show that a
majority of Americans would not welcome legalized casino gambling of the kind now
operating in Nevada and Atlantic City, New Jersey. See N.Y. Times, June 29, 1978, at A15,
col. 4.
3 The Commission was established by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, §§ 804-809, 84 Stat. 922, to "conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study
of gambling in the United States ... and to formulate and propose such changes ... as
the Commission may deem appropriate." Id. § 805(a).
4 GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 5. The Commission's suggestion that Con-
gress enact a federal statute to grant to the states the power to regulate gambling within
their borders may be political rhetoric. The states have always exercised sovereignty, consis-
tent with the Constitution, over intrastate activities. Further, Congress's powers under the
commerce clause to regulate gambling in interstate commerce would remain unaffected by
such a law.
5 The Commission recommended, inter alia, that the federal government not tax
gambling winnings and operations, that 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976), which prohibits illegal
gambling businesses, be amended to limit its reach to large-scale gambling operations, and
that the federal government make greater use of civil remedies against gambling offenders.
See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 2.
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mission's report or otherwise attempt a comprehensive review of
federal gambling policy-such legislation, S. 1437,6 has already
passed the Senate-its members ought to bring to their task a firm
grasp of what the federal gambling law is, how that law developed,
and what policies underlie it.7 This Article seeks to shed light on
each of these questions.
The more than fifty provisions of federal law that affect
gambling are scattered throughout various titles of the United
States Code." As the Code's presentation of these gambling pro-
visions lacks unity, so, too, does their history; the story of their
development is not one but several. The earliest congressional con-
cern arose in response to the inability of states acting alone to
control the perceived abuses of the nineteenth century state-
chartered lotteries. Subsequent federal gambling legislation has
manifested a variety of policies that include depriving organized
crime of its gambling revenue, harmonizing federal gambling taxes
with diverse state gambling policies, and developing a coherent
gambling policy to govern federal enclaves. Understanding the de-
velopment of each of these strands of the federal law of gambling
is a first step toward learning the lessons common to all.
6 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
7 justice Holmes aptly put it: "In order to know what [the law] is, we must know what
it has been ... " O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
$ See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17b (dealings in commodity futures), 2044(b)(7) (gambling convic-
tion as ground for denial, revocation, or suspension of farm labor contractor registration
certificate) (1976); 8 U.S.C. § 1104(f)(4) (1976) (alien whose income principally derived
from gambling not of good moral character); 12 U.S.C. §§ 25a (participation by national
banks in lotteries and related activities), 339 (participation by state member banks in lot-
teries and related activities), 1730c (participation by insured institutions in lotteries and
related activities), 1829a (participation by state nonmember insured banks in lotteries and
related activities) (1976); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1976) (transportation of gambling de-
vices); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1083 (gambling ships), 1084 (interstate wire communications),
1301-1307 (lotteries), 1511 (obstruction of state or local law enforcement with intent to
facilitate illegal gambling businesses), 1952 (interstate and foreign travel or transportation
in aid of racketeering enterprises), 1953 (interstate transportation of wagering parapher-
nalia), 1955 (prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), 1961-1968 (racketeer influenced
and corrupt organizations), 2516(I)(c) (authorization for interception of wire or oral com-
munications) (1976); 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976) (importation of lottery tickets and advertise-
ments); 26 U.S.C. §§ 165(d) (income tax deduction for wagering losses), 4401-4424 (wager-
ing taxes), 4461-4464 (occupational tax on coin-operated devices) (1976); 39 U.S.C. § 3005
(1976) (lotteries conducted through mail); 42 U.S.C. § 3781 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (defini-
tion of "organized crime"); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (administrative
sanctions against radio operation).
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THE LOTTERY STATUTES: CHANGING
ATTITUDES AND FEDERALISM
A. State-Chartered Lotteries of the Nineteenth Century:
The Fight for the Power to Regulate
Lotteries flourished in the United States from the colonial
period through the 1830's. 9 Generally condoned by the law at their
outset, lotteries were not only popular but also respectable:
For many years after [the lottery] began to prevail it was not
regarded at all as a kind of gambling; the most reputable citizens
were engaged in these lotteries, either as selected managers or as
liberal subscribers. It was looked upon as a kind of voluntary tax
for paving streets, erecting wharves, buildings, etc., with a con-
tingent profitable return for such subscribers as held the lucky
numbers.' 0
Many states soon banned private lotteries, largely because they
competed with state lotteries and engendered fraud and corrup-
tion." To further stifle competition, states also prohibited the in-
state sale of tickets for neighboring state lotteries. Nevertheless,
reflecting Jacksonian ideals-animosity toward legislatively-created
privilege, concern for efficiency in government, distaste for fraud
and corruption, and sympathy for the poor upon whom the bur-
den of the lottery system was thought to fall-the states (and the
District of Columbia through congressional regulation), one by
one, proscribed lotteries altogether, usually by constitutional
amendment.
1 2
9 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776-1976, at 655-734 [hereinafter cited as DE-
VELOPMENTS]; H. CHAFETZ, PLAY THE DEVIL 297-308 (1960); J. EZELL, FORTUNE'S MERRY
WHEEL 177-203 (1960); G. SULLIVAN, By CHANCE A WINNER: THE HISTORY OF LOTTERIES
12-43 (1972); F. WILLIAMS, LOTTERIES, LAWS AND MORALS 28-44 (1958).
10 A. SPOFFORD, LOTTERIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, S. Misc. Doc. No. 57, 52d Cong.,
2d Sess. 174-75 (1893).
I ISee id. at 193. See generally J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 102-05.
'
12 See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 74-88; A. SPOFFORD, supra note 10, at 193. The
development of the law of lotteries in the District of Columbia-a federal enclave under
the jurisdiction of Congress (see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17)-accurately reflects changing
national attitudes and policies toward gambling and lotteries in particular. Washington,
D.C. "had a special experience with lotteries." WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAw, LEGALIZED NUMBERS IN WASHINGTON 11 (1973). Lotteries were a
popular means of financing public improvements at the turn of the nineteenth century,
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Two obstacles, however, hampered the efforts of states to shel-
ter their citizens from the perceived evils of the nineteenth century
and Washington, D.C., as a planned city, needed many new buildings. See J. EZELL, supra
note 9, at 102-08. A number of lotteries were conducted, with scandal associated from the
beginning. The most notorious was a lottery operated by Samuel Blodget in the 1790's,
which ended with Blodget sacrificing his personal property to cover prizes he was unable
to deliver as promised. Id. at 102-05. In 1812, Congress authorized lotteries for the District
of Columbia, but the amount to be raised on an individual project could not exceed
$10,000, and the President had to approve. See Act of May 4, 1812, ch. 75, § 6, 2 Stat. 721.
Congress also authorized specific lotteries. See, e.g., ANNALS OF CONG., 14th Cong., 1st Sess.
90 (1816) (lottery to benefit Georgetown University). Cf. ANNALS OF CONG., 10th Cong., 2d
Sess. 501 (1808) (petition for lottery to benefit Alexandria church). For early cases arising
from problems associated with lottery ventures, see Shankland v. Mayor of Washington, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 389 (1831); Clark v. Mayor of Washington, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 40 (1827);
Mayor of Washington v. Young, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 406 (1825); Brent v. Davis, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 395 (1825) (irregularities in lottery offering challenged); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (District of Columbia not authorized to sell lottery tickets
outside its borders). Young, Clark, and Shankland all involved attempts by ticket purchasers
in the same lottery to collect from its manager.
Congress responded to the corruption associated with gambling ventures in the District
of Columbia. In 1831, the first congressional effort to establish comprehensive penal laws
for the District of Columbia contained a section limiting the operation of gaming tables. See
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 37, § 12, 4 Stat. 449. In 1842, Congress also outlawed the sale of
lottery tickets in the District of Columbia by providing that maintaining a place of business
for the sale of such tickets would be unlawful, that contracts for the sale of lottery tickets
would be void, and that money paid for such contracts could be recovered. See Act of Aug.
31, 1842, ch. 282, 5 Stat. 578. Despite the new legislation, gambling persisted, and in some
cases became legend. The Palace of Fortune, operated by Edward Pendleton, was allegedly
the favorite of lobbyists and legislators alike in the decades before the Civil War. When
Pendleton died, President Buchanan attended the funeral, and prominent Democrats
served as pallbearers. H. CHAFETZ, supra note 9, at 182.
During the post-Civil War period, national attitudes toward gambling, and particu-
larly toward lotteries, changed. Congress began to move in earnest against gambling ven-
tures in the District of Columbia. Congress added "gift enterprises" to the list of prohibited
activities in 1873 (see Act of Feb. 17, 1873, ch. 148, 17 Stat. 464), strengthened the prohibi-
tion regarding lottery tickets in 1878 (see Act of Apr. 29, 1878, ch. 68, 20 Stat. 39), and in
1883, adopted "[an act more effectually to suppress gaming in the District of Columbia"
(Act of Jan. 31, 1883, ch. 40, 22 Stat. 411). In 1901, Congress largely codified the existing
law and prohibited lotteries, gaming tables, three-card monte, and bookmaking. See Act of
Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 863-869, 31 Stat. 1189. A Washington court summarized the law
and public opinion concerning lotteries as follows:
Although formerly permitted by law, and even encouraged, public opinion for
nearly half a century almost everywhere in this and all civilized countries has rec-
ognized lotteries as fruitful sources of unmitigated mischief; as a cunning scheme
by which crafty knaves plunder the silly and credulous; destructive of thrift and
honest industry, and pandering to idleness and vice .... The keeping of a shop
within this District for the sale of lottery or policy tickets is something affecting
the entire country ....
United States v. Green, 19 D.C. (8 Mackey) 230, 241 (1890). The laws of the District of
Columbia continue to prohibit many forms of gambling. See D.C. CODE §§ 22-1501 to
-1515 (1973). Before the provision was held unconstitutionally vague in Holly v. United
States, 464 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1972), it was also illegal to be present at an "illegal estab-
lishment," which was defined to include a "gambling establishment." See D.C. CODE § 22-
1515(a) (1973).
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lotteries. One was the contract clause of the Constitution.'3 Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward'4 established that any state's attempt to revoke a state charter
would impermissibly impair the obligation of contracts. 15 After
Dartmouth College, states could forefend new lotteries but had to
avoid interfering with existing lotteries.' 6
Dartmouth College symbolized the Marshall Court's policy of
upholding property and privilege against the power of the people
acting through state legislatures. With Marshall's death, however,
the Court began to expand the power of state legislatures to pursue
the public good at the cost of individual wealth. A line of decisions
"a "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. James Wilson is often thought to be the father of the
contract clause. See B. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 &
n.25 (1938). Perhaps, he saw in it a means to secure "sure anchors of privilege and of prop-
erty" to protect against "the irregular and impetuous tides of party and faction." Wilson,
Considerations on the Bank of North America (1785), reprinted in 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
824, 834 (R. McCloskey, ed. 1967). See B. WRIGHT, JR., supra, at 16-18.
14 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 624 (1819).
15 Id. Although many historians cite Dartmouth College as establishing the sanctity of
legislatively-granted charters (see, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 324-25
(1945)), the careful legal historian must comment on Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87 (1810), which was, in fact, the first Supreme Court case to hold a state legislative enact-
ment violative of the contract clause. Fletcher arose from the so-called "Yazoo Land Fraud"
scandals which involved sales of public lands by a corrupt Georgia Legislature. Upon dis-
covering the corruption, subsequent legislatures attempted to rescind the sales, even
though the land had since been resold. The purchasers retained Alexander Hamilton, who
advised them that the legislature's action contravened the contract clause. See B. WRIGHT,
JR., supra note 13, at 21-22. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall agreed
with Hamilton. See 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136-39. The land grants were, to be sure, exe-
cuted rather than executory obligations as demanded by the contract clause, but the land
grants were attended, in Marshall's opinion, by an "implied contract" on the part of the
grantor not to claim again the thing granted. Id. at 137. Consequently, the legislature could
not act to set aside the sales.
16 The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, affirmed an acquittal of one selling lot-
tery tickets in State v. Hawthorne, 9 Mo. 389, 396-97 (1845), on the ground that the
contract clause prevented the Missouri Legislature from repealing prior grants and
criminalizing lottery ticket sales formerly permitted. In 1821, the antilottery movement
secured a constitutional amendment banning lotteries in New York. See N.Y. CONST. art. 7,
§ 11 (1821), reprinted in 2 B. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1341 (2d ed. 1878). Legisla-
tion enforced the ban prospectively (see Act of Mar. 15, 1822, ch. 71, § 1, 1822 N.Y. Laws
73), but existing lotteries continued. In 1833, the legislature reached a compromise with
the firm of Yates & McIntyre-assignees of all of New York's outstanding lottery grants-
whereby all lotteries would cease after one more year of operation. See Act of Apr. 30,
1833, ch. 306, 1833 N.Y. Laws 484. Public pressure on Yates & McIntyre had been build-
ing. See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 214-15. McIntyre was a member of the legislature and
also State Comptroller from 1806 to 1821. J. B. Yates, in turn, was a member of Congress
and his brother was Governor of New York from 1823 to 1825. See id. at 86. There was a
basis in fact, therefore, for the Jacksonian fear of legislatively-created privilege and profit
in the operation of state-chartered lottery systems.
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gradually subjected existing state-chartered lotteries to the policy
choices of state legislatures. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge,'7 the Court announced that state charters should be nar-
rowly construed. Chief Justice Taney, Marshall's successor and a
Jackson appointee, wrote for the Court: "While the rights of pri-
vate property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the
community also have rights, and that the happiness and well being
of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.' Phalen v.
Virginia 9 created a greater threat to existing lotteries. The Court
upheld a state's power to impose reasonable limits on the duration
of a lottery charter subsequent to granting it. 20 Phalen, a weak
precedent because the charter involved "had become obsolete by
non-user," 21 received reinforcement in Stone v. Mississippi.22 Chief
Justice Waite wrote for a unanimous Court:
The contracts which the Constitution protects are those that re-
late to property rights, not governmental. It is not always easy to
tell on which side of the line which separates governmental from
property rights a particular case is to be put; but in respect to
lotteries there can be no difficulty. . . . Certainly the right to
suppress them is governmental, to be exercised at all times by
those in power, at their discretion. Any one, therefore, who ac-
cepts a lottery charter does so with the implied understanding
that the people, in their sovereign capacity, and through their
properly constituted agencies, may resume it at any time when
the public good shall require, whether it be paid for or not.23
17 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
18 Id. at 548. Men of privilege and property immediately recognized the implications of
Charles River Bridge. Chancellor Kent commented that the decision "undermin[ed] the
foundations of morality, confidence and truth." A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 15, at 327
(quoting Kent, Supreme Court of the United States, 2 NEW-YORK REVIEW 372, 387 (1838)). An
article in the North American Review, a Whig journal, lamented: "We have fallen under a
new dispensation in respect to the judiciary." Id. at 328 (quoting Davies, Constitutional Law,
46 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 126, 153 (1838)).
19 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850).
2 01 Id. The Court's attitude toward lotteries shone through oft-cited language:
The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among the
most important duties of government. Experience has shown that the common
forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the
wide-spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and
places, but the latter infects the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it
reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the
ignorant and simple.
Id. at 168.21 Id. at 169.
22 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
23 1d. at 820-21.
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A cycle that began with Marshall, who found implied contracts in
order to protect legislative charters, ended with Waite, who found
implied understandings in order to overturn them.
Even after Stone swept the contract clause from the paths of
the antilottery forces, state legislatures faced still another obstacle.
Although a state legislature could prohibit lotteries from operating
in the state, it could do little to prevent the distribution, through
the mails, of tickets for lotteries chartered by other states. The
problems of enforcement were too great. Because the antilottery
state lacked the power to prosecute out-of-state operators or to
regulate the mails, it would have had to attack lotteries at the con-
sumer level-a difficult, expensive, and unpopular task. States seek-
ing a more efficient method of controlling lotteries called upon the
federal government to halt the flow of lottery tickets through the
mails.2 4 The antilottery forces found an ally in the United States
Post Office. The Postal Service had discovered exploitation of the
mails by several fraudulent lottery schemes, 25 and was seeking
legislation to bolster its regulatory powers.26 Prior to 1868, the only
federal legislation concerning use of the mails by lotteries forbade
postal authorities from acting as the lotteries' agents.27
B. Early Federal Attempts To Control Lotteries
Through Regulation of the Mails
Congress enacted its first significant limitation on state lotteries
in 1868. Hidden in an "Act to further amend the postal Laws,"28
the provision stated that: "it shall not be lawful to deposit in a
post office, to be sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning
2' The Constitution grants Congress the "Power... To establish Post Offices and post
Roads." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
25 For example, a firm in New York would obtain the names of persons living in rural
districts throughout the country and send them circulars through the mail advertising a
fraudulent "gift enterprise" scheme. The firm would receive in response large amounts of
money daily. Whenever a customer complained that he had not received the "gift," the
firm would reply either that it had never received the money from the purchasers or that
it had already mailed the package, thus placing the blame on the Post Office, which could
not disprove the allegations. See S. Misc. Doc. No. 57, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1866).
26 See S. 148, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
2 See Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 61, § 6, 4 Stat. 238 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1303
(1976)). In 1821, the House had passed a resolution calling for a report by the Committee
on the District of Columbia on the number and profits of lotteries. ANNALS OF CONG., 16th
Cong., 2d Sess. 757 (1821).
28 Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, 15 Stat. 194. The Act concerned, inter alia, the free
return of nondeliverable mail (id. § 1), the establishment of postal money orders (id. § 2),
and a discount for sales of postage stamps to vendors (id. § 12).
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lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offer-
ing prizes of any kind on any pretext whatever. '2 9 A provision that
would have allowed the postmaster to open letters suspected of
containing lottery materials was eliminated in conference,30 making
the new statute difficult to enforce. A provision imposing penalties
on postal employees for unlawfully detaining or delaying mail re-
mained in force,3' and, although it did not apply to mail prohib-
ited by the new statute, postal authorities had no way, in the typical
situation, to ascertain the contents of suspected letters without con-
travening the fourth amendment.3 2 When Congress codified the
postal laws in 1872, 33 it reworded the 1868 limitation on the mail-
ing of lottery materials, leaving only illegal lotteries subject to the
prohibition.3 4
During the next few years, while the nation fought a depres-
sion, criticism of remaining state-chartered lotteries intensified. 35
Between 1872 and 1876, seven additional states enacted constitu-
tional amendments forbidding their legislatures to authorize lot-
29 Id. § 13. The Senate had added the antilottery provision to the House bill. See CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4175 (1868).
30 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4412 (1868). Chairman Farnsworth of the House
Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads reported that this would be a "dangerous
power to confer upon postmasters." Id. The limitation on the mailing of lottery tickets, how-
ever, sparked little dispute and no open debate.
31 See REv. STAT. §§ 3890, 3891 (1875). The Attorney General observed:
While it may be lawful ... to detain and refuse to deliver a letter or circular within
the prohibition of the statute, it is unlawful for him to detain or delay any letter
which is not . . . within that prohibition . . . . The officer may have acted in
perfect good faith . . . he may have had reasonable ground to believe . . . that the
letter detained was within the prohibition of the statute; and yet I cannot say...
that such a plea would be a good defence, either to a public prosecution, or to a
private suit, by the person aggrieved.
12 Op. Att'y Gen. 538, 539 (1868).
32 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
33 See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283.
3' The section provided:
That it shall not be lawful to convey by mail, nor to deposit in a post-office to be
sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning illegal lotteries, so-called gift-
concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes, or concerning schemes de-
vised and intended to deceive and defraud the public for the purpose of obtaining
money under false pretences ....
Id. § 149. Because no open debate or report discussed the new language, it is not clear
whether Congress intended a policy change. Chairman Farnsworth of the House Commit-
tee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads introduced the bill, H.R. 1, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1872), and said that it made no major changes in existing law. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1871). The law continued to prohibit postal officials from acting as lottery
agents. See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 79, 17 Stat. 294.
35 See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 238-41.
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teries for any purpose.36 Yet the populace apparently bought more
tickets than ever. The Assistant Attorney General of New York, for
example, reported that in New York City alone, thirty-three lottery
agencies received an average total of more than 9,500 letters each
week. 37
In 1876, Congress amended the restriction on the mailing of
lottery materials by striking the word "illegal. '38 The change reflect-
ed a congressional determination to exclude from the mails mate-
rials from all lotteries, including those chartered by state legisla-
tures. 39 Major and recurring constitutional questions were fervently
argued on the Senate floor and decisively answered with a vote
adopting the proposed amendment. 40
A year later, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional-
3 A. SPOFFORD, supra note 10, at 193. Eastern states adopted antilottery amendments
based on experience with the lotteries. Antilottery provisions in Western constitutions (see,
e.g., NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 24, reprinted in 2 B. POORE, supra note 16, at 1247),
however, are apparently examples of lawyers copying old documents when drafting new
texts (see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 417-18).
37J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 238. The report cited 7,661 ordinary and 1,993 registered
letters as the weekly average. Id.
" See Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90.
" "The object of the amendment to [REV. STAT. § 3894] is to secure uniformity and
prohibit lottery circulars of any kind from passing through the mails." 4 CONG. REc. 3656
(1876) (remarks of Rep. Cannon, of the House Comm. on the Post-Office and Post-Roads)
(reporting H.R. 2575, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876)). For consistent interpretations of con-
gressional intent see Horner v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 456 (1893); 15 Op. Att'y Gen.
203, 204 (1877).
40 The Senate clearly saw the issues raised by the federal prohibition:
The difficulty which the [Post Office] Department labors under is in determining
what are and what are not legal lotteries. A great many schemes are gotten up,
some in the Territories, some of them in operation to-day apparently with the
forms of law, but yet of doubtful legal force, and they are transmitting their mat-
ter through the mails, and the whole thing proves to be a fraud upon the com-
munity; and the question arises whether it is not wiser and better to treat all
lotteries, whether legal or illegal, as precisely the same, or as a system of gam-
bling which a wise course in legislation will not only justify but demand at our
hands shall be stopped.
4 CONG. REC. 4262 (1876) (remarks of Senator Hamlin). Debate in the Senate also touched
upon the propriety of congressional action with respect to local lottery activity:
[I]f a State chooses to authorize and legalize a lottery, call it gambling, if you
please, and gambling it is, that is a matter entirely for the consideration of that
State ....
Id. (remarks of Senator West). The breadth of the prohibition was a particular concern:
Certainly the Senate does not mean to decide that the citizens of a State where
lotteries are legal have no right to send a lottery scheme or circular from one portion
of the State to another. That seems to me to be interfering with the rights of the
people of the States where they choose to think that the sale of lottery tickets is
not criminal or improper.
Id. (remarks of Senator Whyte).
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ity of closing the mails to lottery materials. The Court, in Ex parte
Jackson,41 held that "[t]he power possessed by Congress embraces
the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. '42 By
construing the prohibition as it would any other postal regulation,
the Court avoided the issue of interference with prerogatives re-
served to the states by the tenth amendment. Instead, the Court
warned against the infringement of individual rights:
The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves
the right to determine what shall be excluded. The difficulty
attending the subject arises, not from the want of power in Con-
gress to prescribe regulations as to what shall constitute mail
matter, but from the necessity of enforcing them consistently
with rights reserved to the people, of far greater importance than
the transportation of the mail.
43
Thus, subject to first and fourth amendment constraints, Jackson
sustained the power of Congress "to refuse its facilities for the
distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals. 44
41 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
42 Id. at 732.
43 Id. The Court discussed potential first and fourth amendment problems under the
statute (see id. at 733-34), and then announced the limits of permissible interference with
the mails, cautioning Congress not to violate constitutional guarantees:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their.own dpmiciles. The con-
stitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secur in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against
inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and
examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to
search in one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the hands of
officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of
letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail
matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in
the fourth amendment of the Constitution
(id. at 733).
44Md. at 736. The holding off qk" .became the subject of much dispute in ensuing
years. The Senate Committee on Post.Offices and Post-Roads reported S. 1017, 48th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1884), which would have prohibited the mailing of newspapers containing
lottery advertisements. The Report citedJackson as authorizing the enactment of such legis-
lation. See 15 CONG. REC. 4380 (1884). The Minority Report limitedJackson to the statute it
construed (see id. at 4383) and emphasized language in the case that spelled out restrictions
upon the power of Congress to interfere with freedom of the press:
Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transportation of printed
matter in the mail, which is open to examination, so as to interfere in any manner
with the freedom of the press. Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom
as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be
of little value
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The 1876 statutory change, however, failed to eliminate state-
chartered lotteries. The Postmaster General initially instructed
postmasters not to accept or deliver letters addressed to lottery
companies or their agents on the assumption that such mail con-
cerned lotteries. 45 Nevertheless, the Attorney General concluded
that the statute conferred no powers of seizure or detention; the
statute contemplated only one enforcement mechanism-a fine.4 6
The Attorney General also determined that newspapers, which
were open to inspection, were not "circulars" and were thus outside
the statutory prohibition.47 Consequently, the federal statute could
not effectively guard against misuse of the mails by lottery com-
panies; it was a watchdog without teeth.
Meanwhile, the Louisiana Lottery, which had helped to spur
the 1876 amendment, continued to operate in flagrant violation of
the national will. In 1868, a New York gambling syndicate had se-
cured, by bribery, an exclusive lottery franchise from the Louisiana
Legislature.4 8 Declaring that the franchise would increase state rev-
enue and stop the flow of gambling dollars out of the state, the leg-
islature gave the syndicate a lucrative monopoly by prohibiting the
(Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (quoted in 15 CONG. REC. 4383 (1884))). Because Jackson
affirmed the 1876 lottery restrictions, but also cautioned against overextensions of congres-
sional power in violation of constitutional guarantees, Congressmen repeatedly cited the
case in an exaggerated fashion to support diametrically opposed positions during the con-
gressional battle with the Louisiana Lottery. See notes 53 & 57 infra.
45 J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 240. In 1895, Congress gave the Postmaster General the
explicit authority to refuse to deliver ordinary letters addressed to persons or companies
operating lotteries. See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 4, 28 Stat. 963. Congress had earlier
conferred similar powers with respect to registered mail. See Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908,
§ 2, 26 Stat. 465.46 See 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 5, 6 (1878). See generally 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 306, 308-11 (1885);
17 Op. Att'y Gen. 77, 78 (1881). Ezell reports the following background:
The management [of the Louisiana Lottery] decided to test the legality of the
federal law of 1876. Ben Butler, stormy petrel of the Civil War, postwar political
king-pin and the brother-in-law of the Secretary of the Treasury, headed a corps
of nine lawyers to press the fight. [The Lottery's agent] reportedly hurried to Wash-
ington for personal interviews with President Rutherfo.AJ$: Hayes and Secretary of
the Treasury John Sherman, a move interpreted by notxthern newspapers as an at-
tempt to inject the lottery into national politics. Despite numei-ous indications that
the lottery was unpopular, the Attorney General handed down a decision which
was berated by lottery foes as sustaining the law of 1876 but at the same time
preventing its enforcement.
J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 247-48.
47 I do not think that a newspaper or periodical is rendered non-mailable by con-
taining a lottery advertisement. This does not transform the newspaper into a
"circular" within the purview of section 3894 ....
18 Op. Att'y Gen. 306, 309 (1885).
4S J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 243.
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sale of other lottery tickets in the state.49 Although the lottery de-
veloped foes in Louisiana, its supporters squelched attempts to re-
voke the franchise or authorize a second lottery.50 The lottery em-
barked on its most profitable decade three years after Congress
passed the 1876 statute; the lottery obtained ninety-three percent
of its revenue from outside of Louisiana.
51
49 Id. at 243-44. In exchange for $40,000 per year for 25 years, the Louisiana Legisla-
ture exempted the lottery from all state taxes. Id. at 244. The lottery and its shareholders
prospered:
This is a private corporation and its affairs are veiled in the greatest secrecy.
The number of its stockholders is not known, but they are believed to be less than
twenty in number. Some five or six control the great majority of the stock.
All the proceedings and workings of the company are carefully concealed
from the public. Four national banks in New Orleans . . . guaranty the prizes
drawn.
The stock of the company embraces 12,000 shares at a par value of
$1,200,000. Owing to the large dividends paid by the company the shares are
quoted at $1,200, or an aggregate of $12,000,000.
The dividends are believed to exceed, on the average, 100 per cent., and [in
1889] ... were 170 per cent.
This dividend, large as it is, represents only half of the profits of the company
for a single year. The other profits go to certain preferred stockholders, very few
in number.
[ . . T]he daily drawings . . . exceed $2,000,000 annually [in addition to
$28,000,000 from monthly and special drawings] making the enormous annual
income of $30,000,000, or twice the sum that was paid Napoleon by Jefferson in
1801 for the entire Louisiana Purchase.
The remarkable thing about this lottery is the fact that 93 per cent of income
is derived outside the State of Louisiana, from other States of the Union and the
Territories. There is not a city or considerable village in the country which does
not contribute to the enormous revenues of this gigantic gambling concern. It was
the boast of the champions of the company in the recent struggle before the
Louisiana Legislature that it was "enriching the State by millions."
21 CONG. R~c. 8705-06 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Moore).
50 See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 245.
51 Id. at 248-49, 251; 21 CONG. REc. 8705-06, 8721 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Moore
and Rep. Price). Many smaller schemes were also in operation at the same time, although
after 1878 none were legal. See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 241. Two other states, Delaware
and Vermont, permitted lotteries when authorized by their own legislatures, but their legis-
latures authorized no lotteries during this period. See H.R. REP. No. 787, 50th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1888). In 1884, the Senate Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads
surveyed the extant state lottery statutes and constitutional provisions while considering
S. 1017, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884), which would have prohibited the mailing of lottery
advertisements. See 15 CONG. REC. 4380-82 (1884). Of 38 states, only Delaware, Vermont,
and Louisiana did not completely prohibit lotteries. The Report concluded: "From the
foregoing it clearly appears that the bill reported by the committee is not only within the
power and duty of Congress, but is also in harmony with and in support of the policy of
nearly every State in the Union." Id. at 4382.
In reply to a House resolution calling for information regarding the use of the mails
for lottery purposes, the Postmaster General reported the existence of over 100 lottery
schemes. See H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 22, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1880).
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Pressure on Congress to take further action against lotteries
mounted over the next decade. Scores of petitions begged for con-
gressional eradication of the Louisiana Lottery, by then dubbed the
"Serpent."52 Countless bills were introduced, but most died in
committee.53 In a special appeal to Congress, President Benjamin
Harrison urged that without federal aid the states were powerless
to control the lotteries:
If the baneful effects of the lotteries were confined to the States
that give the companies corporate powers and a license to con-
duct the business, the citizens of other States, being powerless to
apply legal remedies, might clear themselves of responsibility by
32 J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 268.
53 Approximately ten bills a year concerning lotteries were read and sent to committee
from the 48th to 51st Congresses. One such bill was H.R. 5933, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1888), which would have prohibited the advertisement of lottery tickets in the District of
Columbia. Debate concerning H.R. 5933 typified the arguments and divisions of Congress
during this period. See 19 CONG. REc. 1153-61 (1888). The bill's opponents relied upon Ex
parle Jackson to show that the first and fourth amendments imposed restrictions upon
Congress with regard to lottery regulation. See id. at 1155 (remarks of Rep. Rogers). They
further argued:
What is the Louisiana lottery? It is an institution authorized, organized, and
created by the organic law of a sovereign State of this Union. It is a legal institu-
tion in so far as the State of Louisiana can make it so, as completely as any institu-
tion chartered by any State in this broad land. Now, my friend from Illinois [Rep.
Cannon] knows that in so far as we can exercise this power in reference to the
Louisiana lottery we can equally exercise it with reference to any banking institu-
tion chartered in the State of Louisiana or elsewhere. Now, I wish to ask my
friend this question: If we can say to this lottery company, a chartered institution,
bearing the stamp and impress of the authority of a State law-nay, of the con-
stitution of one of the States of this Union---"Your advertisement shall not be
published in any newspaper issued in the District of Columbia," why can we not
say to some banking corporation authorized in the State of Louisiana, or if you
choose, in the District of Columbia, "You shall not receive the moneys of this
lottery company as deposits in your vaults?"
Id. at 1157 (remarks of Rep. Compton). Proponents of the bill often argued emotionally,
denying that the bill would violate constitutional guarantees:
I know it will be insisted that the provisions of the bill will be an abridgment
of the "freedom of the press;" but, Mr. Speaker, it will not abridge any "freedom of
the press" to do right or to publish whatever may promote the good of mankind.
It is not designed to take away any proper or legitimate right of the press, but
only to restrain and prohibit all license to perpetrate a wrong by enticing the
young and unsuspecting into habits that will lead them into ruin, as has heretofore
been done in many instances. Some of the blackest deeds in the catalogue of
crimes have been committed under the plea of liberty. On the way to the guil-
lotine Madame Roland, sic] exclaimed, "0 Liberty! Liberty! what crimes are com-
mitted in thy name."
Id. at 1156 (remarks of Rep. Glass). The House referred the bill to the Committee on the
Judiciary by a vote of 119 to 113, with 91 not voting. Id. at 1161.
Some antilottery proposals did succeed. In 1878, Congress eliminated the sale of lot-
tery tickets in the District of Columbia. See Act of Apr. 29, 1878, ch. 68, 20 Stat. 39.
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the use of such moral agencies as were within their reach. But
the case is not so. The people of all the States are debauched and
defrauded. The vast sums of money offered to the States for
charters are drawn from the people of the United States, and the
General Government through its mail system is made the effec-
tive and profitable medium of intercourse between the lottery
company and its victims. . . . The use of the mails by these
companies is a prostitution of an agency only intended to serve
the purpose of a legitimate trade and a decent social inter-
course.
54
C. Lottery Statutes of the 1890's
1. Tightening Antimailing Restraints
The President's urgent request provided the impetus for new
legislation to eliminate the Louisiana Lottery. In 1890, Congress
banned from the mails newspapers that contained lottery adver-
tisements, 55 a move it had long contemplated.5 6 The new legislation
broadened the definition of prohibited matter, and specifically au-
54 Special Message to Congress from President Harrison (July 29, 1890), reprinted in 9
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 80-81 (J.
Richardson ed. 1894) [hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON]. The President had earlier re-
quested new antilottery legislation. See First Annual Message to Congress by President Harri-
son, reprinted in 9 RICHARDSON, supra, at 44. Harrison's messages reflected the concern of
Postmaster General John Wanamaker. In his 1889 annual report, Wanamaker had de-
scribed the ineffectiveness of existing federal law in dealing with the Louisiana Lottery. See
REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, pt. 4, 51st Cong., Ist Sess.
39-41 (1889). Wanamaker also wrote, in a special report, that the "entire Post-Office De-
partment is in point of fact the principal agent of the Louisiana State Lottery Company." S.
EXEC. Doc. No. 196, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1889).
Harrison's role in the battle against the lotteries was ironic. The antilottery movement
had begun as a Democratic attack against state-created privilege; it was now ending as a
Republican attack against corruption that would have to overcome states' rights objections.
5 5 See Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465. The Act provided in pertinent
part:
[N]or shall any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any kind contain-
ing any advertisement of any lottery or gift enterprise of any kind offering prizes
dependent upon lot or chance, or containing any list of prizes awarded at the
drawings of any such lottery or gift enterprise, whether said list is of any part or
of all of the drawing, be carried in the mail or delivered by any postmaster or
letter-carrier.
Id. In 1888, Congress considered a similar provision for the District of Columbia. See note
53 supra.
56See S. REP. No. 1579, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890); H.R. REP. No. 787, 50th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1888); H.R. REP. No. 2678, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886); S. REP. No. 11, 49th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1886); H.R. REP. No. 826, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884); S. REP. No. 233,
48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884).
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thorized postal authorities to refuse to deliver registered letters
suspected of being lottery-related. 57
The 1890 Act culminated fifteen years of congressional debate
over a recurring issue of federalism. 58 Advocates of the bill con-
tended that more than Louisiana's rights were at issue; the rights of
the other states were also involved. Because federal control of the
mails precluded the other states from caging the Louisiana Lot-
tery59 only Congress could "crush this hydra-headed monster,
'7See Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 2, 26 Stat. 465. The Act empowered the Post-
master General to return to the senders all registered mail addressed to any person or
company (or agent of same) suspected of conducting a lottery. Although he could not open
letters, the Postmaster General could ground his suspicions on any "evidence satisfactory to
him." Id.
"The Minority Report issued in connection with S. 1017, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884),
a bill analogous to that enacted in 1890, cogently framed the issue:
Assuming that the States are competent to protect the morals of their people
against the corrupting and injurious effects of lotteries and lottery advertisements,
and that the duty to furnish such protection rests with them, this bill presents the
grave question as to how far Congress may legitimately go in exercising unques-
tionable powers for the accomplishment of objects and purposes that do not come law-
fully within its jurisdiction. In other words, can Congress properly regulate the
mail service of the country, under its authority "to establish post-offices and post-
roads,"for the purpose of preventing the circulation of newspapers containing lot-
tery advertisements and the suppression of lotteries?
S. REP. No. 233, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1884) (emphasis in original). After references
to Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), the framers of the Constitution, Calhoun, Webster,
and other luminaries, the Minority Report concluded that: "The present bill is a long depar-
ture from the conservative opinions entertained and acted upon by the great statesmen of
1836. If not unconstitutional it embodies a principle and policy of a most dangerous
character and tendency. ... S. REP. No. 233, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1884). Quoting
Jackson, the Minority Report directly addressed the freedom of the press issue:
Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom [freedom of the press] as liberty
of publishing; indeed, without the circulation the publication would be of little value. [Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (emphasis added by Minority Report).]
... The freedom of circulation by the ordinary channels of communication is
the very essence of the press's freedom .... Deny to the press the right to circulate
through the mails and over post-routes, which now include all public highways,
railroads, and navigable streams (unless sent as merchandise), and the guarantee
thrown around its freedom by the Constitution is worthless.
Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
'9 The States are powerless to extirpate the Louisiana lottery. They are powerless
even to protect themselves from its insidious brigandage. They have exhausted
their resources. The mails, the national banks, and the channels of interstate
transportation are controlled by the national authority and by national authority
alone. The national Congress and the national Executive are alone equal to the
overthrow of this pestilent corporation, which has become the richest, the most
audacious, and the most powerful gambling institution that the world has ever
known.
21 CONG,. REC. 8706 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Moore) (concerning H.R. 11569, 51st Cong.,
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which is demoralizing the young, the poor, and the needy through-
out the country, as no other institution in America has ever done. 60
The 1890 Act broke the back of the Louisiana Lottery. "A
fearless man was appointed postmaster in New Orleans and
thousands of pieces of mail were seized and immense masses of
evidence collected. 61 Business at the New Orleans post office de-
creased by one-third. 2 In 1892, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act in In re Rapier:63
We cannot regard the right to operate a lottery as a funda-
mental right infringed by the legislation in question; nor are we
able to see that Congress can be held, in its enactment, to have
abridged the freedom of the press. The circulation of newspa-
pers is not prohibited, but the government declines itself to be-
come an agent in the circulation of printed matter which it re-
gards as injurious to the people.64
2. Regulation Beyond the Mails: Legislation
Under the Commerce Clause
Congress struck at lotteries once again in 1895. Reaching be-
yond its postal authority to its powers under the commerce
1st Sess. (1890)). In general, the House debates over the 1890 legislation reiterated earlier
arguments. See id. at 8698-721.60 Id. at 8705 (remarks of Rep. Moore). Representative Hays responded in vain, with a
federalism argument:
[I]f Congress, in its supremacy, can indirectly undermine, discriminate against,
and in effect destroy the legislation of the States in matters exclusively reserved to
the States, our system is destroyed, the rights of the States under their reserved
powers practically ended, and the Government is centralized, with the States mere
figure-heads. To apply it: If a State, for purposes of revenue or from policy,
desires to establish, tolerate, or legalize lotteries, which it has an undenied and
undoubted authority to do, and which is a matter over which Congress has no
earthly concern, and then Congress can, by indirection, through the exercise of
another power, practically nullify and invalidate this action and make criminals of
those within that State that do the customary and essential acts to its existence and
prosperity according to its design and the law of the State, then the State might as
well go out of business and cease to exist.
Id. at 8703 (Minority Report of Rep. Hays).
61 J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 263-64.
6 2 See REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, pt. 4, 51st Cong.,
2d Sess. 14-15 (1890). The following year, the Postmaster General reported increased convic-
tions under the lottery statutes. See REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL, H.R. EXEC. Doc.
No. 1, pt. 4, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1891). The new statutes also drew accolades from the
press. Of 2,259 editorials in 850 newspapers, 2,172 opposed the use of the mails by lottery
companies and 87 favored such use. Id. at 22.
63 143 U.S. 110 (1892).64 1d. at 134.
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clause, 65 Congress outlawed the importation and interstate carriage
of lottery-related materials. 66 The catalyst for the new legislation
was, once again, the Louisiana Lottery. Wounded by the 1890 Act
and having finally lost its state charter,67 the "Serpent" had regen-
erated in Honduras in an attempt to operate without using the
United States mails. 68
The Supreme Court heard oral argument three times before
sustaining the constitutionality of the 1895 law by a five to four
majority in Champion v. Ames. 69 Although petitioner argued that the
65 "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
66See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 28 Star. 963 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1301 (1976)). Sections 2 and 3 of the 1895 legislation integrated the new changes into prior
federal antilottery statutes. Section 4 permitted postal officials to refuse to deliver any mail,
including ordinary letters, relating to lotteries.
Representative Broderick explained the need for additional legislation:
Mr. Speaker, in 1890 Congress forebade the use of the United States mails to
companies and individuals for the purpose of advertising lottery schemes. That
law has been evaded by using for such purposes the express, and it has been
deemed necessary to amend the law so as to prohibit carrying in any way matter
intended to advertise lotteries . . . . This bill has been commended by the Post-
Office Department. The law as it exists has given the Department much trouble
. . [An excerpt from the Postmaster General's most recent report was read,
urging that a bill such as the one under consideration would "strike at the root of
this great evil and eradicate it."]
A few years ago we had but one lottery in the United States. Public sentiment
was aroused against it. When the institution was driven out by the legislation of
the Congress and by the States it was reorganized in the territory of Honduras,
and has been operating from that territory throughout the States of the Union, so
that to-day, instead of having one lottery, as we had a few years ago, we have a
number. This lottery business has grown to such an extent that it has shocked the
moral sense of the people of the entire country, and it ought to be suppressed.
27 CONG. REC. 3013 (1895) (remarks of Rep. Broderick).
67 See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 267.
6See 27 CONG. REC. 3013 (1895) (remarks of Rep. Broderick); 26 CONG. REc. 2356
(1894). In attempting to eradicate the Louisiana Lottery, Congress also affected charitable
lotteries despite an intention to avoid doing so:
I have not the slightest objection to confining it to the lottery business, but to
provide that the offering of prizes shall be a penal offense at innocent church
fairs and other little enterprises of that sort, it seems to me, is going beyond what
we ought to attempt.
Id. at 4313 (remarks of Senator Gorman). The problem lay in the broad language of the
statute.
69 188 U.S. 321 (1903). Champion was first argued in early 1901 and then was joined
with Francis v. Ames, 188 U.S. 375 (1903), for reargument in October 1901 and again in
December 1902. In Francis, Justice Holmes found that the definition of lottery materials in
the 1895 provisions did not encompass the operator's records of numbers chosen by lottery
customers. See notes 82-86 and accompanying text infra. The ultimate 5 to 4 decision in
Champion coupled with the restrictive decision in Francis shows that the 1895 provisions
troubled the Court.
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statute infringed upon powers reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment,70 the Court emphasized the commerce clause and
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.71 Justice Har-
lan dismissed the tenth amendment issue because "the power to
regulate commerce among the States has been expressly delegated
to Congress. 72 Although the propriety of the statute was not for
the courts to determine, its constitutionality was clear:
If the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another be
interstate commerce, and if Congress is of opinion that an effec-
tive regulation for the suppression of lotteries, carried on
through such commerce, is to make it a criminal offence to cause
lottery tickets to be carried from one State to another, we know
of no authority in the courts to hold that the means thus devised
are not appropriate and necessary to protect the country at large
against a species of interstate commerce which, although in gen-
eral use and somewhat favored in both national and state legisla-
tion in the early history of the country, has grown into disrepute
and has become offensive to the entire people of the Nation. It is
a kind of traffic which no one can be entitled to pursue as of
right. 7 3
Irony characterizes the history of gambling law. At the outset,
Chief Justice Marshall's expansive opinion in Dartmouth College
stalled reform. It took a revolution in constitutional thinking,
touched off by Chief Justice Taney in Charles River Bridge, to re-
store power to state legislatures. Ultimately, however, the end of
the state-chartered lottery systems was made possible through an
expansive reading of the Constitution. That reading came in
Champion, ironically rooted in Marshall's own opinion in Gibbons.
70 188 U.S. at 330-32. Champion sought habeas corpus relief from a conviction under
the 1895 statute. Id. at 325.
71 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Writing for the Court in Champion, Justice Harlan
quoted extensively from Gibbons:
[The commerce power] is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule
by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.
188 U.S. at 347 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 9 (emphasis added in
Champion)).
72 188 U.S. at 357.
73 1d. at 358. The dissenters argued that the tenth amendment prohibited the congres-
sional action and that the "scope of the commerce clause of the Constitution cannot be
enlarged because of present views of public interest." Id. at 372 (dissenting opinion, Fuller,
C.J.).
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The Court created a federal police power where none existed be-
fore. First, federal power grew, and stood in the way; then federal
power shrank, and stood aside; finally, federal power grew, and
fought the last battle itself.7 4
D. Modern Reforms of Federal Lottery Laws
The antilottery acts of the nineteenth century remain part of
the federal law of gambling. They have, however, required sup-
plementation and amendment to overcome narrow judicial con-
struction and to accommodate changing state gambling policies.
The provisions authorizing specific actions by postal authorities for
suspected violations of the antilottery measures are found today
in 39 U.S.C. § 3005. 5 The 1890 Act prohibiting the mailing of
lottery-related materials is now 18 U.S.C. § 1302,6 while the 1895
Act forbidding the importation and transportation of lottery mate-
rials is 18 U.S.C. § 1301. 77
1. Overcoming Narrow Judicial Construction
The definition of prohibited matter in section 1302 is broader
than that in section 1301 because at the time of its enactment
Congress had greater confidence in its power to regulate what
could be sent through the mails than what could pass through
74 Many interests that first expressed support for Dartmouth College, and then voiced
alarm at Charles River Bridge, now expressed concern with Champion. 3 C. WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 457-60 (1922). A report to the American Bar
Association in 1917 characterized Champion as
the Pandora's box from which burst forth with amazing speed and ever-increas-
ing velocity the tendency to federalize and centralize, beyond the dreams of Alex-
ander Hamilton, a government whose centripetal forces had already been too
greatly strengthened as a result of the Civil War. It was the beginning of that
steady, unending, unceasing movement in Congress to stretch far beyond its real
meaning and far beyond what any fair construction, however liberal, warranted
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. This movement has progressed so
steadily, has been pressed so persistently, and has gone so far that it threatens to
utterly annihilate our dual system of government, to utterly destroy the police
powers of the several States, and finally to be about to deprive our people of the
inestimable blessings of local self-government, unless it be checked speedily and
sharply.
3 C. WARREN, supra, at 460 (quoting Hardwick, The Regulation of Commerce Between the States






interstate commerce.7 8 Both sections have been narrowly construed
by the courts.
France v. United States,79 decided in 1897, involved a lottery
operation headquartered in Covington, Kentucky. The lottery's
agents in Cincinnati, just across the Ohio River, solicited bets in
Ohio and carried individual slips of paper bearing the selected
numbers over the bridge to Kentucky each day. After the numbers
were drawn, messengers returned to Ohio with payoffs and lists of
the successful combinations. Federal agents arrested several mes-
sengers enroute to Ohio with payoffs. The messengers were in-
dicted for conspiring to violate the predecessor of section 1301,
which prohibited interstate transportation of "any paper, certifi-
cate, or instrument purporting to be or represent a ticket, chance,
share, or interest in or dependent upon the event of a lottery. ' 0
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that the
statute applied only to future lotteries and thus allowed interstate
carriage of materials relating to a drawing that had already oc-
curred .8
The Supreme Court again construed the wording of the stat-
ute in 1903, in Francis v. United States,8 2 decided concurrently with
Champion v. Ames. 83 Francis involved a factual situation almost iden-
tical to that in France. The operator of an Ohio lottery business was
convicted for conspiring with his Kentucky agents to transport bet-
ting slips from Kentucky across the river to Ohio. Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court, distinguished the carriage of lottery mate-
rials between states by individuals from the sending of such mate-
rials across state lines through a commercial carrier.8 4 When
carried by the agents of a company, as in this case, the tickets
circulated internally and remained within the lottery company's
possession. Justice Holmes suggested that, without a change of pos-
session, such conveyance did not constitute commerce, even though
it aided a business. The conviction, however, was reversed on a
separate ground. The Court narrowly construed the word "repre-
Is See United States v. McGuire, 64 F.2d 485, 496-97 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion,
Manton, J.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 645 (1933).
79 164 U.S. 676 (1897).
80 Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963.
8' 164 U.S. at 681-82. "Although the objection is a narrow one, yet the statute being
highly penal, rendering its violator liable to fine and imprisonment, we are compelled to
construe it strictly." Id. at 682-83.
82 188 U.S. 375 (1903).
83 188 U.S. 321 (1903). See note 64 supra.
84 Francis v. United States, 188 U.S. at 377.
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sent" in the statute,8 5 holding that the agent's records of the num-
bers individual bettors had chosen were not encompassed by the
statute: "They as little represented the purchasers' chances, as the
stubs in a check book represent the sums coming to the payees of
the checks." 6
The Supreme Court did not reconsider the predecessors of
sections 1301 or 1302 for nearly fifty years, leaving the decisions in
France and Francis to guide the lower courts. Subsequent lower
court cases applying the sections followed the established pat-
terns. In 1952, the Supreme Court relied heavily on France and
Francis in dismissing an indictment brought under section 1302
against one who had mailed materials pertaining to a proposed
lottery venture. 88 The Court held that section 1302 only applied to
existing, rather than hypothetical, lottery enterprises. 89
In 1961, as part of a general effort to combat organized crime,
Congress responded to the narrow constructions given sections
1301 and 1302 by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1953.90 Section 1953 covers
a broader range of materials than section 1301 in its prohibi-
tion against interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia. 91
8 5 Id.
86 Id. at 378.
'7 Among the cases that overturned substantive convictions by relying on France and
Francis and construing the antilottery statutes narrowly were: United States v. McGuire, 64
F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 645 (1933); United States v. Wade, 59 F.2d 831
(S.D. Tex. 1932); United States v. Whelpley, 125 F. 616 (W.D. Va. 1903). Even where a
conviction was obtained under § 1301, France and Francis required distinguishing at length.
See, e.g., United States v. Bianco, 103 F. Supp. 867, 870-72 (W.D. Pa. 1952). The standard
of narrow construction established in France and Francis has, however, been questioned in
United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 269 (1966).
86 United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277 (1952). Subsequent court decisions continued
to employ strict construction. See United States v. Sanderlin, 199 F. Supp. 116, 117 (E.D.
Va. 1961). Cf United States v. Bergland, .209 F. Supp. 547, 549-50 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (reli-
ance on France misplaced with respect to the construction of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952 (1976)),
rev'd on other grounds, 318 F.2d 159 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 861 (1963).
" United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277, 280 (1952).
9 0 See Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-218, § 1, 75 Stat. 492 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1976)). The legislative history of § 1953 clearly demonstrates that Con-
gress intended it to supplement § 1301. See note 202 and accompanying text infra.
91 Section 1953 prohibits interstate transportation of "any record, paraphernalia, tick-
et, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or other device used, or to be used, or
adapted, devised, or designed for use in (a) bookmaking; or (b) wagering pools with re-
spect to a sporting event; or (c) in a numbers, policy, bolita, or similar game." 18 U.S.C. §
1953(a) (1976).
Although § 1953(a) fails to mention lotteries expressly, the section's legislative history
indicates that it should be applied to lottery-related materials. See note 202 infra; cf. United
States v. Baker, 364 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1966) (applying § 1953 to lottery without reference
to legislative history).
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Congress also tightened the language of section 1302,92 to exclude
from the mails, even when travelling intrastate, "[a]ny article de-
scribed in section 1953." 93
2. Extension to the Broadcast Media
Congress enacted the federal prohibition against the broad-
casting of lottery-related information, 18 U.S.C. § 1304, as part of
the Communications Act of 1934, 94 two years after an almost iden-
tical provision had suffered a pocket veto. 95 Proponents of the
enactment advanced two principal justifications: (1) to promote
consistency with the antilottery postal statutes, and (2) to remove
any competitive advantage radio stations might have over news-
papers as a result of the postal and interstate commerce prohibi-
tions of lottery-related materials. 96
Although no prosecution has been brought under section
1304, it has undergone considerable administrative and judi-
cial interpetation in connection with the licensing procedures of
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC has is-
sued administrative decisions under section 1304, for example,
disapproving of "give-away" programs sponsored or advertised
by radio and television stations.9" In FCC v. American Broadcasting
9 2 See Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-218, § 2, 75 Stat. 492.
93 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
94 Ch. 652, § 316, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976)).
9' See H.R. 7716, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). Part of a bill to amend the Radio Act of
1927, then the principal federal statute regulating broadcasting, the antilottery measure
apparently sparked little controversy. For discussion of the bill see H.R. REP. No. 2106,
72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) (Conf. Rep.). The bill passed both Houses of Congress and
went to the President in 1933 (76 CONG. REC. 5397 (1933)), who exercised a pocket veto.
Congress incorporated a similar provision into the Communications Act of 1934 as § 316.
See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 10988 (1934). Approved
by the Senate (see id. at 10912) and the House (see id. at 10995), the legislation received the
approval of the President.
96 The committee does not think that the United States should permit any radio
station, licensed and regulated by the Government, to engage in such unlawful
practices.
Furthermore, the broadcast of such information is unfair to the newspapers,
which are forbidden the use of the mails, if they contain such information.
H.R. REP. No. 221, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932). For a comparison of the postal and
broadcasting antilottery statutes see Haley, The Broadcasting and Postal Lottery Statutes, 4 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 475 (1936).
'7 The first case to treat a giveaway scheme as a lottery under § 1304 was WRBL Radio
Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687 (1937). In review of a license renewal request the FCC charac-
terized as lotteries several advertisement campaigns broadcast by the station. The Commis-
sion found that the advertisements possessed the three elements essential to a lottery:
chance, a prize, and consideration. The FCC has continued to pursue giveaways (see, e.g.,
Metromedia, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 1075 (1976)), finding liability only where the elements of
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Co.,98 the three major television networks sued to vindicate their ex-
tensive broadcasting of "give-away" programs. The Supreme Court
upheld a lower court determination that the FCC's regulations were
overbroad. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, held that
"the Commission's power ... is limited by the scope of the stat-
ute,"9 9 and that a prohibited lottery. must involve "chance," "a
prize," and "consideration."'10 0 The Court found no considera-
tion for the "give-aways."'' 1 The FCC, however, continued to in-
lotteries are present (see id. at 1079-81; cf. Greater Indianapolis Broadcasting Co., 44
F.C.C.2d 37 (1973) (no liability without presence of consideration)).
The FCC possesses varied administrative remedies. The Commission may refuse to
renew operating licenses when facilities are not operated in the "public interest." Cf., e.g.,
Action Radio, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 803 (1975) (contested license renewed despite lottery viola-
tion because of beneficial public broadcasting). Lottery violations may enter into the re-
newal calculus. See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Broadcasting, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 558 (1976). The
FCC "may revoke any station license or construction permit" (47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6)
(Supp. V 1975)), issue cease and desist orders (id. § 312(b) (1970)), and impose forfeitures
of up to $1,000 for each day of an infraction (id. § 503(b)(1)(E); see, e.g., Metromedia, Inc.,
60 F.C.C.2d 1075 (1976) (6 stations fined between $2,000 and $3,000 apiece for § 1304
violations)). The Commission may also promulgate declaratory orders (5 U.S.C. § 554(e)
(1976)), and regulations (47 U.S.C. § 303(f), (r) (1970)).
The FCC has published regulations relating to lotteries:
(a) No licensee of an AM, FM or television broadcast station, except as in
paragraph (c) of this section, shall broadcast any advertisement of or information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes depen-
dent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or
awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise or scheme, whether said list
contains any part or all of such prizes. (18 U.S.C. § 1304, 62 Stat. 763).
47 C.F.R. § 73.1211(a) (1977). A similar regulation extends to stations originating cable
television transmissions. See id. § 76.213(a). Both provisions contain exemptions for state-
conducted lotteries. See id. §§ 73.1211 (c), 76.213(c).
98 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
'9 Id. at 290. The regulations in question were much broader than those now in force.
See id. at 288-89.
1°Id. at 290.
101 To be eligible for a prize on the "give-away" programs involved here, not a
single home contestant is required to purchase anything or pay an admission price
or leave his home to visit the promoter's place of business; the only effort re-
quired for participation is listening.
We believe that it would be stretching the statute to the breaking point to give
it an interpretation that would make such programs a crime.
Id. at 294 (footnote omitted).
The court adopted a traditional definition of lottery by requiring "chance," "prize,"
and "consideration." See, e.g., Hull v. Ruggles, 56 N.Y. 424 (1874); People v. Payne, 3
Denio 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846). But see ROYAL COMMISSION ON LOTTERIES AND BETTING,
FINAL REPORT, CMD. No. 4341, at 4 (1933) ("a distribution of prizes by lot or chance"). The
general prohibitions of lotteries found in state law often incorporate the broad, traditional
definition. Thus, the Jacksonian antilottery provisions not only catch 19th century, large-
scale lotteries in their net, but also, unintentionally, snare 20th century, small-scale com-
mercial "lotteries" such as church raffles and bank nights. Courts must resort to contorted
reasoning to limit the general prohibitions to their intended scope. See, e.g., State v. Eames,
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terpret section 1304 broadly,' 0 2 and has developed a full body of
law on consideration 0 3 and on the state of mind required by the
statute.'
0 4
The most significant cases to arise under section 1304 have
involved state-operated lotteries. Soon after the New York State
Lottery began operating in 1967, the FCC ruled in a declaratory
judgment that section 1304 applied to state-operated lotteries. 0 5
Consequently, it barred all lottery-related announcements other
than ordinary news reports, public debates, and station editori-
als.' 0 6 Broadcasters challenged the interpretation on first amend-
ment grounds, but the Second Circuit rejected their constitutional
attack in New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States.'0 7 Never-
theless, the court construed the statute narrowly, holding that it
barred only the broadcasting of information that "directly pro-
87 N.H. 477, 183 A. 590 (1936) (no consideration present in "Bank Night"; information
quashed). Cf. State v. Doran, 124 Conn. 160, 198 A. 573 (1938) ("Bank Night" violates
statutes drawn more broadly than definition of lottery; no consideration present). See gen-
erally DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 100-02.
102 The D.C. Circuit restricted an FCC holding in Caples Co. v. United States, 243
F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The FCC had found that a television program based on bingo
was a lottery, distinguishing American Broadcasting because the bingo participant had to
obtain cards from local stores handling the sponsor's products in order to play. The court,
however, held:
The undesirability of this type of programming is not enough to brand those
responsible for it as criminals. Protection of the public interest will have to be
sought by means not pegged so tightly to the criminal statute or in additional
legislative authority.
Id. at 234.
103 See Metromedia, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 1075, 1081-83 (1976); Taft Broadcasting Co., 18
F.C.C.2d 186 (1969); WBRE-TV, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 96 (1969); Concerning Applicability of
Lottery Statute to Contests and Sales Promotions, 18 F.C.C.2d 52 (1969). The most fas-
cinating of these 1969 cases may be United Television Co., 20 F.C.C.2d 278 (1969), in
which a station carrying religious programs was in reality tipping off local residents to
winning numbers by means of carefully selected citations to the Scriptures. See United
Television Co., 55 F.C.C.2d 416 (1975).
104 The FCC has shown little sympathy for station managers arguing lack of knowl-
edge. See Metromedia, Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 1075, 1079-81 (1976); Ohio Quests, Inc., 8
F.C.C.2d 859, 860 (1967). But see Meredith Colon Johnston, 1 F.C.C.2d 720, 724 (1965).
'05 See Broadcasting of Information Concerning Lotteries, 14 F.C.C.2d 707 (1968).
The FCC acted before Congress enacted an exemption from § 1304 for state-authorized
lotteries (Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1307 (1976))).
'06 "In the category of news, any material broadcast in normal good faith coverage,
which is reasonably related to the audience's right and desire to know and be informed of
the day-to-day happenings within the community is permissible." Broadcasting of Informa-
tion Concerning Lotteries, 14 F.C.C.2d 707, 710 (1968).
? 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970).
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motes" a given lottery,'0 8 and set aside the FCC ruling for lack of
specificity.
In 1972, the Jersey Cape Broadcasting Corp. requested a dec-
laratory ruling from the FCC as to whether a one-sentence an-
nouncement during the Thursday evening news broadcast advising
New Jersey residents of the winning number in the state lottery's
weekly drawing would violate section 1304. The FCC answered in
the affirmative, 10 9 and refused to reconsider. 110 The Third Circuit,
sitting en banc, held that the proposed broadcast was a news item
protected by the first amendment."' The case was argued before
the Supreme Court but resolved by Congress. By enacting 18
U.S.C. § 1307,112 Congress withdrew state-operated lotteries from
the reach of section 1304 and rendered the case moot."13
108 Id. at 999. "[W]e think that the section must be strictly construed to go no further." Id.
at 997. Although "the first amendment does not protect freedom to swindle even though
words may be used to accomplish that result" (id. at 996), the court noted that "[t]he real
point here is that we are not primarily in the realm of ideas at all but are chiefly concerned
with speech closely allied with the putting into effect of prohibited conduct" (id. at 997). The
court considered in detail what could be broadcast. A news item that had the "incidental
effect of promoting a lottery" would not be banned, but if a lottery announcement con-
tained incidental "news," such as the amount to be realized for education, it would never-
theless be prohibited. Id. at 998. The court conceded "that at times the line drawn may be
thin." Id. An "interview by a television reporter with an excited winner" would be a permis-
sible feature. Id. at 999. The Second Circuit also approved of editorial commentary. Id.
The court found that lottery promotions do not convey information on "matters of highest
public interest," and thus fall short of the threshold standard announced in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for full constitutional protection. Id. at 998.
On remand, the FCC issued a more specific declaratory ruling. See Broadcasting of
Information Concerning Lotteries, 21 F.C.C.2d 846 (1970).
'
0
' See Jersey Cape Broadcasting Corp., 30 F.C.C.2d 794 (1971).
"1
0 See Jersey Cape Broadcasting Corp., 36 F.C.C.2d 93 (1972).
'" New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974) (en
banc), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 371 (1975). The Third Circuit held that FCC regulations
under § 1304 that infringed upon the editorial discretion of a broadcaster in selecting news
items constituted an impermissible prior restraint. Id. at 222. "The contention that on
Thursday afternoon the winning number in the New Jersey lottery is not 'news', in a
broadcast context, is simply frivolous." Id. In dicta, the court concluded that the best con-
struction of § 1304 would restrict its application "to promotion of lotteries for which the
licensee receives compensation." Id. at 224. It is doubtful whether the guidelines for per-
missible broadcasts established in New York State Broadcasters Ass'n could have survived the
Third Circuit's expansive interpretation, and it was for this reason the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the New Jersey State Lottery case. See United States v. New Jersey
State Lottery Comm'n, 420 U.S. 371, 373 (1975) (per curiam).
112 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-583, §§ 2-3, 88 Stat. 1916 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1976)). See notes 141-44 and accompanying text infra.
'"'See United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n, 420 U.S. 371, 373 (1975)
(per curiam). Justice Douglas dissented; he believed that significant issues remained with
respect to the application of the new legislation to nonlottery states. In fact, the State of
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3. Concerns of Federalism: Accommodating Changes in State Law
The antilottery policies of the federal and state governments
united in the nineteenth century to purge the nation of the last
vestiges of the corrupt Louisiana Lottery. By the 1960's, however,
the Louisiana Lottery was forgotten. Sentiment in certain states
swung toward decriminalization. These states perceived the lottery
as a relatively harmless and painless means of augmenting state
treasuries. 14 By 1978, fourteen states had authorized lotteries."15
Lottery income in some states has been thought to be substantial,
New Hampshire had been given permission to intervene on these issues, but the Court
refused to consider them in the context of the New Jersey litigation, and remanded the
case to the Third Circuit. Id. at 373-74. Justice Douglas argued that Congress could not
have intended § 1307 to resolve the serious first amendment issues raised by the appeal. Id.
at 374-75. In a footnote he presented the only judicial analysis to date of problems remain-
ing after the enactment of § 1307:
As the State of New Hampshire points out, the new § 1307 even on its face
does not resolve the claims of all parties to this action. New Hampshire, which was
granted leave to intervene in the Court of Appeals, conducts a lottery; neighbor-
ing Vermont does not. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), upon
which the Court relies, applies only to broadcasts by a station in the State which
conducts the lottery, or in an adjacent State which also conducts a lottery; pre-
sumably, then, § 1304 remains applicable to a Vermont radio station which desires
to broadcast information concerning the New Hampshire lottery. The restraint
imposed by § 1304 will thus continue to inhibit the New Hampshire lottery with
respect to certain groups of prospective participants, including New Hampshire
residents who listen to Vermont radio stations and Vermont residents who might
wish to cross the state line and participate.
Id. at 375 n.* See also note 129 infra.
114 In 1963, New Hampshire became the first state in modern times to establish a
lottery to raise revenue. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 284:21-a to -t (1977). From its earliest
history, New Hampshire seems to have taken the Devil somewhat less seriously than its
Puritan neighbor to the south. Not that New Hampshire was noticeably less devout than
the Bay Colony. Indeed, for almost two centuries Congregationalism was for all practical
purposes the established religion. But by 1819, it was no longer dominant politically. Post-
civil war immigration of Roman Catholics further diluted traditional antigambling senti-
ment, whether rooted in religion or attitudes reflected in Jacksonian democratic tenets. By
1960, too, the state's population was 58.3% urban and only 3% were actively employed in
agriculture. The image of a New Hampshire dominated by rugged Yankee farmers is,
therefore, illusory. These demographic changes combined with New Hampshire's peculiar
state constitution, which had not been amended in the Jacksonian years, to set the stage for
the first modern return to the lottery. New Hampshire's constitution, the oldest in the
nation save only that of Massachusetts on which it is based, forbids the levying of a pro-
gressive income tax. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 6. The rule was inflexible as well, because until
a 1964 amendment only a constitutional convention could alter the basic charter. To avoid
excessive taxation on real property, New Hampshire has had to rely heavily on "sin taxes."
In 1963, these legal, political, and social forces produced the first modern state-run lottery.
See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 116 n.2.
115 See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1978-1979, at
73 (1978).
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but it has always been small relative to the entire budget.116 The
state-conducted lotteries of modern years have been thought effi-
cient and corruption-proof because they are computerized. Indeed,
the modern lotteries bear little apparent resemblance to their
exploitive nineteenth century ancestors." 7 Nevertheless, it can be
argued that they rest on governmental policies of unproven wis-
dom." 8
Decriminalization of lotteries in more than one-quarter of the
states has posed difficulties for those states and for the federal
government. Federal laws, originally enacted to complement states'
antilottery efforts, at first hobbled the new state-lottery operations.
The federal laws limited the ability of state-operated lotteries to
advertise,"19 and to purchase and distribute lottery-related mate-
1"6 See, e.g., Lottery Termed Bad Bet and Poor State Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1974, at
33, col. 7. After careful study of state decriminalization efforts, the Task Force on
Legalized Gambling
found no justification for the highly publicized assertions of a number of state
government officials that legalized gambling will be an important new source of
substantial revenue for state treasuries. We have determined that neither the early
financial returns from the lotteries and from off-track betting nor the economics
of the illegal gambling industry support the optimistic assumptions that are now so
widespread. Even allowing for a wide margin of error and for differences in the
volume of activity from one state to another, the Task Force is convinced that total
revenues from comprehensive legalization of gambling would make only a rela-
tively small contribution to state treasuries.
TASK FORCE ON LEGALIZED GAMBLING, EASY MONEY 6 (1974) (emphasis deleted) [hereinaf-
ter cited as EASY MONEY].
117 But Ezell concludes:
[I]f history teaches anything, a study of over thirteen hundred legal lotteries held
in the United States proves these things: they cost more than they brought in if
their total impact on society is reckoned; and that one hundred and sixty years'
experience indicates clearly that the most careful supervision cannot eradicate the
inevitable abuses in a system particularly susceptible to fraud.
J. EZELL, supra note 9, at 280-81 (footnote omitted).
118 For in depth analysis of the various policy considerations see DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 9, at 678-734. The ultimate judgment is unfavorable. As presently operated, modern
state-conducted lotteries not only raise relatively insignificant amounts of revenue ineffi-
ciently but also draw funds from those who can least afford to part with them. In addition,
state-conducted lotteries have produced new bureaucracies, staffed through political pa-
tronage, that are unresponsive to the demands of the law, and that have stimulated par-
ticipation in lotteries through deceptive techniques. Lastly, state-conducted lotteries have
not displaced their illegal counterparts. Arguably, instead of fighting organized crime,
state-conducted lotteries threaten to tarnish the image of government. While the twentieth
century lotteries have not been characterized by nineteenth-century-type corruption, twen-
tieth century forms of corruption abound. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 719-20.
119 Advertisements pertaining to lotteries could not be mailed (18 U.S.C. § 1302
(1976)); broadcasted (id. § 1304); or lawfully transported in interstate commerce (id. §
1301).
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rials.120 Despite their attempts to navigate the federal straits, state
lotteries frequently appeared to violate federal laws. Open conflict
seemed unavoidable in late 1974 when the Department of Justice
threatened to prosecute several states for federal crimes. 121
The impending prosecution of states operating lotteries jolted
Congress into action. Having considered similar proposals for sev-
eral years,'122 Congress quickly exempted state-operated lotteries
from the federal laws. 123 The new legislation effected two major
changes in the federal law of gambling. First, it added 18 U.S.C.
§ 1307, circumscribing sections 1301-1304 with respect to state-
operated lotteries. 124 Second, the new law amended section 1953,
120 Congress had prohibited interstate transportation of lottery-related materials (18
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302, 1304, 1953 (1976)) as well as use of wire communications (id. § 1084)
and travel in interstate commerce involving lotteries (id. § 1952).
In 1967, Congress amended the federal banking laws to restrict the role of federally-
chartered or -insured banks with respect to lotteries. See 12 U.S.C. § 25a, 339, 1730c,
1829a (1976). See generally notes 289-95 and accompanying text infra.
121 On August 30, 1974, Attorney General Saxbe sent a telegram to the governor of
each state that conducted a lottery warning that "[slerious questions have arisen concern-
ing the legality of the lottery that is being conducted in your state," and that "[t]here is a
distinct possibility that there are violations of the criminal provisions of the Federal code."
Saxbe Threatens Suit to Shut Down State Lotteries, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1974, at 1, col. 1. In
September 1974, however, Saxbe announced a 90-day moratorium on federal prosecution
under the antilottery statutes in order to allow Congress the opportunity to amend the
provisions. Lotteries Get 90-Day Reprieve, Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 1974, at I, col. 8.
State-conducted lotteries have also come into conflict with private interests. See, e.g.,
National Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977). National
Football League reviewed an attempt by the Delaware lottery to transform itself into a foot-
ball pool without legislative authorization.
122 In 1971, Representative Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in-
troduced H.R. 2374, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which would have exempted state-
conducted lotteries from federal gambling laws. He held hearings on the measure on Oc-
tober 13, 1971. In 1973, Representative Rodino introduced H.R. 6668, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) and held hearings on that measure on April 24, 1974. Senator Hart introduced a
parallel bill, S. 544, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). These bills ultimately became law. See Act
of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916.
123 See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916.
124 See id. §§ 2-3 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1976)). Section 1307 currently
provides:
(a) The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304 shall not apply to
an advertisement, list of prizes, or information concerning a lottery conducted by
a State acting under the authority of State law-
(1) contained in a newspaper published in that State or in an adjacent
State which conducts such a lottery, or
(2) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that
State or an adjacent State which conducts such a lottery.
(b) The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, and 1303 shall not apply to the
transportation or mailing to addresses within a State of tickets and other material
concerning a lottery conducted by that State acting under authority of State law.
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exempting materials related to state lotteries from that section's
prohibition against interstate transportation of gambling parapher-
nalia.' 2 5 The legislative history of the act reveals that Congress
meant to create only limited exemptions for state lotteries; federal
(c) For the purposes of this section "State" means a State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or
possession of the United States.
(d) For the purposes of this section "lottery" means the pooling of proceeds
derived from the sale of tickets or chances and alloting those proceeds or parts
thereof by chance to one or more chance takers or ticket purchasers. "Lottery"
does not include the placing or accepting of bets or wagers on sporting events or
contests.
18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1976).
The law also amended 39 U.S.C. § 3005 to allow the mailing of newspapers containing
advertisements for state-operated lotteries and to allow letters containing lottery materials
to be mailed within states permitting such lotteries. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-583, § 4, 88 Stat. 1916. In 1976, Congress amended § 3005 again (see Act of Oct. 17,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-525, § 2, 90 Stat. 2478) in order to harmonize treatment of the
broadcast and print media (see S. REP. No. 618, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5513). The provision currently reads:
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the mailing of (1) a newspaper of
general circulation containing advertisements, lists of prizes, or information con-
cerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under authority of State law, pub-
lished in that State, or in an adjacent State which conducts such a lottery, or (2)
tickets or other materials concerning such a lottery within that State to addresses
within that State. For the purposes of this subsection, "State" means a State of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
any territory or possession of the United States.
39 U.S.C. § 3005(d) (1976).
Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code provide further indicia of congressional
intent to avoid interfering with state lotteries. See notes 365-69 and accompanying text
infra.
2 See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-583, § 3, 88 Stat. 1916 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1976)). Section 1953 currently provides:
(a) Whoever, except a common carrier in the usual course of its business,
knowingly carries or sends in interstate or foreign commerce any record,
paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or other device
used, or to be used, or adapted, devised, or designed for use in (a) bookmaking;
or (b) wagering pools with respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a numbers, policy,
bolita, or similar game shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years or both.
(b) This section shall not apply to (1) parimutuel betting equipment,
parimutuel tickets where legally acquired, or parimutuel materials used or de-
signed for use at racetracks or other sporting events in connection with which
betting is legal under applicable State law, or (2) the transportation of betting
materials to be used in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event into a
State in which such betting is legal under the statutes of that State, or (3) the
carriage or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of any newspaper or
similar publication, or (4) equipment, tickets, or materials used or designed for use within
a State in a lottery conducted by that State acting under authority of State law.
18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1976) (emphasis added).
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laws would continue to reinforce the policies of nonlottery states. 126
Congress hoped to accommodate the interests of both lottery and
nonlottery states by:
1. Permitting transportation and mailing to addresses within
the particular State conducting the lottery;
2. Permitting the mailing of newspapers published within
the State, notwithstanding lottery promotional or other informa-
tion contained therein concerning a State-run lottery in that
State;
3. Permitting the broadcasting of promotional or other in-
formation concerning a lottery within that State from stations
licensed to a location within that State; and
4. Permitting a State-run lottery to obtain material neces-
sary to conduct its operation from out-of-State sources.127
4. Residual Problems
Because section 1307 attempts to harmonize the discordant
policies of lottery and nonlottery states, 28 it may at times produce
seemingly confused or even illogical results. 129 More worrisome
126 "The purpose of S. 544, as amended, is to amend present Federal provisions relat-
ing to lotteries (18 U.S.C. 1301-1304, 1953; 39 U.S.C. 3005) to accommodate the operation
of legally authorized State-run lotteries consistent with continued Federal protection to the
policies of nonlottery States." S. REP. No. 1404, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). See H.R.
REP. No. 1517, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7007.
127 S. REP. No. 1404, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974). Congress recently amended §
1307(a)(1) and 39 U.S.C. § 3005(d) to harmonize the exemption from lottery prohibitions
granted to newspapers with that granted to radio and television. See Act of Oct. 17, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-525, 90 Stat. 2478.
128 In conjunction with its Report on amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1307 and 39 U.S.C. §
3005, the Senate Judiciary Committee commented:
The Department of Justice in its report on H.R. 1607 stated that it has no
objection to its enactment. The committee, in reporting this act, endorses the De-
partment's statement regarding State-conducted lotteries, as follows:
This Department's position relating to State-conducted lotteries has
always been to object to any erosion of Federal protection to those States
which have determined that lotteries are not in the best interests of their
citizens. This proposed legislation applies only to States which conduct
lotteries and does not upset the balance created by the present law.
S. REP. No. 618, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5513, 5514.
129 A series of hypothetical applications, by no means exhaustive of the possible com-
plexities, best illustrates the operation of § 1307: (1) WBZ Radio, licensed to a location in
Massachusetts, may broadcast advertisements, commentary, and news about the lotteries of
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and New Hampshire, but not about
those of Maine, New Jersey, or Pennsylvania. Broadcast facilities licensed to a location in a
lottery state may broadcast only with respect to the lotteries of that state and adjacent
states. See 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1976); 47 C.F.R. 73.1221(c) (1977). Maine, New Jersey, and
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is the possibility that the literal language of the 1975 legislation
opened in section 1953 a loophole wider than Congress intended.
The Report accompanying the legislation indicated that it would
permit "the transportation of equipment, tickets, or materials used
or designed for use within a State conducting such a lottery under
Pennsylvania do not border Massachusetts. WBZ listeners in Portland, Maine, will hear
advertisements for the lotteries of five states, but federal law prevents them from hearing
from WBZ anything but legitimate news about their own state lottery. (2) A Portsmouth,
New Hampshire television facility, licensed to transmit cable television originating from
New York City, has to filter out lottery advertisements and commentary, unless "technically
infeasible" (47 C.F.R. § 76.213(a)(3) (1977)), that could legally be broadcast from New York
but not from New Hampshire. The cable facility in New Hampshire may broadcast only
New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts lottery information despite having its pro-
gramming source in another state. Its source in New York City, however, could not broad-
cast information concerning Maine's lottery. Perhaps the New Hampshire facility could
interject advertisements for the Maine lottery at each point that it would have to expunge
materials about the New York lottery. From the legislative history accompanying the stat-
ute, it appears that cable television raises some paradoxes not foreseen by Congress. Sub-
sequent FCC regulations (see 47 C.F.R. § 76.213(a) (1977)) have not fully alleviated the
problems. (3) Because the state has no lottery, a Virginia radio or television station, or
newspaper, could not advertise any lotteries at all, even though readers and listeners from
Maryland and Pennsylvania would be interested in information concerning their states'
lotteries and Virginians would have numerous alternative media sources from which to
obtain the same information. Federal law deprives the Virginia media of considerable rev-
enue available to competitors in neighboring states. (4) A person living in Virginia could
not mail a letter containing anything related to any lottery to any address anywhere with-
out violating federal law. Section 1302 prohibits such mailings, and the exemption in §
1307 does not apply. (5) A person living in Massachusetts could mail a letter from his
home to any address within the state concerning any aspect of the Massachusetts lottery,
but he could not mail to an address within the state any materials concerning any other
lottery. Two provisions dictate this result. Section 1307 exempts from §§ 1301-1302 "the
transportation or mailing to addresses within a State of tickets and other material concern-
ing a lottery conducted by that State acting under authority of State law." 18 U.S.C. §
1307(b) (1976). To come within this exemption, the materials must be mailed or sent to a
state that conducts a lottery and the materials so sent must relate to that lottery. Mail
relating to lotteries is exempt from 39 U.S.C. § 3005(a) only if such mail remains at all
times within that state conducting the lottery to which the materials pertain. See 39 U.S.C. §
3005(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Oct. 17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-525, 90
Stat. 2478. (6) A printer in Alexandria, Virginia, could prepare tickets and advertising
circulars for the New Jersey lottery and ship them to New Jersey without violating federal
law. The printer would have to take care not to interrupt the trip to New Jersey by having
the materials stored at another location, and he would also have to guard against misdirect-
ing the New Jersey materials to another state. There is no state of mind requirement as to
result in §§ 1301-1302. One who knowingly sends lottery-related materials in interstate
commerce (having an active appreciation of his actions and the surrounding circumstances)
but who falls outside the § 1307 exemptions could thus violate § 1301 even though he has
no particular result in mind. Previously, this posed no problem because one could not
legally send any lottery-related materials in interstate commerce. One purpose of § 1307
was to allow states conducting lotteries to obtain the necessary materials from beyond their
own borders without violating federal law. Otherwise, in order to operate a lottery, a state
would first have to enter the lottery-material manufacturing business.
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the authority of its State law to addresses within the State."' 30 As
enacted, however, section 1953(b)(4) does not apply only to mate-
rials entering a lottery state; the provision, read literally, exempts
lottery-related material shipped anywhere.131 Consequently, the
exemption leaves only section 1301 to regulate the flow of lottery-
related materials into antilottery states. 132 This result belies the
legislative history of section 1953. Congress enacted section 1953
primarily to rehabilitate the narrowly construed section 1301 as a
restriction on interstate transportation of lottery materials. Con-
gress should amend section 1953 to perfect its intended design. 33
One danger of resurrecting section 1953 is its potential impact
on individuals carrying legally purchased lottery tickets in in-
terstate commerce. The individual holder of a state lottery ticket
would not now violate section 1953 by carrying it across state lines.
But, as discussed in United States v. Fabrizio, ' 34 such a bettor would
have committed a felony under federal law before the recent
amendments. 35 Policy justifications for this harsh result are scant.
... H.R. REP. No. 1517, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7007, 7010 (emphasis added).
131 See 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b)(4) (1976), quoted in note 125 supra.
132 Section 1307, which limits the operation of § 1301, is drafted more clearly. It
exempts only "the transportation or mailing to addresses within a State of tickets and other
material concerning a lottery conducted by that State acting under authority of State law."
18 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (1976).
133 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b)(4) (1976), quoted in note 125 supra, could be
amended to read: "(4) the transportation into a State of equipment, tickets or materials used
or designed for use within that State in a lottery conducted by that State acting under au-
thority of State law."
134 385 U.S. 263 (1966).
135 Justice Stewart argued in his dissent that the majority construed § 1953 too
broadly:
The Government does not contend that federal law makes it a crime for a
person from another State to visit New Hampshire, purchase a sweepstakes ticket
there, and return to his home. But it has argued that if a visitor to New Hamp-
shire returns home with a receipt that merely acknowledges his personal purchase
and in no way affects his eligibility to receive a prize, he has committed a crime
punishable by imprisonment of up to five years. Thus the Government requires us
to assume that Congress has branded as felons many or most of the thousands of
visitors to New Hampshire who have purchased sweepstakes tickets there. I do not
believe that Congress intended such an unexpected result, which only the most
abjectly literal approach to statutory interpretation could tolerate. No plausible
legislative purpose would be served by the Government's construction, for when
an individual takes an acknowledgment of purchase home from New Hampshire,
merely retaining it as a personal record of his purchase, the anti-gambling policies
of other States are in no way undermined, and no opening is provided for the
growth of organized racketeering.
Id. at 272-73 (footnote omitted).
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Federal policy toward gambling does not require including the
state lottery bettor in the sweep of an amended section 1953. The
national policy toward gambling rests heavily on principles of
federalism and, in most instances, has merely supported the sub-
stantive policy choices of the several states. The federal govern-
ment has attempted to adapt federal law to shifts in public attitudes
toward gambling. Because some states have established and en-
couraged lotteries, but other states still oppose them, Congress has
had to balance conflicting state interests. As a rule, the federal
government should intervene to support state antilottery policies
only when those policies are significantly threatened and require
federal reinforcement.
Allowing individual bettors in state-conducted lotteries to carry
their tickets or acknowledgements across state borders is not incon-
sistent with the present national policy toward lotteries. The in-
terstate transportation of lottery tickets by individuals who do not
intend to resell them does not threaten state antilottery policies. A
state can enact and enforce laws against individual bettors import-
ing lottery tickets just as easily as the federal government can. Only
in prosecuting large-scale gambling operations does the federal
government possess a significant enforcement advantage. In gen-
eral, federal gambling legislation reflects this conclusion. 136 Regula-
tion of the individual bettor should remain a matter of state law; no
justification appears for deviating from the federal practice of
noninterference with state policies.
If Congress closes the current loophole in section 1953, it
should also exempt individual bettors in state-conducted lotkeries
from the sweep of the statute. Such an amendment should allow an
individual to carry lottery tickets from legal state-conducted lot-
teries across state lines, provided that the individual does not resell
or intend to resell the tickets.' 37 These changes would align federal
136 Many federal statutes manifest Congress's desire to exempt the individual bettor
from federal gambling laws. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1084, 1511, 1952, 1955 (1976).
137 For example, the following provision Could be appended to § 1953(b)(4): "... . act-
ing under authority of State law; nor shall this section apply to tickets or other materials
concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under authority of State law when trans-
ported personally by an individual not for subsequent resale." This language would exempt
individuals from the rule of § 1953, and yet avoid problems relating to interstate transpor-
tation of lottery tickets for profit. This exemption could also be drawn as an affirmative
defense on which defendant would have to carry some burden of persuasion. Cf. Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (affirmative defense on which defendant had burden of
persuasion upheld because separate from elements of crime). But cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975) (affirmative defense that allocates burden of persuasion on element of
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lottery law with federal gambling policy.
II
MODERN CRIMINAL STATUTES: AN ATTACK ON ORGANIZED CRIME
The first half of the twentieth century saw the federal gov-
ernment virtually abstain from gambling-related legislation. 138 The
pressure on the national government generated by the Louisiana
Lottery and similar enterprises had subsided. Responsibility for
regulating gambling returned to the states, where it had rested
exclusively before the nineteenth-century lottery scandals.
Since 1948, the federal role in the regulation of gambling has
expanded significantly. Federal statutes have dealt with gambling
ships, 139 interstate and foreign transportation of wagering para-
crime to defendant violates due process). In either case, the exemption for the individual
bettor would not unduly impede the effectiveness of § 1953 against interstate schemes to
distribute lottery tickets for profit in violation of the policies of other states.
'I' Except for extending the antilottery statutes to radio broadcasting in 1934 (see notes
94-96 and accompanying text supra), Congress enacted no federal statute between 1895
and 1948 that directly affected gambling. Congress did include a chapter on gambling in
the District of Columbia Code (see Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 863-869, 31 Stat. 1189
(current version at D.C. CODE §§ 22-1501 to -1508 (1967))), as well as restrictions on specu-
lation in futures contracts (see Act of Mar. 1, 1909, ch. 233, 35 Stat. 670 (current version at
D.C. CODE §§ 22-1509 to -1512 (1967))). Congress joined many states (see, e.g., Act of Apr.
9, 1913, ch. 236, 1913 N.Y. Laws (current version at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 351 to 351-e
(1968 & Supp. 1977)); see generally DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 96-100, 341-44) in
limiting "bucketing" transactions, which involved futures speculation. Legislatures appar-
ently theorized that futures contracts involved wagering on the price of commodities at
some future time. When parties entered such contracts without a bona fide intention to
invest in the underlying commodities, they implicated the antisocial consequences tra-
ditionally associated with gambling. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Hammond
Elevator Co., 165 Ind. 492, 512, 76 N.E. 100, 107-08 (1905). The Supreme Court generally
upheld state regulation of futures trading. See, e.g., Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902);
Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461 (1901). The distinction between forms of prohibited con-
duct and insurance, or investments in the securities and commodities markets, is not clear,
but perhaps turns on the perceived social utility of a given type of transaction.
The first federal attempt to regulate trading in commodities futures was the Future
Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921), which imposed a heavy tax on certain contracts
for the future sale of grain. The Supreme Court promptly declared the Act an unconstitu-
tional use of the taxing power to usurp regulatory powers reserved to the states. See Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). Congress relied on its powers under the commerce clause to
enact the Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (originally enacted as
Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922)) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17b
(1976)). Congress has also enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1976)).
'"See 18 U.S.C. §8 1081-1083 (1976). Congress sought an end to the operation of
gambling ships floating off the California coast. Such ships were attracting thousands of
customers in the 1940s. The floating casinos anchored beyond the three mile limit to avoid
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phernalia 140 and gambling devices, 14 1 transmission of wagering in-
formation through wire facilities, 142 interstate travel in furtherance
of racketeering enterprises, 143 the business enterprise of gambl-
ing, 14 4 state-conducted lotteries, 14 5 and wagering taxes. 146 This leg-
islative activity occurred in three cycles that corresponded rough-
ly with the Kefauver investigations of 1950-1951, Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy's program against organized crime in 1961-
1962, and anti-crime efforts that occurred in 1969-1970 during
the Nixon Administration.
California jurisdiction, and used small "water taxis" to shuttle their customers from shore.
Treasury licensing provisions allowed prosecution of only some of the offenders. See
Comment, Federal Regulation of Gambling, 60 YALE L.J. 1396, 1406 n.62 (1951).
The new provisions outlawed owning or operating a vessel used as a gambling estab-
lishment within federal jurisdiction but outside the jurisdiction of a state:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any citizen or resident of the United States, or any
other person who is on an American vessel or is otherwise under or within the
jurisdiction of the United States, directly or indirectly-
(1) to set up, operate, or own or hold any interest in any gambling
ship or any gambling establishment on any gambling ship; or
(2) in pursuance of the operation of any gambling establishment on
any gambling ship, to conduct or deal any gambling game, or to conduct
or operate any gambling device, or to induce, entice, solicit, or permit any
person to bet or play at any such establishment,
if such gambling ship is on the high seas, or is an American vessel or otherwise
under or within the jurisdiction of the United States, and is not within the juris-
diction of any State.
18 U.S.C. § 1082(a) (1976). Subsection (b) provides for a fine up to $10,000 and two years'
imprisonment; subsection (c) is a forfeiture provision. Section 1081 contains definitions and
§ 1083 prohibits "water taxis" from providing transportation to and from illegal gambling
ships on the high seas.
The House Committee on the Judiciary, reporting the bill without amendment, em-
phasized that it proscribed only commercial enterprises:
[T]he committee wants it clearly understood that it is not its intention to provide
any agency of the Government with an opportunity to harass the vast number of
private yachtsmen, and that the Secretary of the Treasury shall carefully draft any
,regulations he may issue so as to be sure that the application thereof will be to
large-scale commercial gambling alone.
H.R. REP. No. 1700, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1948] U.S. CONG. SERV. 1487,
1488. Only one case arising under the gambling ship statutes has been reported. See
United States v. Black, 291 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (motion to dismiss § 1082 indict-
ment denied because premature). Congress enacted §§ 1081-1083 to alleviate a specific
problem that was beyond the power of state legislatures to control, and therefore, the
provisions do not reflect a general congressional policy toward gambling.
140 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1976).
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1976).
142 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1976).
'
43 See id. § 1952.
'
44 See id. §§ 1511, 1955.
1 See id. § 1307.
146 See I.R.C. §§ 4401-4423, 4461-4463.
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A. The Kefauver Committee and the Johnson Act
In 1950, two events signaled a new federal assault on or-
ganized crime 147 generally, and gambling specifically. In February,
the Attorney General's Conference on Organized Crime 4 s con-
vened to discuss the need for concerted federal action to supple-
ment the various state laws dealing with gambling:
[W]hile practically all of the States have laws prohibiting gam-
bling and gaming, and the use of gambling machines, such as the
notorious slot machine, is prohibited, the efforts of the local en-
forcement officials are usually and often frustrated not only by
the hostility and opposition of those who stand to benefit by
147 "Organized crime" is a phrase with many meanings. It is much like the fictional
crime portrayed in Akira Kurasawa's 1950 film, Rashoman, in which a ninth century
nobleman's bride is raped by a bandit, and the nobleman lies dead. The film portrays
versions of the double crime from the perspectives of each of the three participants and a
witness. Each version is different. So it is with the definition of organized crime. Some have
seen nothing, and decided that nothing was there. See, e.g., Hawkins, God and the Mafia, 14
PUB. INTEREST 24 (1969). Others, examining the phenomenon from an anthropological
perspective, have seen a "social system." See, e.g., F. IANNI, A FAMILY BUSINESS (1972). One
commentator, relying on press accounts, has seen only a public relations gimmick. See D.
SMITH, THE MAFIA MYSTIQUE (1975). The organizational theorist sees a functional division
of labor. See D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION (1969). Some lawyers have seen it as a
conspiracy. See, e.g., Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases:
A Preliminary Analysis, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME-ANNOTATIONS AND CON-
SULTANTS' PAPERS 80, 81-83 app. C (1967). The Commission adopted a view that termed
conspiratorial behavior "organized crime" when its organizational sophistication reached
a level where division of labor included positions for an "enforcer" of violence and a "cor-
rupter" of the legitimate processes of our society. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME
-ANNOTATIONS AND CONSULTANTS' PAPERS 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: ORGANIZED CRIME]. The Mafia was termed only the "core" of organized crime; it was
not identified with it. Id. at 6. Nevertheless, the Commission on the Review of the National
Policy Toward Gambling equated "organized crime" with Mafia (see GAMBLING IN AMERICA,
supra note 2, at 171), much to the consternation of Senator McClellan (see id. at 181-82 ("in
none of the hearings or in the processing of legislation in which I have been involved has the
term been used in this circumscribed fashion")).
The Department of Justice has estimated the percentage of gambling controlled by
"organized crime" in the sense of Mafia: Far West, 29.2; Midwest 47.4; Northeast, 53.2;
Southeast, 35.7; Southwest, 2.0. EASY MONEY, supra note 116, at 9. For a journalistic review
see TIME, May 16, 1977, at 32.
48 The Attorney General had received resolutions from local officials and organiza-
tions seeking a conference to discuss law enforcement problems. The proposed conference
met during the annual Conference of United States Attorneys and focused principally on
large-scale organizations that depended upon syndicated gambling. See Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 3357 and H.R. 6736, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1950) (statement of Hcrzel H.E. Plaine, Office of the Ass't Solicitor General, Dep't
of Justice) [hereinafter cited as 1950 House Commerce Hearings].
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these operations, but also by the ease with which the parapher-
nalia, which is essential to gambling operations, can be distrib-
uted in interstate commerce.1 4 9
Three months later, the Senate established the Special Senate
Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Com-
merce-the Kefauver Committee. 150 Together, these events evoked
a flurry of publicity, 151 congressional hearings, 152 and legislation. 53
149 Id.
"' See S. Res. 202, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (submitted by Senator Kefauver). The
introduction of the Committee's Third Interim Report stated its purposes:
The function of the committee was to make a full and complete study and investi-
gation to determine whether organized crime utilizes the facilities of interstate
commerce or whether it operates otherwise through the avenues of interstate
commerce to promote any transactions which violate Federal law or the law of the
State in which such transactions might occur.
S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1951).
,' National concern over rising crime rates in general and organized crime in particu-
lar characterized the postwar period. See W. MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMIT EE AND THE
POLITIcs OF CRIME 1950-1952, at 23-41 (1974). Public unrest led to the formation of
numerous local crime commissions (see id. at 40-41; S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
19-20 (1951)) and the establishment by major newspapers of a clearinghouse to publicize
and analyze as much news as possible about national crime syndicates and their leaders (see
W. MOORE, supra, at 41). The resulting pressure on the federal government led first to the
expanded February 1949 meeting of United States Attorneys addressed by President Tru-
man. See note 148 supra. Ultimately, Congress established the Kefauver Committee.
The Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, which
thrust its chairman into presidential politics, held numerous public hearings throughout
the country, many of which were televised. The Committee heard over 600 witnesses and
collected lengthy testimony in Miami, Tampa, New Orleans, Kansas City, Cleveland, St.
Louis, Detroit, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Las Vegas, Philadelphia, Chicago, New York,
and Washington, D.C. See S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1951). See generally
Hearings Before a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-19 (1950-51). The Kefauver Committee issued several Reports sum-
marizing its findings, which included the existence of a national crime syndicate; it also
made recommendations before ending its investigation on Sept. 1, 1951. See S. REP. No.
2370, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. REP. No.
307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951). For discus-
sion and evaluation of the Committee's history see Wilson, The Kefauver Committee 1950, in
5 CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 1792-1974, at 3439 (A. Schlesinger, Jr.
& R. Burns eds. 1975). Significantly, at the beginning of the probe, "Attorney General
McGrath [had said] that the Justice Department had no persuasive evidence that a 'national
crime syndicate' . . . [existed]." Id. at 3450.
"' See Transmission of Gambling Information: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 3358, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Anticrime
Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1563, S.
1564, S. 1624, and S. 2116, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951) (interstate transmission of gambling
information and materials).
53 The Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1976), was a direct outgrowth of the
Kefauver investigations. Congress also enacted wagering excise taxes at this time. See notes
324-31 and accompanying text infra.
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And although Congress enacted only one significant set of pro-
visions relating to gambling at that time, proposals stemming from
the Kefauver hearings formed the core of measures enacted de-
cades later.15 4
In 1951, responding to the Kefauver hearings, Congress
passed the Johnson Act,15 5 limiting the interstate transportation of
gambling devices. The House Report accompanying the bill de-
clared that "[t]he primary purpose of this legislation is to support
the policy of those States which outlaw slot machines and similar
gambling devices, by prohibiting use of the channels of interstate
or foreign commerce for the shipment of such machines or devices
into such States."'1 56 The bill sought to combat "[n]ation-wide crime
syndicates" thought to be immune from local law enforcement; 1 5 7 it
did not supplant local gambling policies. 158 A provision allowing
states to exempt themselves from the direct impact of the proposed
statute by subsequent state legislation 159 countered objections that
154 Attorney General Kennedy's program to curb organized crime and racketeering
included several measures proposed by the Kefauver Committee. See, e.g., notes 221-28
and accompanying text infra.
"1
5 See Act of Jan. 2, 1951, ch. 1194, 64 Stat. 1134 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1171-1178 (1976)).
156 H.R. REP. No. 2769, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CONG. SERV.
4240, 4240.
' 
7 See id. at 4-5, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CONG. SERv. 4240, 4243.
15' Herzel Plaine of the Justice Department, testifying before the House committee,
emphasized the limited federal role contemplated under the statute:
Aside from the Federal antilottery laws which were enacted in 1890, 1895, and
1934, and some very recent legislation dealing with gambling ships, the Federal
Government has no present enforcement function in the field of gambling. The
laws and the policy which by their accumulative effect we might say establish a
Nationwide policy against gambling, particularly commercialized gambling, are
to be found in the laws and constitutions of the several States. In that sense, this
committee and the whole Congress will be approaching the present-day problem
just as Congress approached the lottery problem in 1890, and again in 1895, when
the so-called national policy against lotteries had been formed in the States by
their laws and constitutions, and Congress was asked to enact a Federal law to
close the loopholes in interstate and foreign commerce in aid of that policy.
Proceeding, then, Mr. Chairman, on the assumption that there is a substantive
evil to be corrected, let me say categorically that the purpose of the bill is to
support the basic policy of the States which outlaws slot machines and similar
gambling devices by prohibiting the interstate shipment of such machines, except
into States where their use is legal.
1950 House Commerce Hearings, supra note 148, at 37.
1'5 9 See Act of Jan. 2, 1951, ch. 1194, § 2, 64 Stat. 1134 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1172 (1976),. Section 1172 contains the following proviso:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to transportation of any gambling device
to a place in any State which has enacted a law providing for the exemption of
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the bill infringed on states' rights. 160
The basic provisions of the Johnson Act defined the affected
gambling devices, 16  prohibited their interstate transportation
under certain conditions, 162 and required elaborate reporting and
registration by their manufacturers. 6 3 Courts have applied the
provisions to a variety of devices.' 64 Although the Johnson Act has
such State from the provisions of this section, or to a place in any subdivision of a
State if the State in which such subdivision is located has enacted a law providing
for the exemption of such subdivision from the provisions of this section, nor shall
this section apply to any gambling device used or designed for use at and trans-
ported to licensed gambling establishments where betting is legal under applicable
State laws: Provided, further, That it shall not be unlawful to transport in interstate
or foreign commerce any gambling device into any State in which the transported
gambling device is specifically enumerated as lawful in a statute of that State.
15 U.S.C. § 1172 (1976). In a state where certain gambling devices are lawful, the proviso
does not entirely negate the effect of the statute. In the absence of the federal statute,
certain activities not expressly proscribed could be conducted within the state. After the
enactment of § 1172, state legislatures, in order to benefit from its exemption, had to
approve expressly the conduct in question, and vote publicly "in favor of sin." The differ-
ence to an elected representative might be substantial.
160 Leading an unsuccessful fight against the bill, Nevada Congressman Walter S. Bar-
ing argued that the law would adversely affect the legal gambling industry and infringe
upon states' rights. See 96 CONG. REc. 13642-44 (1950). He further argued that the power
to regulate gambling came from the states' police powers, and that it would be unreason-
able to extend national commerce clause powers into that area. See id. at 13651-54.
Another opponent of the bill added pragmatically that voting for the proposed bill resem-
bled voting "against sin" because slot machines were likely to be found only where people
did not strongly object to them. Id. at 13655 (remarks of Rep. Tacket). Proponents of the
bill pointed to the requests of many states for federal legislation, quoting from a let-
ter to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce From Attorney General
McGrath:
The only thing that the Federal Government is being asked to do under this
bill is to stop in the channels of commerce the shipment of these machines which
the States are powerless to keep out of the channels of interstate commerce. Ac-
tual enforcement against those people who gamble or use these machines wrong-
fully in the States is left to the States ....
Id. at 13643 (remarks of Rep. Rogers).
'61 See Johnson Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (1976). The term "gambling device" included
not only "slot machines" or similar coin-operated devices dependent upon an element of
chance to give a valuable prize, but also any sub-assembly or essential part of such devices.
The definition of "gambling device" had been much broader in S. 3357, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950), but the House narrowed it in committee. See H.R. R i'. No. 2769, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 6-7 (1950).
'
62 See Johnson Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1172 (1976). The Act provides, as a general rule:
"It shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any gambling device to any place in a State,
the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States from any place outside of
such State, the District of Columbia, or possession .... Id.
'
63 See Johnson Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 1173 (1976). The provision required manufactur-
ers and dealers of gambling devices to register with the Attorney General, to file monthly
records of sales of gambling devices, and to mark each component of such devices. It was
unlawful to repair or sell such gambling devices without complying with the provision.
164 Some courts have read the statute to cover almost any type of gambling device
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survived constitutional challenges, 165 its filing requirements-de-
manding documentation of potentially illegal transactions-have
succumbed to the fifth amendment protection against self-incrim-
ination.1 66 Courts have also narrowed the permissible scope of the
legislation. 16 7 The narrow construction of the Johnson Act and the
invalidation of its filing provisions seriously eroded the statute's
effectiveness and led to requests for congressional renovation. 6 8
B. Robert F. Kennedy's Program Against Organized Crime
Robert F. Kennedy's vigorous efforts against organized crime
and syndicated gambling brought about a dramatic change at the
Justice Department. Kennedy repeatedly testified before congres-
activated by a coin or token, or designed or manufactured as a gambling device. See United
States v. 24 Digger Merchandising Machs., 202 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.) (applying Act to ma-
chine where player operates crane to dig for prizes but exercises minimal control over
where crane digs), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 998 (1953); United States v. Brown, 156 F. Supp.
121 (N.D. Iowa 1957) (applying Act to machine that delivers poker hands redeemable for
cash). Other courts, emphasizing the penal character of the Act, construed its language
strictly to encompass only traditional slot machines. See United States v. Ansani, 240 F.2d
216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957); United States v. Three Gambling Devices,
161 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 254 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1958); United States
v. One Elec. Pointmaker, 149 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1957); United States v. McManus,
138 F. Supp. 164 (D. Wyo. 1952). Thus, a machine might be proscribed in one circuit and
allowed in another. For example, courts generally have construed the statute to exclude
pinball machines. See, e.g., United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 252 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.
1958). But see United States v. 19 Automatic Pay-Off Pinball Machs., 113 F. Supp. 230
(W.D. La. 1953) (Act applied to pinball machine used for gambling but lacking any payoff
mechanism). For discussion of the treatment of pinball machines at the state level, see DE-
VELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 359-61, 753, 790.
165See United States v. 46 Gambling Devices, 138 F. Supp. 896, 899 (D. Md. 1956)
(forfeiture does not violate due process), aff d sub nom. North Beach Amusement Co. v.
United States, 240 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1957); United States v. Ansani, 138 F. Supp. 451,
453-54 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (requiring registration as dealer does not compel self-incrimination
because it applies only to future acts; provision requiring monthly reports of unlawful acts
unconstitutional), aff d, 240 F.2d 216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957); United
States v. 65 Slot Machs., 102 F. Supp. 922, 924 (W.D. La. 1952) (legitimate exercise of
commerce clause power).
166 United States v. Ansani, 138 F. Supp. 451, 453-54 (N.D. Ill. 1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d
216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
167 The statute has been held inapplicable to purely intrastate activities. See United
States v. Braun, 119 F. Supp. 646, 647 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Five
Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v. Denmark, 119 F. Supp. 647,
649-50 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441
(1953); United States v. 15 Mills Blue Bell Gambling Machs., 119 F. Supp. 74, 78 (M.D. Ga.
1953); United States v. 5 Gambling Devices, 119 F. Supp. 641, 644 (N.D. Ga. 1952), aff d,
346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v. 178 Gambling Devices, 107 F. Supp. 394 (S.D. Ill.
1952).
""See notes 221-28 and accompanying text infra.
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sional committees169 and sponsored articles urging the enactment
of new antigambling legislation. 70 The fruits of his endeavors were
three new substantive provisions as well as amendments to the
Johnson Act.
1. Wire Communications-18 U.S.C. § 1084
The first accomplishment of the Kennedy program was an
addition to the gambling chapter of title 18 of the United States
Code, which had previously dealt only with gambling ships. Con-
gress added section 1084 to prohibit interstate transmission of
wagering information.' 7' According to its legislative history, the
new measure was
to assist the various States and the District of Columbia in the
enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking,
and like offenses and to aid in the suppression of organized
gambling activities by prohibiting the use of wire communication
facilities which are or will be used for the transmission of bets or
wagers and gambling information in interstate and foreign
commerce.1
72
16 9 See, e.g., Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021, H.R. 3022, H.R. 3023,
H.R. 3246, H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, and H.R. 7039, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18-47 (1961) [hereinafter cited as House Judiciary Hearings]; The Attorney General's Pro-
gram to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1655, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658, S. 1665, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-18 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Senate Judiciary Hearings]; Gambling Devices: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 3024, H.R. 8410, and S.
1658, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-34 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 House Commerce Hearings].
17 See, e.g., Kennedy, The Program of the Department of Justice on Organized Crime, 38
NOTRE DAME LAW. 637 (1963); Kennedy, Three Weapons Against Organized Crime, 8 CRIME &
DELIN Q. 321 (1962); Pollner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Program to Curb
Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 37 (1962). See also A. SCHLES-
INGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES 222-85 (1978).
171 See Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1084 (1976)). The first subsection provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly
uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire com-
munication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of
bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1976).
172 H.R. REP. No. 967, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2631, 2631.
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In addition to supporting state gambling policies, the statute
sought to cut off a major source of revenue to organized crime by
impeding its gambling activities. 173
Congress framed section 1084 to reach only those "engaged in
the business of betting or wagering,"' 74 thus exempting the indi-
vidual bettor. The provision forbade business gamblers to use any
''wire communication facility" to communicate information relevant
to gambling and also directed common carriers to aid the govern-
ment in forcing business gamblers to comply.' 75 A key exception to
the general policy of the prohibition provided:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information
for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for
the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting
on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which
such betting is legal.176
The history of section 1084 in the courts reflects the section's
legislative purpose. Although the question has never reached the
Supreme Court, lower courts have upheld the statute against fifth
and tenth amendment challenges.177 In construing the section,
courts have attempted to accommodate the balance of interests
between states prohibiting and states allowing gambling with the
congressional policy against the use of interstate facilities for gam-
"I Attorney General Kennedy testified: "Mr. Chairman, our legislation is mainly con-
cerned with effectively curtailing gambling operations. . . . because profits from illegal
gambling are huge and they are the primary source of the funds which finance organized
crime ...." Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169, at 11. In his prepared statement the
Attorney General said: "It is quite evident that modern, organized, commercial gambling
operations are so completely intertwined with the Nation's communications systems that
denial of their use to the gambling fraternity would be a mortal blow to their operations.
This is the precise purpose of the proposed legislation." Id. at 6.
174 The Justice Department bill had originally extended to the social bettor, but was
narrowed in committee. Senator Kefauver remarked that the provision ought to focus on
the professional, not the social gambler. See id. at 278-79.
1'75 See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (1976). The statute's key provision applies only to profes-
sional gamblers who knowingly use communication facilities in furtherance of gambling ac-
tivities. See id. § 1084(a).
17 61d. § 1084(b).
177 Many courts have upheld the Act as within Congress's authority to regulate in-
terstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 254 F. Supp. 9, 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), vacated on other grounds
and remanded mem., 372 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1967). The statute has also survived assertions
that it is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., United States v. Brodson, 390 F. Supp. 774, 779
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
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bling.17 8 Courts have read broadly section 1084,179 but have re-
spected its requirement that the defendant be engaged in the busi-
ness of gambling. 180 The news-reporting exemption in section
1084(b) has also limited prosecutions.' 8 1 Although section 1084 has
produced a steady number of convictions, 182 its principal impact
may be to deter certain forms of gambling.'
83
178 In Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968),
appellants argued that § 1084 did not prohibit the transmission of wagers into Nevada,
because doing so would "'defeat the policies of Nevada while not aiding the enforcement
of the laws of any other State.' " Id. at 897. The court was unsympathetic, responding that
"if the policy of Nevada is not 'defeated' in some way, then the policy of every other State
that prohibits what Nevada allows could be defeated." Id. at 898. The court also argued
that Congress did not enact § 1084 solely to assist the enforcement of state substantive
gambling policies:
This section was part of an omnibus crime bill that recognized the need for inde-
pendent federal action to combat interstate gambling operations. . . .Moreover,
this series of legislation does not stand alone, but appears as part of an indepen-
dent federal policy aimed at those who would, in furtherance of any gambling
activity, employ any means within direct federal control.
Id. at 898 (footnotes omitted).
17' See, e.g., United States v. Bergland, 318 F.2d 159 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
861 (1963); United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.W. Va. 1962).
'
80 See Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897
(1967).
282 Even "scratch sheets," as long as they are sold to the public, are outside the scope
of the prohibition. See United States v. Kelley, 328 F.2d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 1964); Kelley v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 325 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1963).
'
82 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL REPORT
FOR THE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING 36
(1974). The conviction rate for a composite of gambling cases brought under 18 U.S.C. §§
1084, 1952, and 1953 is lower than the conviction rate for all federal prosecutions.
GAMBLING CASES CONVICTION RATE
1967 1968 1960 1970 1971 1972 1973
No. Prosecuted (§§
1084, 1952-1953) 152 108 122 166 380 360 319
No. Convicted 98 96 73 81 163 213 179
% Convicted 65 70 60 49 43 59 56
% Convicted (All
Federal Crimes) 83 80 81 77 72 75 75
The figures are too small for further generalizations.
183 Attorney General Kennedy testified in 1963 that the previous year had seen a
sharp decline in gambling. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for
1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 8-9 (1963). Two years later, a Justice Department
official stated: "The utility of the 1961 antigambling laws is being demonstrated not only
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2. The Travel Act-18 U.S.C. § 1952
In April 1961, Attorney General Kennedy submitted to Con-
gress a proposed draft of a bill to prohibit travel in aid of racke-
teering enterprises.184 The statute proscribed interstate travel with
intent to engage in certain unlawful activities. The Attorney Gen-
eral assured Congress that the social gambler would have little to
fear from the proposed law becaiuse only the business enterprise of
gambling fell within its scope.' 8 5
An early version of the Travel Act defined the gravamen of
the offense as travel in interstate commerce with the intent to
engage in certain unlawful activities. Congress amended the pro-
posed bill to require not only intent but also an attempt to engage
in such activity.' 86 With this restriction, Congress enacted the
by increased prosecutive action, but also by numerous intelligence reports showing that
large interstate gambling operations are either shutting down or becoming intrastate and
relatively minor in scope and profit." Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies,
Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 88 (1965) (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen.
Herbert J. Miller).
184 In his cover letter, Kennedy stated:
Over the years an ever-increasing portion of our national resources has been
diverted into illicit channels. Because many rackets are conducted by highly or-
ganized syndicates whose influence extends over State and National borders, the
Federal Government should come to the aid of local law enforcement authorities
in an effort to stem such activity.
The effect of this legislation would be to impede the clandestine flow of pro-
fits from criminal ventures and to bring about a serious disruption in the far-flung
organization and management of coordinated criminal enterprises. It would thus
be of material assistance to the States in combatting pernicious undertakings which
cross State lines.
Letter from Attorney General Kennedy to the Speaker of the House (April 6, 1961), re-
printed in H.R. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2664, 2666.
185 See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169, at 24 (statement of Att'y Gen. Ken-
nedy). See generally Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169, at 255 (statement of Ass't Att'y
Gen. Herbert J. Miller). Said Kennedy: "[W]e have carefully delineated an area of law
enforcement which will disrupt the organized criminal syndicates without interfering with
general travel." Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169, at 16. Kennedy also stated: "The
main target of our bill is interstate travel to promote gambling. It also is aimed at the huge
profits in the traffic in liquor, narcotics, prostitution, as well as the use of these funds for
corrupting local officials and for their use in racketeering in labor and management."
Id. at 2. Justifying the role of the national government, the Attorney General noted that
"only the Federal Government can shut off the funds which permit the top men of or-
ganized crime to live far from the scene and, therefore, remain immune from the local
officials." Id. at 16.
186 The Senate narrowed the definition of "unlawful activity" and added the require-
ment that action in furtherance of the illicit activity be attempted. S. REP. No. 644, 87th
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measure.18 7
Defendants have unsuccessfully challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Travel Act on a number of theories. 188 Although the
Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1961). The Senate also broadened its version of the bill, S. 1653, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), to include the use of any interstate facilities in aid of organized
crime activities (see S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1961); 107 CONG. REC. 13943
(1961) (remarks of Senator Eastland)) despite a caution from the Justice Department that
such a broad bill would not be politically viable (see Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note
169, at 107 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Herbert J. Miller)). After further changes in the
House, a conference was held to reconcile differences. See H.R. REP. No. 1161, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961) (Conf. Rep.). For criticism and analysis of the impact of this legislative
process on the interests of federalism, see Judge Friendly's opinion for the court in United
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 678-81 (2d Cir. 1973).
187 Act of Sept. 13, 1961 (Travel Act), Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976)). The statute as enacted read as follows:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to-
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the pro-
motion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in sub-
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section, "unlawful activity" means (1) any business enter-
prise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been
paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in
which they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion or bribery in
violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States.
(c) Investigations of violations under this section involving liquor or narcotics
shall be conducted under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Id. Congress has twice amended § 1952, including arson in the definition of unlawful
activity (see Act of July 7, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-68, 79 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1952(b) (2) (1976))), and modifying the definition of narcotics (see Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 701(i)(2), 84 Stat. 1236
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(1) (1976))).
" See, e.g., United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1055-56 (10th Cir. 1975) (rejecting
first, fifth, and tenth amendment challenges), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); United
States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308, 1314 (D. Del. 1976) (rejecting first, fifth, and tenth
amendment challenges). Several courts have upheld the Act as a valid exercise of power
under the commerce clause. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 421 F.2d 570, 574 (8th Cir.
1970); Gilstrap v. United States, 389 F.2d 6, 8 (5th Cir.) (rejecting due process-vagueness
challenge), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 65 (3d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999, 1004
(9th Cir.) (rejecting tenth amendment challenge), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966); United
States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1964) (rejecting due process-vagueness chal-
lenge), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). Turf Center, Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 793,
795 (9th Cir. 1963) (rejecting tenth amendment challenge); Bass v. United States, 324 F.2d
168, 172-73 (8th Cir. 1963) (rejecting tenth amendment challenge). The first amendment
does not protect conduct § 1952 defines as criminal. See, e.g., United States v. Cerone, 452
F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972); Spinelli v. United States,
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Supreme Court has avoided the constitutional merits of the Act, it
has addressed matters of construction. 189
Despite its potential for overlapping other federal gambling
statutes, 190 the Travel Act has been consistently and straightfor-
wardly applied. It is not a per se violation of section 1952 for one
who operates a gambling business to travel between states;' 9' the
interstate travel must relate to the gambling enterprise itself, such
as travel to and from work by employees of the establishment. 192
The Act excludes customers, and courts have confined the reach of
the statute to those engaged in gambling as a business. 193 As con-
382 F.2d 871, 890 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States
v. Corallo, 281 F. Supp. 24, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp.
286, 295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), vacated and remanded mem., 372 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 918 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
189See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 n.9 (1972); Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 n.5 (1971); United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 287 (1969):
The Court has also considered the suppression of evidence obtained through wiretaps. See
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
190 Both § 1952 and § 1084 proscribe the use of interstate wire facilities in furtherance
of certain gambling-related activities. Nevertheless, courts have dismissed arguments setting
forth the danger of double prosecution because the elements of proof differ under the two
statutes. See United States v. McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 918-19 (E.D. Ill. 1962). In Nolan v. United States, 395 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1968), the defendant was convicted under § 1084 but acquitted under § 1952. Cf
United States v. Ruthstein, 414 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1969) (§ 1084 did not preempt similar
state statute which served as grounds of § 1952 conviction). In Erlenbaugh v. United
States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972), the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the
exemption in § 1953 for "any newspaper or similar publication" (18 U.S.C. § 1953(b)(3)
(1976)) applied to § 1952 as well. Section 1952 also seems to overlap 18 U.S.C. § 1082
(1976), the gambling ship provision. Conduct potentially proscribed by both of these stat-
utes was prosecuted under § 1952 in United States v. Brennan, 394 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.)
("floating crap game" on vessel sailing between New Jersey and New York), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 839 (1968).
19' See United States v. Hawthorne, 356 F.2d 740 (4th Cir.) (operator of supper club
with gambling facilities held not culpable under § 1952 for interstate trip incident to family
move), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966). But cf. United States v. Carpenter, 392 F.2d 205
(6th Cir. 1968) (defendant liable after interstate trip to visit son where "dominant motive"
furtherance of gambling activity).
192 See United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001
(1967).
"
3 See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971). The operator of an illicit
establishment may be liable for the foreseeable interstate travel of an employee (United
States v. Lee, 448 F.2d 604, 606 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); United States
v. Chambers, 382 F.2d 910, 913-14 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62,
64-65 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d
577, 580 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965)), but not of patrons (see Rewis
v. United States, 401 U.S. at 811. (dictum)). The interstate traveler who is merely a pa-
tron of a gambling club is not himself liable: "[T]he traveler's purpose must involve more
than the desire to patronize the illegal activity." Id.
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strued, the use of an interstate "facility" pursuant to a gambling
enterprise (also proscribed by section 1952) includes the use of a
telephone, 194 telegraph,195 or newspaper,1 96 but not necessarily the
depositing of an out-of-state check.' 97 Finally, contact with in-
terstate commerce must be more than incidental. 98 All told, the
Travel Act has been reasonably successful in achieving its goals.' 99
194 See Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312, 314 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
1029 (1969); United States v. Winston, 267 F. Supp. 555, 561 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). But see
United States v. DeSapio, 299 F. Supp. 436, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (count of § 1952 indict-
ment alleging use of telephone in intrastate commerce dismissed).
195 See United States v. McMenama, 403 F.2d 969 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 974
(1968); United States v. Hawthorne, 356 F.2d 740 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908
(1966).
19'See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (causing carriage of publica-
tion in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate operation of illegal gambling business
proscribed). In United States v. Arnold, 380 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1967), the Fourth Circuit
overturned a conviction under §§ 1952 and 1084 for ordering, by telephone, a publication
for gambling purposes. It seems unlikely that other courts will follow Arnold.
197 In United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1971), the Seventh Circuit
reversed a § 1952 conviction involving an extortion transaction in which a check had been
cleared interstate. The Fourth Circuit, however, has sustained a § 1952 conviction involving
a bookmaking operation using out-of-state checks. See United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d
1045 (4th Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit has also upheld a conviction involving a bribe
paid with a check moving in interstate commerce. See United States v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d
344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968). The cases can be reconciled by focusing on
the nature of the checks' interstate movement. In Salsbury and Wechsler the checks' move-
ment in interstate commerce was an integral part of an on-going transaction. In Altobella,
the check entered interstate commerce only after the close of the transaction and when out
of defendant's control.
19' See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United States v. McCormick,
442 F.2d 316, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310, 314 (7th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Judkins, 428 F.2d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 1970). See also United
States v. Hawthorne, 356 F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966).
199 Successive Attorneys General have attested to the effectiveness of the Travel Act in
House appropriations hearings. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice re-
quested 30 additional attorneys and support staff in the fiscal year 1962 to meet the in-
creased workload expected under the new statutes. See Departments of State and Justice, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1962: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 6 (1961) (statement of Att'y
Gen. Kennedy). In the first four months after the enactment of §§ 1084, 1952, and 1953
the Justice Department instigated 2,100 investigations. See Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1963: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 122 (1962) (tes-
timony of Ass't Att'y Gen. Herbert J. Miller). In the fiscal year 1963, the Criminal Division
requested funds to expand its Organized Crime and Racketeering Section: "This is where
all the emphasis is going in the Attorney General's drive on organized crime." Id. at 146
(testimony of Admin. Ass't Att'y Gen. S.A. Andretta). Racketeering convictions, numbering
45 in 1960, rose to 546 in calendar year 1964. See Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1966: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 7 (1965) (statement of Att'y
Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach).
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3. Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia-18 U.S.C. § 1953
In 1961, Congress enacted section 1953: "An Act to provide
means for the Federal Government to combat interstate crime and
to assist the States in the enforcement of their criminal laws by
prohibiting the interstate transportation of wagering parapher-
nalia."200 As the third weapon in Attorney General Kennedy's ar-
senal against organized crime, section 1953 overcame the perceived
lack of state jurisdiction to control the widespread use of interstate
facilities by bookmakers and lottery operators.2 0' In addition, the
new statute revived the prohibitions against the interstate distribu-
tion of lottery materials contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302.202
The operative rule of section 1953 penalizes anyone 03 who
200 Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-218, 75 Stat. 492.
201 See Letter from Attorney General Kennedy to the Speaker of the House (April 6,
1961), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 968, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2634, 2636-37.
202 Sections 1301 and 1302 had been emasculated by narrow judicial construction.
Senator Eastland entered into the Congressional Record this statement highlighting the
weaknesses of the then existing legislation:
[T]he lottery statutes in their present form [do not] cover the many thousands of
sports betting pool slips which are transported daily across State lines, for they do
not meet the traditional definition of a lottery-the payment of a consideration
must be for a prize to be awarded by chance. Even out-and-out lottery tickets may
be shipped across State lines with impunity if they are printed in blank, shipped,
and then locally overprinted with the playing numbers.
107 CONG. REC. 13902 (1961).
The legislative history of § 1953 demonstrates that Congress intended to supplement
§§ 1301-1302:
This bill is designed to prevent the easy interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia. Federal laws which are designed to suppress traffic in lottery
tickets in interstate or foreign commerce have been on the statute books since
1895 (18 U.S.C., secs. 1301, [1302]).... These statutes make illegal the transporta-
tion in interstate or foreign commerce of "any paper, certificate or instrument
purporting to be or to represent a ticket, chance, share or interest in or depen-
dent upon the event of a lottery . . .". However, over the years the courts have
limited narrowly the scope of these statutes. Moreover, under the classic definition
of a lottery, the court's interpretation excludes sports' betting slips from existing
statutory prohibition against interstate transportation. Thus, it is that the bill is
designed to close the most important loopholes resulting from these court deci-
sions.
... The language of the proposal makes clear that it will include slips, papers,
or paraphernalia which may be used in a lottery scheme not yet in existence or
already completed. It also bans the interstate transportation of slips recording the
amounts and numbers bet in a numbers lottery and betting slips and other mate-
rial utilized in a bookmaking operation ....
H.R. REP. No. 968, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2634, 2635. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (1976). The statute implicates anyone "except a common
carrier in the usual course of its business." Id. See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169,
at 297, 303-04.
1978] FEDERAL LAW OF GAMBLING
knowingly carries in interstate commerce materials relating to
bookmaking, sports betting pools, or numbers. 20 4 It is the most
broadly drawn of the antigambling provisions, but contains several
explicit exemptions. As enacted, section 1953 exempted: equipment
and materials relating to legalized parimutuel betting,20 5 materials
relating to sports betting that are transported into a state that
permits such betting,20 6 and the interstate transportation of news-
papers and similar publications. 207 In 1975, Congress added a
fourth exemption that pertained to state-conducted lotteries. The
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1307, which saved state lotteries from the
antilottery statutes, 20 8 necessitated a parallel exemption in section
1953 because of the statutory overlap concerning lottery mate-
rials. 20 9 The addition to section 1953, however, fully immunizes
materials relating to state-conducted lotteries, rather than merely
permitting the importation of such materials into lottery states.210
204 Whoever, except a common carrier in the usual course of its business,
knowingly carries or sends in interstate or foreign commerce any record,
paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing or other device
used, or to be used, or adapted, devised, or designed for use in (a) bookmaking;
or (b) wagering pools with respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a numbers, policy,
bolita, or similar game shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than five years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (1976). This prohibition was also incorporated by reference into 18
U.S.C. § 1302 (1976), which now excludes from the mails, inter alia, everything proscribed
by § 1953. The Post Office Department recommended this addition to § 1302 to eliminate
the intrastate mailing of any materials included in the definition of § 1953 that were not
included previously in § 1302. Such materials otherwise would be prohibited only when
they traveled interstate. See Letter from Postmaster General Brawley to Representative Cel-
ler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (May 16, 1961), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
968, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2634, 2637.
20' See 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b)(1) (1976), quoted in note 125 supra. The Justice Department
argued that companies should be able to ship equipment for use in parimutuel racing to
states in which such racing was legal. See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169, at 293-95
(statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Herbert J. Miller). The exemption also permits an individual
to redeem a legally-acquired, out-of-state parimutuel ticket.
206 18 U.S.C § 1953(b)(2), quoted in note 125 supra.
207Id. § 1953(b)(3), quoted in note 125 supra. During the hearings on § 1953, a state-
ment by the ACLU warned that without such an exemption one could be prosecuted for
carrying a newspaper across state lines because of the information contained within it. See
Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169, at 48 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, Director,
Washington, D.C., Office, ACLU).
208 See notes 122-27 and accompanying text supra.
209 To the extent that it deals with lottery-related materials that are knowingly carried
interstate, § 1953 overlaps the provisions which prohibit the mailing (18 U.S.C. § 1302
(1976)) and interstate transportation (18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976)) of lottery-related materials.
Without an exemption equivalent to those added to the other antilottery statutes, § 1953
would prohibit states from obtaining, from out-of-state sources, tickets and advertising
materials for state-conducted lotteries.
210 Congress added the following language to the § 1953 exemptions: "or (4) equip-
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Congress apparently drew the exemption more broadly than it in-
tended to.211
Five years after Congress enacted section 1953, the Supreme
Court fully analyzed its language and policy in United States v. Fa-
brizio.2 2  Fabrizio had been indicted for knowingly carrying
seventy-five purchase acknowledgments for the New Hampshire
Sweepstakes from Keene, New Hampshire to Elmira, New York.
The Supreme Court noted that in section 1953, "Congress painted
with a broad brush,"21 3 and that to construe the section narrowly
"would defeat one of the purposes of the section [which was] to
thwart the interstate movement of such paraphernalia, ' 214 regard-
less of who carried it, in order "to assist local enforcement of laws
pertaining to gambling and like offenses. '215 The Court also re-
fused to confine the statutory prohibition to materials related to
unlawful activities.2 1 6
ment, tickets or materials used or designed for use within a State in a lottery conducted by
that State acting under authority of State law." Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 98-583, 88
Stat. 1916 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b)(4) (1976)). Unlike § 1953(b)(2), relating to wa-
gers on sporting events, the exemption for materials relating to state-conducted lotteries is
not confined to the importation of the exempted materials into a state where such mate-
rials are legal.
211 See notes 130-33 and accompanying text supra. The House Report stated that if
Congress enacted the law: "[T]he transportation of equipment, tickets, or materials used or
designed for use within a State conducting such a lottery under the authority of its State
law to addresses within that State would be permitted." H.R. REP. No. 1517, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7007, 7010. The exemption
clearly permits more.
212 385 U.S. 263 (1966).
2 13 Id. at 266.
214 Id. at 267.
215 Id. at 267 nA.
216 The Court emphasized that "Congress did not limit the coverage of the statute to
,unlawful' or 'illegal' activities" (id. at 268), and that Congress had decided not to exempt
state-run wagering from the reach of § 1953:
Exemption would also defeat one of the principal purposes of § 1953, aiding the
States in the suppression of gambling where such gambling is contrary to state policy. For
example, New York prohibits the sale of lottery tickets and the transfer of any
paper purporting to represent an interest in a lottery "to be drawn within or
without" that State regardless of the legality of the lottery in the place of drawing.
N.Y. Const., Art. I, § 9, N.Y. Penal Law §§ 1373, 1382. To allow the paraphernalia of
a lottery, state-operated or not, to flow freely into New York might significantly endanger
that policy. It is clear that the lottery statutes apply to state-operated as well as
illegal lotteries, and that § 1953 was introduced to strengthen those statutes by
closing the loopholes placed in them by the narrow interpretation of included
materials by this Court in France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676, and Francis v.
United States, 188 U.S. 375
(id. at 269 (emphasis added)). Fabrizio was decided before lotteries were lawful in New York
and before Congress enacted the § 1953 exemption for state-conducted lotteries.
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A number of cases have construed section 1953's exemption
for periodicals. They have held that the exemption permits in-
terstate transportation of scratch sheets, which detail horserace in-
formation and make picks,217 although distribution of such material
may violate the Travel Act.21 8 The Supreme Court has confined
the newspaper exemption to section 1953; the exemption does not
limit prosecutions brought under section 1084 or section 1952.219
The three-pronged attack on syndicated gambling had struck
at the use of wire communications (section 1084), travel in further-
ance of illegal activity (section 1952), and the interstate transporta-
tion of wagering paraphernalia (section 1953). Testimony from
appropriations hearings established the efficacy of the new Ken-
nedy program.22 0
4. Strengthening the Johnson Act
When the shortcomings of the Johnson Act became apparent
soon after its passage in 1951,221 steps were quickly initiated to
clarify its terms and toughen its sanctions. Before disbanding, the
Kefauver Committee recommended expanding the coverage of the
Johnson Act to reduce the revenues obtained by organized crime
through the operation of wagering machines.222 Of the many bills
introduced to accomplish this, none found favor in Congress until
the Gambling Devices Act of 1962.223 The Johnson Act as amended
2'See United States v. Kelly, 328 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1964). The court, on the basis of
legislative history, seemed willing to extend the newspaper exemption to "tout sheets"
which merely list race picks. See id. at 230-34.
21 See United States v. Azar, 243 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mich. 1964).2
'
9 See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972).
220 For instance, the number of cases investigated by the FBI under §§ 1084, 1952, and
1953 rose from 5361 in the first 16 months after enactment to 15,600 in fiscal year 1964.
Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations
for 1964: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 8 (1963) (statement of Att'y Gen. Kennedy); Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1966: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 88 (1965) (state-
ment of Ass't Att'y Gen. Herbert J. Miller). Federal enforcement of the gambling laws has
virtually eliminated most overt forms of illegal gambling. Two prevalent survivors-
numbers and bookmaking-are less open and less easily attacked. See GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 12.
221 See notes 165-68 and accompanying text supra.
222 See S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1951).
222 Pub. L. No. 87-840, 76 Stat. 1075 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1173, 1177 (1976)).
The impetus again came from Attorney General Kennedy, who testified that:
Ten years of experience in enforcement of this act shows that there are seri-
ous flaws and loopholes, and that a major revision is necessary.




(1) an expanded definition of "gambling devices" ;224
(2) substantially modified registration and filing require-
ments;
225
(3) a complete prohibition against the manufacture or pos-
session of such devices in the District of Columbia and other
federal enclaves; 2
26
(4) a forfeiture provision; 227 and
(5) a narrow exemption for devices clearly not associated
with gambling. 2 1
symbols thereon, oranges, cherries, plums, and here and there a jackpot. This is
the "one-arm bandit." The Johnson Act describes the operation of this machine as
having some element of chance which may deliver or entitle the player to receive
money or property. It further describes a machine which is coin operated and, of
course, the machine covered by the act. It also covers the so-called digger or crane
merchandise machine and some variations thereof. However, it does not cover
roulette machines or many other devices common to gambling casinos.
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, there is no logical reason why these devices should
not be included within the Johnson Act, or should not be banned from interstate
commerce. In addition, the existing definition will not extend to a machine in
current use which is in every practical respect a "one-arm bandit"-even to the
extent of its physical appearance. The machine I refer to is called a point maker.
On its face is a glass on which are painted the traditional slot machine symbols
which I mentioned. Behind the glass are [sic] a series of lights which flash on and
off until one remains in each column. The machine registers free games which
can be played off or paid off. This machine has been contrived by the gamblers to
evade the provisions of the Johnson Act. Because it has no drum or wheel, is not
coin operated and does not deliver any money directly to the player, it is not
covered by the act.
Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 169, at 13-14, quoted in S. REP. No. 645, 87th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 2 (1961). Congress passed the amendments after the House Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce had held hearings (see 1962 House Commerce Hearings, supra
note 169) and submitted a Report that considered the impact of syndicated gambling on the
gambling machine industry (see H.R. REP. No. 1828, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in
[1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3809, 3811-12; Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Miller to Representative Harris, Chairman House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce (June 8, 1962), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1828, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, re-
printed in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3809, 3816).
224 (a) The term "gambling device" means-
(1) any so-called "slot machine" ... or
(2) any other machine or mechanical device (including, but not limited to,
roulette wheels and similar devices) designed and manufactured
primarily for use in connection with gambling, and (A) which when
operated may deliver, as the result of the application of an element of
chance, any money or property, or (B) by the operation of which a
person may become entitled to receive, as the result of the application
of an element of chance, any money or property ....
15 U.S.C. § 1171(a) (1976).
2 2
' See id. § 1173.
2 26 See id. § 1175.
22 7 See id. § 1177.
228See id. § 1178. The provision exempts three categories of devices: (1) machines
[Vol. 63:923
1978] FEDERAL LAW OF GAMBLING
The Johnson Act was far more effective after the 1962
amendments. Courts accepted the broad definition of "gambling
devices" in applying the Act to numerous types of machines, 229 and
have consistently rebuffed attacks on the Act's constitutionality. 230
The courts have also enforced the registration provisions of the Act
against intrastate activities having interstate effects. 231 This judicial
action reflected an expanding interpretation of the scope of federal
power under the commerce clause.232
C. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
After enacting Attorney General Kennedy's program, Con-
gress confronted gambling just twice in the decade: in 1964, to
penalize bribery in sporting events, 233 and, in 1967, to restrict bank
designed to be used at a race track in connection with parimutuel betting; (2) machines
such as coin-operated bowling alleys and pinball machines that do not give prizes in money
or property; and (3) "claw" and "digger" machines "manufactured primarily for use at
carnivals or county or State fairs" and not operated by coins. Id.
229See United States v. Wilson, 475 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Bonanza" machine
which dispenses coupons redeemable for cash or store discount); United States v. Various
Gambling Devices, 368 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (pinball); United States v. 5 Gam-
bling Devices, 346 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. La. 1972) (pinball); United States v. 11 Star-Pack
Cigarette Merchandising Machs., 248 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (device attached to
cigarette vending machine that irregularly "pays off" with free package of cigarettes);
United States v. Two Coin-Operated Pinball Machs., 241 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Ky. 1965) (pin-
ball).
230 See, e.g., United States v. H.M. Branson Distrib. Co., 398 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1968) (§
1177 not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous); United States v. 5 Gambling Devices, 346
F. Supp. 999 (W.D. La. 1972) (§ 1177 forfeiture does not violate due process). Bu4 cf.
United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (self-incrimination
defense available in forfeiture proceeding enforcing wagering tax laws).
231 United States v. 5 Gambling Devices, 346 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. La. 1972).
232 See id. at 1004 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964)).23 2 See Act of June 6, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-316, 78 Stat. 203 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
224 (1976)). The operative provision provides:
Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry into effect, or conspires with
any other person to carry into effect any scheme in commerce to influence, in any
way, by bribery any sporting contest, with knowledge that the purpose of such
scheme is to influence by bribery that contest, shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 224(a) (1976). Major scandals involving the "fixing" of college basketball games
and the fear that state governments and athletic associations were powerless to control
organized crime, which was believed to be behind such bribery, led to the congressional
action. Congress did not seek to preempt local authorities in any way. See id. § 224(b).
On December 7, 1950, Bradley University, the top-ranked basketball team in the na-
tion, defeated Oregon State by a score of 77-74 in an important game. Bradley had been
favored by nine points. Several months later an investigation of organized crime in New
York revealed that Bradley had shaved points in order to win by fewer than nine. Brad-
ley's team captain had been the contact man with an organization headed by Salvatore
Tarto Sollazzo, and had distributed $4,000 among his teammates on this occasion. 108
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involvement in state-conducted lotteries.234 In 1970, however, a
comprehensive effort to restrain organized crime began with the
enactment of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.235 That
the Act devoted one title exclusively to gambling 236 reflected the
CONG. REC. 19175 (1962). Two more scandals marred college basketball in 1960 and 1961.
In the first, a New York City lawyer participated in an attempt to fix 25 games in ten
states. 110 CONG. REC. 921 (1964). The other involved 50 games in 23 cities and 17 states.
107 CONG. REC. 11705 (1961). In total, 26 men from 15 schools had accepted $44,000 in
bribes. 108 CONG. REC. 19175 (1962). The later scandals revealed that gamblers had be-
come more sophisticated in their methods. Instead of bribing the favored team, they would
bribe the underdog to lose by a few extra points. Players confessed that they had gone
full-speed on offense so that the score would look good but loafed on defense, allowing the
other team to score more freely. This method of point shaving was difficult to detect and
nearly impossible to prove. Id. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White to
Senator Eastland, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 23, 1962); 110
CONG. REC. 920-23 (1964).
Of the few convictions under this provision, several have involved fixed superfecta in
harness racing (see, e.g., United States v. Gerry, 515 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
832 (1975)), and bribery of football players (see, e.g., United States v. Nolan, 420 F.2d 552
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970)).
234 See Act of Dec. 15, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-203, §§ 1-4, 81 Stat. 608 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 25a, 339, 1730c, 1829a (1976)). See notes 289-95 and accompanying text infra.
The Act authorized criminal sanctions for knowing violation of the new provisions. Act of
Dec. 15, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-203, § 5, 81 Stat. 608 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976)).
235 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. The Organized Crime Control Act was not exclu-
sively a product of the Nixon Administration. Its intellectual origins lay in the work of the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967. See
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 147, at 16-19, 83-91.236 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 801-811, 84 Stat.
922. The gambling title was originally offered as a separate bill. See S. 2022, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969). Other provisions of the Act sought, inter alia, to establish special grand juries
(see Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 101-102, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1976)), to
provide immunity from prosecution for witnesses and informants (see id. §§ 201-260, 18
U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)), and to extend sentencing for recidivists (see id. §§ 1001-1002,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1976)). Title VIII escaped the controversy that surrounded many
of the other provisions. See generally Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary an S. 30, S. 974,
S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate S. 30 Hearings]; Organized Crime Control: Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 30 and related proposals, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as House S. 30 Hearings]; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4007; McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970).
The Act also contained other provisions affecting gambling, including a comprehen-
sive new title pertaining to racketeering activity (see Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
§§ 901-902, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976)) and the addition of the Act's prohibitions to
the list of potential crimes for which wiretap investigations would be authorized under
appropriate circumstances (see Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 810, 84 Stat. 922 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c) (1976)). Wiretapping has been used
extensively in the enforcement of gambling laws. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
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prevalent feeling that gambling was a steady and lucrative source
of revenue for the underworld.237
The gambling title of the Organized Crime Control Act con-
tained two substantive provisions:238 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which pro-
hibits illegal gambling businesses of a prescribed volume; 239 and 18
U.S.C. § 1511, which forbids conspiracy to obstruct state law en-
UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROV-
ING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1,
1976 TO DECEMBER 31, 1976, at 18 (1977) (42% of requests pertain to gambling); NATIONAL
COMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 142-45 (1976); GAMBLING IN AM,1ER-
ICA, supra note 2, at 44-46, 52 (surveillance recommended in major investigations).
237 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 147, at 2; S. REP. No.
1310, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962). Senator McClellan remarked upon introducing S.
3564, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), a precursor of the gambling title, that: "Gambling is the
principal source of income for the elements of organized crime and it is the purpose of
this bill to seek to shut off this flow of revenue by making it a crime to engage in a
substantial business enterprise of gambling." 114 CONG. REC. 15603 (1968).23S See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511, 1955 (1976). The two provisions utilize identical language in
their definitional sections. See id. §§ 1511 (b), 1955(b). Courts have construed the two pro-
visions together. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
239 The provision states in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or
part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which-
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which
it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a
period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any
single day.
(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, book making,
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lot-
teries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.
(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the
United States.
(c) If five or more persons conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or
own all or part of a gambling business and such business operates for two or more
successive days, then, for the purpose of obtaining warrants for arrests, intercep-
tions, and other searches and seizures, probable cause that the business receives
gross revenue in excess of $2,000 in any single day shall be deemed to have been
established.
(d) Any property, including money, used in violation of the provisions of this
section may be seized and forfeited to the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976). Section 1955(e) exempts activities conducted by tax-exempt or-
ganizations from the provision's prohibitions.
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forcement with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling busi-
ness.24 ° Together, the two provisions reach gambling enterprises
previously untouched by federal law.
Sections 1511 and 1955 are more sophisticated than any prior
federal criminal statutes designed to curb gambling. They repre-
sent an effort to reach conduct previously thought to be beyond
federal criminal jurisdiction.241  Relying on expanded notions of
federal power under the commerce clause,242 sections 1511 and
1955 do not require a specific showing of a relationship between
the proscribed activity and interstate commerce. Instead, feder-
al jurisdiction rests upon a congressional finding that gambling
businesses of a given size affect interstate commerce.243 Despite
early concerns that Congress's statutory reach might exceed its
constitutional grasp,2 44 courts of appeals have upheld the legisla-
240 The provision states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the
enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with
the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if-
(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of such
a conspiracy;
(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected, ap-
pointed, or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and
(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.
Id. § 1511(a) (1976). Subsection (b) contains the same definitions as § 1955(b), subsection
(c) exempts from § 1511(a) activities conducted by tax-exempt organizations, and subsec-
tion (d) provides penalties.
241 Before 1970, the federal government could reach local gambling only if it affected
an interstate facility. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 224, 1081-1084, 1301-1304, 1952-1953 (1976). The
failure of federal wagering excise taxes to expand effectively federal gambling jurisdiction
(see notes 324-54 and accompanying text infra) had increased the pressure for enactment of
federal statutes that could reach gambling without requiring a specific showing of interstate
impact.
242 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
243 "The Congress finds that illegal gambling involves widespread use of, and has an
effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities thereof." Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 801, 84 Stat. 922.
244 A colloquy between Senator McClellan and Assistant Attorney General Wilson dur-
ing Senate hearings on the bill is illustrative:
Senator McClellan: I am concerned that the effect of this bill would be to extend
Federal jurisdiction so far that it would be virtually the same as local criminal
jurisdiction in this area. Now, you have mentioned this problem in your re-
marks already.
Mr. Wilson: We have tried to head that off, and if we haven't done it, it needs to
be done, because it is not our purpose to move all this into Federal courts.
Senator McClellan: Our experience in the past has been that in such situations
the expansion of Federal power has tended to supplant, not merely supple-
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tion. 24 5 The new approach of sections 1511 and 1955 has practical
and theoretical advantages. The separation of jurisdictional ele-
ments from the substantive offense simplifies analysis of the ele-
ments of the crime.246 Once the prosecutor proves the requisite
jurisdictional volume and duration,247 the effect of the activity on
interstate commerce becomes irrelevant for purposes of conviction.
A further advantage of the statutes is that they proscribe only
conduct which "is a violation of the law of a State or political sub-
division in which it is conducted"; 24 theoretically, conflict between
federal and local gambling policies is eliminated.
249
ment, State criminal jurisdiction. Again, I take it that is what you want to
avoid?
Mr. Wilson: Yes, sir.
Senate S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 396. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
70-75 (1969); Senate S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 381 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen.
Wilson); id. at 394-402 (testimony of Ass't Att'y Gen. Wilson). Senator McClellan testified in
the House to the same effect. See House S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 105.245 See, e.g., United States v. Abramson, 553 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977); Powell v. Ward, 542 F.2d 99, 101 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes,
529 F.2d 472, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 999-1001 (9th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); United States v. Thaggard, 477 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 458 (3d
Cir. 1972); Schneider v. United States, 459 F.2d 540, 541-42 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 877 (1972). One court, in reversing a § 1955 conviction, has cautioned against abuse
of the technique. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Bridges, 493 F.2d 918 (5th Cir.
1974), held that the government had not proved the jurisdictional requirement necessary
to convict a four-man poker and craps ring that had recently added a fifth participant.
The court warned: "To construe these provisions as urged by the government would not
further the congressional purpose, for such a broad construction could subject almost any
small gambling operation to federal regulation. This is clearly not the function of § 1955."
Id. at 922. See also lanelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786-91 (1975).
246 For examples of Congress mingling the jurisdictional elements with the substantive
offense, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952-1953 (1976).
247 The prosecutor must prove: (1) that five or more persons are involved in the man-
ner required by the statute; (2) that the operation is in violation of local law; and (3) that it
has been operating for more than a month or does more than $2,000 business per day. A
disadvantage of this approach is that it grants prosecutors enormous discretion in deter-
mining whether federal involvement is appropriate in a particular case. But although many
small-scale, local gambling enterprises may meet the minimum criteria for a violation of §
1955, reasonable allocation of federal prosecutorial and judicial resources should militate
against prosecuting such operations. If the discretion permitted by § 1955 appears too
broad, Congress could remedy the problem simply by raising the jurisdictional require-
ments. For instance, Congress could raise the $2,000 per day volume requirement to $10,000
per day.
248 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i) (1976).
249 In some situations, however, conflict might occur. For example, obsolete but unre-
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Sections 1511 and 1955 presuppose the inability of local law
enforcement agencies to deal effectively with gambling. Section
1511 combats one source of that inability-official corruption:
No drive against illegal gambling can even begin to succeed in
those instances where it is to be undermined-and betrayed by
venal law-enforcement officers-police, prosecutors, or even
judges.
It is not pleasant to contemplate, but we cannot blind our-
selves to the distasteful fact that some bribery and bribery at-
tempts of law-enforcement officials at all levels have been charac-
teristic of the presence of organized crime.
Hence, the necessity to the Congress to enact a law which
makes obstruction of State and local law enforcement in such
areas a Federal offense.2 50
Its legislative history emphasizes that section 1511 prohibits only
the obstruction of justice in furtherance of gambling activities, and
only conduct meeting the traditional requirements of a conspir-
acy.25' Neither section 1511 nor section 1955 purports to reach the
individual gambler. He who "conducts, finances, manages, super-
vises, directs, or owns'' 252 an illegal gambling business is culpable;
he who merely bets is not.253
pealed local statutes may prohibit conduct that the community no longer condemns. Fed-
eral prosecutions based on such statutes would conflict with the community's tacit approval
of their nonenforcement.
250 115 CONG. REc. 10736 (1969) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
251 Early drafts of § 1511 used "scheme" instead of "conspiracy." See Senate S. 30 Hear-
ings, supra note 236, at 397 (testimony of Ass't Att'y Gen. Wilson). Opponents of the legisla-
tion criticized the word "scheme" as overly vague. See House S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236,
at 324 (Report by Comm. on Federal Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York).
Senator McClellan argued that participation in a scheme was actually more difficult to
prove than "conspiracy" because it required participation in the illicit activity, while "con-
spiracy" only required an overt, perhaps legal, act by one conspirator. See McClellan, supra
note 236, at 137. The point became academic when the House changed "scheme" to "con-
spiracy" in its version of the bill.
252 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511(b), 1955(b) (1976).
253 "The term 'conducts' refers both to high level bosses and street level employees. It
does not include the player in an illegal game of chance, nor the person who participates
in an illegal gambling activity by placing a bet." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
53 (referring to § 1511), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4028-29.
Earlier drafts had used "participates" instead of the series of verbs currently contained in
the statute. See, e.g., S. 2022, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in Senate S. 30 Hearings,
supra note 236, at 83. In United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), the court observed: "Thus Congress' intent was to in-
clude all those who participate in the operation of a gambling business, regardless how
minor their roles and whether or not they be labelled agents, runners, independent con-
tractors or the like, and to exclude only customers of the business." Id. at 232 (emphasis in
original).
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Because section 1955 has generated substantial litigation,
courts have resolved more questions of its constitutionality and
construction than they have with regard to section 1511. In many
respects, however, sections 1511 and 1955 may be considered in
pari materia. Section 1955 has withstood numerous challenges in-
volving commerce clause powers, 254 equal protection, 255 the right
to travel,25 6 and vagueness.257 Construction of section 1955 has
generated little controversy among the circuits.258 Once initial
254 See note 245 and accompanying text supra.
255 Courts have found no denial of equal protection in the application of § 1955 to
each state according to the laws of that state. See United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333,
1343 (10th Cir. 1973); Schneider v. United States, 459 F.2d 540, 542-43 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972); United States v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 345 F. Supp. 410, 427 (E.D.
La. 1972) ("The rule is simply that a variation in state laws does not in any way nullify or
render unreasonable a federal antigambling statute which incorporates state law."). The
exemption for tax-exempt organizations in §§ 1511(c) and 1955(e) has also been held not
to violate equal protection. See United States v. Thaggard, 477 F.2d 626, 630-31 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
256 See United States v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 345 F. Supp. 410, 427 (E.D. La. 1972).
257 See United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 459 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Garri-
son, 348 F. Supp. 1112, 1119-20 (E.D. La. 1972); United States v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 345 F.
Supp. 410, 427 (E.D. La. 1972).
258 There is one notable exception. Section 1955 defendants have asserted that under
Wharton's Rule, they could not be convicted for both the substantive offense created by §
1955, and for conspiracy to commit it, since § 1955 itself requires a minimum number of
participants. (Wharton's Rule applies to crimes, such as adultery and bribery, that logically
require a minimum of two participants. In such cases, a third party would be required for
conspiracy to be a logically separable offense.) The courts did not resolve the issue without
confusion. The better rule is that of United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975):
In asking us to apply Wharton's rule to the section 1955 situation, appellants mis-
conceive the import of that section's jurisdictional requirement that five or more
persons be involved in the illegal gambling business. Such jurisdictional require-
ments are unrelated to the criminal character of the conduct and should be sepa-
rately treated.
Other courts have held that Wharton's Rule presents no problem when more than five
defendants are indicted. See United States v. lannelli, 477 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1973),
aff'd, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). For a fallacious argument that Wharton's Rule
prohibits a double-count indictment charging conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) and
violation of § 1955, see United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (N.D. Ohio
1971):
Congress has established several jurisdictional elements for this offense. One,
which makes appropriate the application of "Wharton's Rule," is subsection (ii) of
the Act. Through this unique section, Congress has made the offense federally
cognizable only when there are five or more participants. One of the bases of
federal intervention is a concert of action between the parties. In other words, the
offense is one involving the element of concursus necessarius. That is, it is absolutely
necessary that there be a plurality of parties and it is necessary that there be
concerted action among them. It therefore appears that a charge of conspiring to
commit the offense should not be maintainable.
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problems were resolved, the bulk of litigation under the gambling
provisions concerned the propriety of law enforcement officers'
conduct under federal wiretapping provisions. 59
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 also dealt with
"racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations. ' 260 These pro-
visions, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, were primarily, but not
exclusively, aimed at curtailing the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate businesses. 26 1 Section 1962 prohibits a series of rela-
tionships between enterprises affecting interstate commerce and
participants in, or money derived from, a "pattern of racketeering
activity. '262 The title defines "racketeering activity" to include
The Supreme Court resolved the debate in favor of the better rule. See Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). See generally Comment, Gambling Under the Organized Crime
Control Act: Wharton's Rule and the Odds on Conspiracy, 59 IowA L. REv. 452 (1973); Note,
Wharton's Rule and Conspiracy to Operate an Illegal Gambling Business, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
613 (1973).
259 See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
908 (1974); United States v. Kleve, 465 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Curreri,
363 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Bleau, 363 F. Supp. 438 (D. Md. 1973);
Quintina v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 769 (D. Mass. 1973).
210 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 901, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
261 Senator McClellan stated:
Threats, arson and assault are used to force competitors out of business and ob-
tain larger shares of the market. Building contractors pay tribute for the privilege
of using nonunion labor, while labor unions infiltrated by organized crime raise
no objection. A corporation is bled of its assets, goods obtained by the corporation
on credit are sold for a quick profit, and then the corporation is forced into bank-
ruptcy while the criminals who infiltrated it disappear. Large sums in stocks and
bonds are stolen from brokerage houses and banks, and then used as collateral to
obtain loans. Income routinely is understated for tax purposes, so that mob busi-
nesses have competitive advantages over businesses which report all their income.
These methods and others give such a competitive advantage to the mob enter-
prise that monopoly power is approached or gained, and prices are raised.
House S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 106. The final legislation, of course, prohibited
more than the criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses; it prohibited the operation by
any person of any enterprise that through a pattern of racketeering activity affected in-
terstate commerce. See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(provision not limited to legitimate businesses), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United
States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1975) (provision not limited to organized
crime), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
Organized crime has obtained much of its original financing for both legitimate and
illegitimate ventures from syndicated gambling. Senator McClellan stated:
We must recognize, too, that La Cosa Nostra's control of gambling ravishes the
entire society, not merely the gamblers, since the $6 or $7 billion profit organized
gambling operators earn each year bankrolls not only the Mafia drug trade, but
organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business and other activities, and this is
one of the Nation's most serious criminal justice and economic problems.
House S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 87. But see Reuter & Rubenstein, Fact, Fancy and Or-
ganized Crime, 53 PUB. INTEREST 45 (1978).
262 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). Subsection (a) prohibits the investment of income de-
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gambling activity prohibited by sections 1084, 1511, 1952, 1953,
and 1955, as well as numerous other forms of criminal activity. 263
A "pattern" is two acts of "racketeering" occurring within ten years
of each other.264
Civil remedies resembling those available under the antitrust
laws are an important aspect of this title of the Act. 265 Section 1964
empowers district courts to employ a broad range of equitable rem-
edies to prevent or restrain violations of section 1962.266 In addi-
tion, injured parties may bring treble damage actions. 267 Further,
section 1965 provides liberal venue and service of process for civil
actions. 268 The only serious question posed by the civil provisions
concerns the extent to which their use by the government as substi-
tutes for criminal prosecution may circumvent constitutional
guarantees afforded defendants by the criminal justice system.2 69
rived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" in any enterprise engaged in or affecting
interstate commerce. Subsection (b) prohibits the acquisition of an interest in such an en-
terprise through a "pattern of racketeering activity." The remaining two subsections pro-
scribe conducting the affairs of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce
through a "pattern of racketeering activity" and prohibit conspiring to violate any of the
other subsections of § 1962.
23 See id. § 1961. Subsection (1) defines "racketeering activity" as any threat or act,
punishable under state law by imprisonment for more than one year, involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in dangerous drugs.
Racketeering activity also encompasses a lengthy list of felonies indictable under Title 18.
264 See id. § 1961(5). At least one of these acts must have occurred after the effec-
tive date of §§ 1961-1968, and the 10-year period excludes any period of imprison-
ment.
26 See id. § 1964. The Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward
Gambling found the civil provisions "to be cost-effective, thorough, and capable of great
success in stemming illegal gambling in the United States." GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra
note 2, at 21.266 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976). The court may force divestiture of any interest in
any enterprise held by any person and may prohibit involvement in certain enterprises.
The court may also force dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. For discussion of
§ 1964 remedies, see United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975). Section 1964(b) provides that the Attorney General may institute such
proceedings; § 1966 permits him to request accelerated disposition. Section 1964(d) estops
a defendant from denying in a civil proceeding issues finally determined against him in a
criminal proceeding under §§ 1961-1963.
267 "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 ... may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
2" See id. § 1965. Nationwide service of process is available if "the ends of justice
require." Id. § 1965(b).
269 The civil proceedings under §§ 1964-1968 arguably have impact equal to that of
many criminal proceedings and possess many advantages for prosecutors:
These time-tested remedies . . . should enable the Government to intervene in
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Sharp controversy accompanied the adoption of sections.
1961-1968. Opponents condemned the list of crimes constituting
"racketeering activity" as overinclusive, 27 0 the statutory definition
of "pattern" as overbroad,2 7 1 the statute as ill-designed for its prac-
tically unachievable goals, 272 and the civil remedies provided as
subject to abuse. 27 3 The statute's proponents prevailed, however,
many situations which are not susceptible to proof of a criminal violation. Thus, in
contrast to a criminal proceeding, the civil procedure .. .with its lesser standard
of proof, non-injury [sic] adjudication process, amendment of pleadings, etc., will
provide a valuable new method of attacking the evil aimed at in this bill. The
relief offered by these equitable remedies would also seem to have greater poten-
tial than that of the penal sanctions for actually removing the criminal figure from
a particular organization and enjoining him from engaging in similar activity. Fi-
nally, these remedies are flexible, allowing of several alternate courses of action
for dealing with a particular type of predatory activity, and they may also be effec-
tively monitored by the Court to insure that its decrees are not violated.
Letter from Deputy Attorney General Kliendienst to Senator McClellan (August 11, 1969),
reprinted in Senate S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 404, 408.
Whether the United States will choose to use these measures in marginal situations
and, if so, whether such use will be held constitutional remains to be seen. For a sympa-
thetic analysis of the civil provisions, see Comment, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of
Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192 (1975).
Sections 1964-1968 have had only a short enforcement history. Courts have resolved
constitutional challenges to (1) the validity of an order obtained by the United States for
civil injunctive relief and (2) the application of the criminal provisions in § 1962 to the
acquisition of a foreign corporation. See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th
Cir. 1974) (dismissing defendants' claim that § 1964 circumvented a failure of proof under
criminal standards, citing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), for proposition that Congress
may authorize injunctive relief to remove obstructions to interstate commerce), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975). Private treble damage actions under § 1964 have also been litigated.
See, e.g., King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
270 One group complained that many of the criminal provisions included in the defini-
tion of "racketeering activity" were relatively minor violations that could receive far harsher
penalties if prosecuted under § 1962. See House S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 327-29
(Report by Comm. on Federal Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York). Sen-
ator McClellan defended the list, arguing that "[t]he listed offenses lend themselves to or-
ganized commercial exploitation, unlike some other offenses such as rape, and experience
has shown they are commonly committed by participants in organized crime." McClellan,
supra note 236, at 142-43.
271 The requirement that two acts must have occurred within 10 years of each other
was added to § 1961(5) in response to ACLU complaints that an earlier version created a
"pattern" from one recent occurrence linked without limit to any prior activity enumerated
in § 196 1(1). See House S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236, at 499 (statement of Lawrence Speiser,
Director, Washington, D.C. Office, ACLU).
272 See id. at 328-29 (statement of Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman, Comm. on Federal
Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York); id. at 499 (statement of Lawrence
Speiser, Director, Washington, D.C. Office, ACLU). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (Dissenting Views), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4007, 4081-82.
273 H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88 (Dissenting Views), reprinted in
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4083-84; House S. 30 Hearings, supra note 236,
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placing an effective weapon in the hands of the Department of
Justice.
The development of federal criminal statutes manifests a rec-
ognition of the importance of balancing state and federal policies
in curtailing objectionable forms of gambling. Although overall
federal involvement in the regulation of gambling has increased
steadily, the basic federal role has been to support state policies.
As presently constituted, the federal criminal statutes define nar-
row parameters of permissible activity, but afford the states suf-




A. Criminal Provisions in Federal Enclaves
The federal government exercises power over Indian reserva-
tions, 274 military installations, the District of Columbia, 275 and
United States territories and possessions. 276 Only one federal stat-
ute deals expressly with gambling in such enclaves: 15 U.S.C. §
1175, enacted as part of the Johnson Act in 1951.277 Although
section 1175 regulates only gambling devices, state laws regulating
or prohibiting other forms of gambling may also apply in areas of
federal jurisdiction. The Assimilative Crimes Act278 adopts state
at 499 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington, D.C. Office, ACLU).
274 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
275 Id. § 8, cl. 17.
276 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
277 Act of Jan. 2, 1951, ch. 1194, § 5, 64 Stat. 1134 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1175
(1976)).
It shall be unlawful to manufacture, recondition, repair, sell, transport, possess, or
use any gambling device in the District of Columbia, in any possession of the
United States, within Indian country as defined in section 1151 of title 18 or
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States as de-
fined in section 7 of title 18.
15 U.S.C. § 1175 (1976).
278 Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter re-
served or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or
omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress,
would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State,
Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws
thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense
and subject to a like punishment.
18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). A revised Assimilative Crimes Act has been included in the pro-
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statutes as federal substantive law to govern offenses not covered
by the federal criminal code.
Congress has freely exercised its guardianship over Indians,27 9
asserting its constitutional power under the commerce clause, 280
the doctrine of federal preemption, 28 ' and the concept of a na-
tional police power.282 Even before Congress adopted the Johnson
Act, a federal court restricted the use of gambling devices on an
Indian reservation by invoking the Assimilative Crimes Act and
applying state law. 283 And in United States v. Blackfeet Tribe,28 4 the
court found the congressional regulation of gambling devices in
section 1175 to be a legitimate exercise of national police power. 28 5
Until Congress abdicates its jurisdiction over the Indian tribes,28 6
they will remain subject to both federal and state regulation.
The status of military installations in regard to gambling laws
resembles that of the Indian reservations. Apart from section 1175,
and any state law applicable through the Assimilative Crimes Act,
gambling on military installations is also subject to the rules and
posed recodification of Title 18. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978) (proposed
18 U.S.C. § 1862).2
,9 See generally Waldmeir, Federal Enclaves in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, app.
I, at 933, 936-950.
280 See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1975); Perrin v. United
States, 232 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1914); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey
(Lariviere), 93 U.S. 188, 194-95 (1876); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407,
417 (1865).
281 See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
282 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886). But see Organized Village
of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
283 In United States v. Sosseur, 87 F. Supp. 225 (W.D. Wis. 1949), a Chippewa Indian
was convicted under Wisconsin state law for operating a slot machine on a reservation,
even though the Tribal Council had granted him a license to do so.
284 369 F. Supp. 562 (D. Mont. 1973).
282 "[The police] power is not dependent upon specific constitutional grant and is ple-
nary. Where the police power is found, the control of gambling is a legitimate exercise of
it." Id. at 564-65.
286 Congress has attempted to relinquish to certain states jurisdiction over reservations
within their borders, with the ultimate goal of terminating federal domain. See Act of Aug.
15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1976), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)). Subsequent legislation, however, requires tribal consent
before a state may assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over a reservation. See 25 U.S.C. §§
1321-1326 (1976). The extent to which Public Law 280 shifts jurisdiction from the federal
government to the states involved remains unclear. Compare Santa Rosa Band of Indians v.
Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975) (local land use regulation held inapplicable to
tribe and its lands), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) with Rincon Band of Mission Indians
v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp, 471 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (county ordinance prohibiting
gambling held applicable to card games operated by Indians), dismissed on other grounds, 495
F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974). See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280:
The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535 (1975).
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regulations promulgated by that branch of the armed services hav-
ing jurisdiction. 287 With a few exceptions,288 federal gambling legis-
lation applies to United States possessions in the same manner as it
applies to the states.
B. Miscellaneous Noncriminal Provisions
In 1967, shortly after New York began to operate its state
lottery, Congress amended the federal banking laws to prohibit
banks insured by federal agencies from distributing or advertising
lottery tickets.2 8 9 The extensive legislative history of the amend-
ments290 discloses several intertwined rationales. The committee
... See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 22, 32 n.119.
288 15 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1976) defines only the Virgin Islands and Guam as "states" for
the purposes of the Johnson Act. American Samoa and other minor island holdings would
seem, therefore, to be the only "possessions" referred to in 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (1976), quoted
in note 287 supra. Micronesia, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific, is under the adminis-
trative jurisdiction of the United States, but is not subject to any federal gambling laws. See
Waldmeir, supra note 279, at 950-51. Congress has extended 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976) to
the Panama Canal Zone, thereby prohibiting the transportation of lottery tickets to the
Zone. Id. Through a contractual arrangement with the United States, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico is excluded from the proscriptions of the Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-
1178 (1976), and from United States Internal Revenue laws (see 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1970)). See
GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 23. See generally Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal
Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 GEO. L. REv. 219 (1967).
28
' See Act of Dec. 15, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-203, 81 Stat. 608. This Act amended four
banking acts. To the National Banking Act, it added Rev. Stat. § 5136A (12 U.S.C. § 25a
(1976)); to the Federal Reserve Act, a new § 9A (12 U.S.C. § 339 (1976)); to the National
Housing Act, a new § 410 (12 U.S.C. § 1730c (1976)); and to the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act, a new § 20 (12 U.S.C. § 1829a (1976)). The Act also added 18 U.S.C. § 1306
(1976), making criminal a violation of any of the other provisions. The new provisions are
similarly worded and each aims at a different type of financial institution. An example of
the statutory scheme, 12 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1976), reads in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited activities
A national bank may not-
(1) deal in lottery tickets;
(2) deal in bets used as a means or substitute for participation in a lottery;
(3) announce, advertise, or publicize the existence of any lottery;
(4) announce, advertise, or publicize the existence or identity of any par-
ticipant or winner, as such, in a lottery.
(b) Use of banking premises prohibited
A national bank may not permit-
(1) the use of any part of any of its banking offices by any persons for any
purpose forbidden to the bank under subsection (a) ....
Banks are, however, allowed to perform "lawful banking services" for state-operated lot-
teries. See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 19.
290 See generally H.R. REP. No. 382, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. REP. No. 727, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2228; Prohibition on Use of
Financial Institutions as Lottery Agencies: Hearings on H.R. 10595 Before the Subcomm. on Finan-
cial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Banking Hearings]; To Prohibit Certain Financial Institutions from
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reports viewed the proposals as mere extensions of a preexisting
federal policy denying gambling activities the use of federal
facilities. 29 1 The Chairman of the House Committee on Banking
and Currency justified the extension on moral grounds and on his
view of appropriate banking functions. 292 Others suggested that the
Participating in Gambling Activities: Hearings on H.R. 892 Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as House Banking Hearings].
291 See H.R. REP. No. 382, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1967); S. REP. No. 727, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2228, 2229-30.
292 In introducing the bill, H.R. 9892, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), Congressman Pat-
man, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, called gambling an "unmitigated evil"
(113 CONG. REC. 12,346 (1967)), and argued that bank participation in gambling enter-
prises "is a great boost to the gambling interests and opens the door to eventual domina-
tion or outright takeover of these banks by the gambling syndicates" (id.). Patman elabo-
rated:
[T]he purpose of the bill is to reaffirm the traditional policy of Congress and of
all branches of the Federal Government to shun gimmickry, deception, gambling,
huckstering, and all fast-buck activities; and instead to meet Federal obligations
and Federal responsibilities on a high plane of ethics. Between the lines of the
legalisms written into this bill, you may read-and I hope Members of Congress
and all other citizens will read-this statement: "The Federal Government of the
United States is too proud to work as a shill for gamblers."
Id. at 18582. Patman alluded to the federal antilottery policy in effect since President Ben-
jamin Harrison's pleas to Congress in 1890. Id. Patman then specifically addressed the New
York lottery: "It is not the purpose of this legislation to impede the New York State lottery
in any manner, or to question the morality of such a lottery. But, rather, the legislation
seeks to keep banks' activities limited to normal banking operations, which certainly do not
include selling lottery tickets." Id. at 15171. Other Congressmen stressed that bank in-
volvement in lottery-related activities was inappropriate. See House Banking Hearings, supra
note 290, at 19 (remarks of Rep. Wylie) ("[T]here is a certain element of dignity and trust
about a bank and action on the part of the Federal Government, the State and so forth,
which would allow banks to sell lottery tickets is not proper ...."); 113 CONG. REc. 32197
(1967) (remarks of Senator Lausche) ("[T]he Federal Government should not be a partici-
pant in pandering to and promoting the passions."); 113 CONG. REC. 18669 (1967) (remarks
of Rep. Horton) ("I do not feel this is an appropriate function for financial institutions, the
traditional bastions of thrift and frugality.").
Among the bill's opponents was Senator Javits of New York. He argued that "Congress
has refrained from asserting its authority where a State has instituted a lottery" (Senate
Banking Hearings, supra note 290, at 26), and that "[a]nything one wishes could be legislated
under the guise of regulating banks on grounds of respectability or morality or ethics" (113
CONG. REC. 32193 (1967)). The minority views appended to the Senate Report were
framed in terms reminiscent of the states' rights controversy over the 19th century antilot-
tery legislation. See S. REP. No. 727, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, reprinted in [1967] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2228, 2240.
Indeed, much in the legislative history of these provisions echoes the old arguments
over the legitimacy of the lotteries themselves. See DEVELOPmENTS, supra note 9, at 81-88. It
is not without a little irony, therefore, that it is recalled that major segments of the finan-
cial community trace their origins to 19th century lotteries. See J. EZELL, supra note 9, at
82-84. The firm of S & M Allen transformed itself from a lottery-brokerage house into a
private banking and stock brokerage firm. Further, S & M Allen was the learning place of
Enoch W. Clark, a relative of the Aliens, who established E.W. Clark & Co., a private
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legislation was necessary to restore the competitive equality upset
when savings and loan associations but not other financial institu-
tions abandoned the lottery business. 293
Despite the vehement attacks on the admixture of banking and
gambling, the final legislation is an incomplete prohibition of
bank involvement with lotteries. The amendments do not forbid
banks from performing traditional banking services for lotteries,
and the extent of other permissible activities will remain undefined
until the amendments receive judicial scrutiny294 or administrative
gloss.
2 9 5
Several other federal statutes not yet mentioned relate to
gambling. Although they have little independent policy significance
and have not generated great controversy, these provisions are a
part of the federal policy toward gambling.
The Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act 296 authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to deny, revoke, or suspend a prospective ag-
ricultural labor foreman's certificate of registration for reasons that
include a prior conviction for gambling.297 Congress feared that
unscrupulous crew leaders would exploit migrant farm workers
through gambling.298
banking firm. The Clark concern was the nation's largest dealer in domestic currency in
the mid-1800's. Jay Cooke and Company, which was the leading investment house of the
Civil War, was a descendant of E.W. Clark & Co. Other prominent banking concerns with
close ties to lotteries include the First National Bank of New York and Chase Manhattan
Bank.
293 The General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had ruled: "[T]he
sale of lottery tickets by Federal savings and loan institutions would be inconsistent with
their objectives as thrift institutions .... " Memorandum of Kenneth E. Scott, General
Counsel, FHLB (May 15, 1967), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 382, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 14, 17
(1967). Federal savings and loan associations subsequently halted lottery ticket sales, put-
ting other financial institutions in a superior competitive position. See S. REP. No. 727, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2228, 2231.
294 In Canal Nat'l Bank v. Mills, 405 F. Supp. 249 (D. Me. 1975), the court refused to
issue a declaratory judgment on legality of banks acting as "escrow agents" for the state
lottery. The court found no justiciable controversy because prosecution was unlikely in
light of opinions forwarded the banks by regulatory authorities. Id. at 351-54. In reviewing
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1976), the Fifth Circuit referred to the banking
amendments as examples of the policy against use of facilities within federal control for
gambling purposes. Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895, 898 & n.8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 919 (1968).
295 Each statute empowered the supervisory authorities of the subject banks to issue
"such regulations as may be necessary." 12 U.S.C. §§ 25a(e), 339(e), 1730c(e), 1829a(e)
(1976).
296 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 7, 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920).
297 7 U.S.C. § 2044(b) (1976).
298 Many labor contractors perform their functions in a satisfactory and re-
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Immigration and naturalization provisions require findings of
"good moral character," which, in certain circumstances, may
exclude gamblers. 299 The government has used this provision sev-
eral times in deportation proceedings. 30 0 An analogous section of
the Tariff Act of 1922301 prohibits the importation of lottery tickets
and advertisements. 30 2 The Act establishing the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration to aid in the fight against organized
crime includes gambling in its list of target criminal activities. 30 3
The FCC also has authority to administer sanctions for violations of
the antilottery statutes. 30 4
sponsible manner. However, because of their dependency upon the contractors,
migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by irrespon-
sible labor contractors. Moreover, the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce are being used to perpetrate such exploitation and abuse.
S. REP. No. 202, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963). "[T]he crew leader.., is the source of week-
end entertainment often consisting of whiskey, women, and 'Georgia skin,' a gambling
game." S. REP. No. 167, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1963) (quoting Migratory Labor: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 610 (1959) (remarks of Mariana C. Alcock, representative of the
American Friends Serv. Comm.)).
299 For the purposes of this chapter-
No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral
character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be
established is, or was-
(4) one whose income is derived principally from illegal gambling activities;
(5) one who has been convicted of two or more gambling offenses committed
during such period ....
8 U.S.C. _§ 1101(f) (1976) (originally enacted as McCarran-Walter Act, ch. 477, § 101(f), 66
Stat. 163 (1952)). The inclusion of gambling in § I101(f) was an attempt to clarify 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(12) (1976), which excludes aliens who seek admission to "engage in any ... un-
lawful commercialized vice."
300 8 U.S.C. § I 101(f)(5) (1976) survived constitutional attack in In re Lee Wee, 143 F.
Supp. 736 (S.D. Cal. 1956), in which it was asserted that the provision made "moral charac-
ter" turn on whether the jurisdiction where the alien happened to live permitted gambling.
See generally In re A-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 242 (1954) (Italian alien convicted for "bookmaking
and pool selling" and arrested for lottery violations held deportable); In re S-K-C-, 8 I.
& N. Dec. 185 (1958) (Chinese national employed as dealer in Chinese dominoes and fan-
tan at Seattle club in violation of Washington law held deportable).
301 Ch. 356, § 305, 42 Stat. 858 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976)).
302 All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any
foreign country ... any lottery ticket, or any printed paper that may be used as a
lottery ticket, or any advertisement of any lottery.
19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1976). Congress enacted the predecessor of § 1305 in 1894, when
antilottery sentiment was strong. See Tariff of 1894, ch. 349, § 10, 28 Stat. 509.
303 See 42 U.S.C. § 3781(b) (1976) (originally enacted as Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 601, 82 Stat. 197).
304 See note 97 supra.
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Although the Senate failed to follow suit, the House of Repre-
sentatives approved the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1976,305
prohibiting a "parimutuel wager being placed or accepted in one
State with respect to the outcome of a horserace taking place in
another State. '30 6 The bill sought to regulate interstate commerce
with respect to parimutuel wagering in order to maintain the stabil-
ity of the horseracing industry. 307 By approving the bill, the House
registered its willingness to use federal power 308 to protect and
promote the business of racetrack gambling. 30 9 Proponents of the
30 The bill, H.R. 14071, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), passed the House on Sept. 21,
1976. 122 CONG. REC. H10719 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976). Its operative provision declares
that "[n]o person may accept any interstate off-track parimutuel wager." H.R. 14071, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1976).
306 H.R. REP. No. 1366, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The remedies provided by the
Act include the right of the host state or racing association, or a horse owner whose horse
ran in the subject race, to sue for "liquidated damages." H.R. 14071, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §
5 (1976). As a general rule, the liquidated damages are set at treble the amount that would
have been distributed to the plaintiff had the wager been properly placed at the track. Id.
The bill grants federal courts subject matter jurisdiction, permits venue in the state of the
event or where the off-track betting facilities are located, and provides for nationwide ser-
vice of process. Id. § 7. The statute of limitations is set at three years from the discovery of
the alleged violation, and intervention is allowed as of right for racing associations, states,
or horse owners affected by the action. Id. § 6.
307 H.R. 14071, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(6) (1976). The drafters of the bill premised it
on a finding that "attendance and wagering at racetracks are adversely affected by off-
track parimutuel wagering." Id. § 2(4). This premise is based on the unsubstantiated esti-
mate that "if interstate wagering is permitted to develop nationwide, thoroughbred horse-
racing would be reduced from 99 tracks to two or three, thoroughbreds raced would be
reduced from 58,520 to about 5,000, and licensed track employees would be reduced from
101,000 to about 7,500." H. R. REP. No. 1366, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
308 The bill presents several problems. Because it might force a state to defend an
action brought without its consent, the bill may violate the eleventh amendment. See Letter
from Assistant Attorney General Uhlmann to Representative Staggers, Chairman, House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (June 14, 1976), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
1366, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1976). The bill also reflects a substantive policy choice
that conflicts with the interests of several states. For example, both New York and Connect-
icut, the only two states where off-track betting is currently legal, oppose the statute. See,
e.g., Interstate Horseracing Act: Hearings on H.R. 11973 and 11610 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1976) (testimony of Paul R. Screvane, President and Chairman of the
Board of Directors, New York City Off-Track Betting Corp.); id. at 153 (statement of Paul
Silvergleid, Chairman, Conn. Comm'n of Special Revenue). For other dissenting views, see
H.R. REP. No. 1366, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-22 and 122 CONG. REC. H10696-700 (daily
ed. Sept. 21, 1976).
309 The Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling has op-
posed the Interstate Horseracing Act because it conflicts with the Commission's proposed
"hands off" policy in regard to the states. The Commission recommends that interstate
off-track betting be federally prohibited only in states that prohibit it. See GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 140.
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The Internal Revenue Code includes a number of provisions ex-
pressly addressing gambling.3 1' Section 4401 levies a two-percent
excise tax on all wagers placed with a gambling business.312 The
Code also imposes an occupational tax on the operators of gam-
bling businesses,313 and a tax on coin-operated gambling devices.314
Other sections provide definitions, 315 require registration and rec-
ordkeeping,31 6 demand confidentiality of information relating to
the imposition of the wagering taxes, 3 17 and impose penalties. 318
31o See S. 1185, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 8046, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S.
REP. No. 1117, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).31 1 See I.R.C. §§ 4401-4424, 4461-4464.
312 See I.R.C. § 4401. I.R.C. § 4402, however, exempts: (1) wagers placed with pari-
mutuels licensed by a state; (2) wagers placed on coin-operated devices taxed under I.R.C.
§§ 4461-4464; and (3) wagers placed in state lotteries. The exemption for state-operated
lotteries currently reads as follows:
No tax shall be imposed by this subchapter-
(3) State-conducted Lotteries, etc. On any wager placed in a sweepstakes, wa-
gering pool, or lottery which is conducted by an agency of a State acting under
authority of State law, but only if such wager is placed with the State agency
conducting such sweepstakes, wagering pool, or lottery, or with its authorized
employees or agents.
Id. § 4402(3). Congress added the original version of this provision to the statute after the
establishment of the New Hampshire Sweepstakes, to avoid having federal tax laws inhibit
a lawful state enterprise. See note 369 infra.
1
13 See I.R.C. § 4411 (tax of $500 per year on persons liable for taxes under § 4401
or their agents).
314 See id. § 4461 (tax of $250 per machine per year). The tax applies to machines of
the slot machines genus, but excepts "bona fide vending or amusement" machines,
machines that dispense a prize of merchandise valued at under a nickel, and machines
dispensing legal tickets from a state-operated lottery. Id. § 4462(b).315 See id. § 4421.
316 See id. §§ 4403 (persons liable for excise tax must maintain daily records of gross
amount of all wagers placed with them), 4412 (persons liable for occupational tax must
provide locations of businesses giving rise to tax, addresses of agents receiving wagers, and
other information), 4423 (granting IRS access to books of account of persons subject to
wagering taxes).3 17 Id. § 4424.
318 The general penalty sections of the Code apply, including I.R.C. § 7201 (penalties
for tax evasion), and I.R.C. § 7203 (penalties for failure to file return or provide informa-
tion). Further, I.R.C. § 4422 provides that the wagering taxes imposed by §§ 4401-4424
should not be construed as preemptively federal, but instead as allowing parallel state taxa-
tion.
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In addition, gambling winnings,319 like all illegal income, 2 ° come
within the statutory definition of gross income.32 1 A specific provi-
sion allows the taxpayer to deduct gambling losses only to offset
gambling winnings, and denies him an offset against other types
of income.32 2 Otherwise, gambling income is treated no differently
than income from other sources.
32 3
A. Special Wagering Taxes
1. Legislative and Enforcement History
The current wagering excise and occupational taxes evolved
from tax legislation first enacted in 1951.324 That law imposed a
ten-percent tax on wagers placed on sporting events, betting pools,
and lotteries conducted for profit.325 Those who conducted gam-
bling enterprises within the statutory definition had to pay the ten-
percent tax,326 and were expected, in turn, to reduce the odds they
gave their customers.3 27 The law also required operators to make
'19 See Winkler v. United States, 230 F.2d 766, 776 (lst Cir. 1956).320 See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzled funds taxable); United
States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (gains from illicit liquor traffic taxable).
321 See, e.g., Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937) (lottery); Weiner v. Com-
missioner, 10 B.T.A. 905 (1928) (card playing). The tax is based on the return on the
wager-the gambler's taxable income does not include the recovery of his initial wager, his
capital investment. See Silver v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 461, 463 (1940).322 See I.R.C. § 165(d). See generally Skeeles v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 242 (Ct. Cl.
1951).
13 Before 1970, income derived from gambling was ineligible for income averaging
under I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305, but Congress eliminated this exclusion. See Tax Reform Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311 (d)(2)(F), 83 Stat. 487.
3 24 See Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183, §§ 463, 471, 65 Stat. 452 (current ver-
sion at I.R.C. §§ 4461, 4401-4424). Only that part of the tax relating to coin-operated
gambling devices had existed prior to 1951. See Revenue Act of 1941, ch. 412, § 555, 55
Stat. 687 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 4461-4464).
32' See I.R.C. § 4421(1). Congress excluded card games, roulette, dice games, and social
and friendly wagers, but this did not reflect
any belief that they are not suitable subjects for taxation. However, the method of
taxation which the bill proposes, while particularly appropriate to bookmaking and
to policy operation, does not appear readily adaptable to these other forms of
gambling .... In any event, your committee believes that the tax it proposes will
cover at least 90 percent of total commercial wagering.
H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in [1951] U.S. ConE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1781, 1840-41. The Report cited no evidence for the 90% estimate.
32r I.R.C. § 4401(c).
327 One might assume that a gambling enterprise would simply add the tax onto the
price of the bet, decreasing the customer's expected rate of return. Few illegal gambling
operations, however, would face this situation because most would illegally evade such a
tax.
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elaborate disclosures, including lists of employees and gross
amounts of wagers, 328 and to purchase and display occupational
tax stamps. 329
Congress had two goals in passing the wagering excise taxes:
to tap additional sources of revenue during a period of extreme
budgetary pressures,33 0 and to combat organized crime by seizing
gambling profits. 331 Illegal operators affected by the tax would
32 See I.R.C. §§ 4403, 4412. I.R.C. § 6107 (repealed 1968) placed an affirmative duty
on the IRS to make lists of taxpayers under the wagering taxes available to local prosecutors.
329 I.R.C. § 6806 (repealed 1968) required those liable under §§ 4411 and 4461 to
"place and keep conspicuously" occupational tax stamps in their business establishments.
330 President Truman, in a special message to Congress on Feb. 2, 1951, urged a "pay
as we go tax program" ([1951] PUB. PAPERS 134, 136) and asked for increased personal and
corporate income taxes and new excise taxes to cover increased government spending (id.
136-37). The House Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1951 stated:
Commercialized gambling holds the unique position of being a multibillion-
dollar, Nation-wide business that has remained comparatively free from taxation
by either State or Federal Governments. This relative immunity from taxation has
persisted in spite of the fact that wagering has many characteristics which make it
particularly suitable as a subject for taxation. Your committee is convinced that the
continuance of this immunity is inconsistent with the present need for increased
revenue, especially at a time when many consumer items of a seminecessity nature
are being called upon to bear new or additional tax burdens.
H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 55, reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1781, 1838. See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 113, reprinted in [1951] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1969, 2090. The Reports also contained estimates of $407 million
per year in expected revenue from the new taxes, which would ease the budgetary pressures
caused by the Korean War. See H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 54, reprinted in
[1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1781, 1837; S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong. Ist Sess.
112, reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1969, 2089.
331 Although House and Senate Reports on the bill framed it as a revenue measure
only, floor debates reveal that many Congressmen regarded the bill as a weapon to fight
organized crime. See, e.g., 97 CONG. REC. 6892 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Cooper). This
second purpose of the wagering excise taxes comports with the Kefauver Committee rec-
ommendations. The Committee had believed that gambling was the mainstay of organized
crime and that taxation could be used to combat it effectively. See S. REP. No. 307, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12, 13-14 (1951) See generally Comment, The Use of Taxation to Control
Organized Crime, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 226 (1951); Note, Federal Regulation of Gambling: Betting
on a Long Shot, 57 GEO. L.J. 573 (1969). The IRS disagreed. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TAX STATUTES RELATING TO GAMBLING
AND INTERNAL REVENUE ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 1953-1973, at 3 (1975) (unpublished re-
port submitted to the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling)
[hereinafter cited as IRS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The Kefauver Committee's conclusions continue to reappear at the highest levels of
government. In a 1969 message to Congress, President Nixon stated: "[Organized Crime's]
economic base is principally derived from its virtual monopoly of illegal gambling, the num-
bers racket, and the importation of narcotics." Special Message to Congress on a Program
To Combat Organized Crime in America, reprinted in [1969] PRES. PAPERS 315, 315, re-
printed in H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), quoted in S. REP. No. 764, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972).
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either suffer reduced profits and subject themselves to prosecution
for violating local gambling laws, or risk federal prosecution for tax
evasion.332
Difficulties in enforcement crippled the 1951 wagering tax
legislation. The Internal Revenue Service had opposed the legisla-
tion from the outset, believing that the new tax would prove un-
productive and unenforceable. 333 IRS Commissioner Dunlap, tes-
tifying before the House Appropriations Committee, also felt that a
feebly enforced gambling tax would breed contempt for other tax
provisions. 334 He requested, without success, that Congress provide
Although Senator Kefauver was himself concerned about converting the IRS into a
"crime-control agency" (see 97 CONG. REc. 12231 (remarks of Senator Kefauver)), the
Kefauver Committee recommendations urged a large role for the IRS in the battle against
organized crime:
IV.... The Bureau of Internal Revenue should maintain on a current and con-
tinuing basis a list of known gangsters, racketeers, gamblers, and criminals whose
income-tax returns should receive special attention by a squad of trained experts
V. The Bureau of Internal Revenue should enforce the regulations which require
taxpayers to keep adequate books and records of income and expenses, against
the gamblers, gangsters, and racketeers who are continually flouting them. Viola-
tion should be made a felony ....
VI. Gambling casinos should be required to maintain daily records of money won
and lost to be filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue .... Where the casino is
operating illegally, in addition to the aforementioned obligations, the operators of
the casino should be required to keep records of all bets and wagers ....
VII. The law and regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue should be
amended so that no wagering losses, expenses, or disbursements of any kind ...
incurred in or as a result of illegal gambling shall be deductible for income-tax
purposes ....
IX. The internal revenue laws and regulations should be amended so as to require
any person who has been engaged in an illegitimate business netting in excess of
$2,500 a year for any of 5 years previously, to file a net-worth statement of all his
assets, along with his income-tax returns ....
S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 9-13 (1951) (italics deleted).
332 In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968), the Court found that the filing provisions violated the fifth amendment,
thus ending the use of this tactic. See notes 340-46 and accompanying text infra.
31' See IRS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, .supra note 331, at 3. Officials of the IRS so testified
in 1974 before the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling.
See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, app. III, at 10 (summary of testimony of Donald
Alexander, Comm'r of IRS; John Olszewski, Director, Intelligence Div., IRS; and Mervin
D. Boyd, Program Analyst, Intelligence Div., IRS).
334 Treasury-Post Office Departments Appropriations for 1953: Hearings Before a Subcomm of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 426 (1952) (testimony ot John B.
Dunlap, Comm'r of Internal Revenue).
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thousands of additional agents to properly enforce the new tax.335
The enforcement history of the 1951 Act fully vindicated the
doubts expressed by the IRS. Predicted to yield $407 million annu-
ally, the new taxes yielded less than $10 million per year over the
next decade.3 36 Moreover, the enforcement cost to the IRS has
been extremely high. 337 The 1951 Act also did not live up to expec-
tations as a weapon against organized crime. Estimates of the na-
tional illegal gambling handle have dramatically exceeded the re-
ported income upon which the tax has been collected.33 8 The disin-
centive to reveal potentially unlawful conduct and the shortage of
IRS personnel combined to impede enforcement of the statute
against the gambling operations of organized crime. Nevertheless,
the wagering taxes provided the only jurisdictional beachhead for
the federal assault on illegal gambling and organized crime in the
1960's.
"5 In 1952, Commissioner Dunlap requested 4,333 additional revenue agents, the
number thought necessary to enforce the new provisions properly. See id. at 422-23. See
generally Caplin, The Gambling Business and Federal Taxes, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 371, 373
(1962). The Senate Committee that recommended the wagering taxes had also foreseen the
need for additional IRS manpower. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 118, reprinted
in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1969, 2096.
336 IRS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 331, at 19. Statistics to 1973 were even lower:
WAGERING TAX COLLECTIONS
Tax Stamps Seizures Wagering Tax Collections
Sold
Year Occupational Excise Total
1965 7,284 1,187,283 $603,000 $6,066,000 $6,669,000
1967 5,197 746,426 672,000 5,624,000 [6,296,000]
1969 3,527 354,000 4,328,000 4,682,000
1971 3,089 28,140 369,000 4,572,000 4,941,000
1973 1,675 4,820 376,000 5,533,000 [5,909,000]
Source: Duncan, Federal Gambling Taxation in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, app. I,
at 887, table 1, at 894.
337 The IRS estimated that it cost $18.6 million to collect the wagering taxes between
1952 and 1966. This task consumed between 2.9% and 11.A% of the time of the Intelli-
gence Division, yet produced only a minute fraction of total IRS receipts. See IRS LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 331, at 19.
338 The gross handle of illegal gambling is difficult to estimate, but all seem to agree
that it is high. See EASY MONEY, supra note 116, at 53-54. The handle, however, corre-
sponds only to the volume of business-the gross amount bet. The net profit derived from
illegal gambling is much lower, perhaps approximating $2 billion annually. See id. at 55;
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1967). The Commission on the Review of the
National Policy Toward Gambling recently concluded that an estimate of $5 billion for the
annual volume of illegal gambling was too low and that an accurate determination of the
amount is impossible as long as "extremely popular forms of gambling remain illegal."
GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 3.
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Although they posed both practical and theoretical difficul-
ties, the wagering excise taxes were upheld. Early Supreme Court
decisions held that the wagering excise taxes were neither an
unconstitutional infringement on the police powers of the states,
nor violative of the fifth amendment's protection against self-
incrimination.3 39
2. Constitutional Attack
In 1968, the Supreme Court decisions in Marchetti v. United
States340 and Grosso v. United States341 curtailed the effect of the
wagering tax statutes on illegal gambling operations by limiting the
statutes' registration requirements on fifth amendment grounds.
Marchetti involved a conviction for conspiring to evade the fifty
dollar occupational tax on persons in the business of accepting
wagers, failing to pay that tax, and failing to comply with registra-
tion requirements. 342 Noting that all states except Nevada had
broad penal provisions against gambling and that the registration
information was readily available to local authorities, the Court
held that: "[T]hese provisions may not be employed to punish
339See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled in part, Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The Court upheld the $50 occupational tax (345 U.S. at
25-31) and considered the registration requirements "'obviously supportable as in aid of a
revenue purpose" ' (id. at 32 (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937))).
The Court also addressed the defendant's fifth amendment claim:
Since appellee failed to register for the wagering tax, it is difficult to see how
he can now claim the privilege even assuming that the disclosure of violations of
law is called for....
Assuming that respondent can raise the self-incrimination issue, that privilege
has relation only to past acts, not to future acts that may or may not be commit-
ted .... If respondent wishes to take wagers subject to excise taxes ... he must
pay an occupational tax and register. Under the registration provisions of the wa-
gering tax, appellee is not compelled to confess to acts already committed, he is
merely informed by the statute that in order to engage in the business of wagering
in the future he must fulfill certain conditions.
Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted). See Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), overruled in
part, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Regarding the probative value of
federal tax stamps in state wagering prosecutions, see Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So. 2d 494
(Fla. 1954). (statute declaring gambling stamp prima facie evidence of state gambling viola-
tion unconstitutional).
The Supreme Court has refused to extend the occupational tax to runners for a larger
enterprise. See United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957). See generally United States
v. Cooperstein, 221 F. Supp. 522 (D. Mass. 1963). Congressional efforts to expand the
definition to reach runners have failed. See S. REP. No. 764, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972);
S. REP. No. 840, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
340 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
34, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
342 390 U.S. at 40-41.
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criminally those persons who have defended a failure to comply
with their requirements with a proper assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination. 343 The Court insisted that its holding
did not limit the right to tax illegal enterprises,344 but was confined
strictly to the scope of the fifth amendment privilege.3 45
Grosso extended the Marchetti holding by applying it to a con-
viction for failure to pay the ten-percent excise tax. The Court
noted that the IRS's practice of releasing to local authorities infor-
mation obtained in enforcing the excise tax raised equally serious
self-incrimination problems.3 46 The Court left it to Congress to
decide how to isolate the wagering information from potential state
gambling prosecutions and consequent fifth amendment prob-
lems.3 47 The next year, Congress attempted to alleviate the fifth
amendment problems by removing the requirement that the IRS
disclose registration information3 48 and altering the provision re-
343 Id. at 42. In so holding, the Court overruled,J in part, Lewis v. United States, 348
U.S. 419 (1955) and United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. at 54. For a student note anticipating this shift, see Comment, Self-
Incrimination and the Federal Excise Tax on Wagering, 76 YALE L.J. 839 (1967).
344 390 U.S. at 44.
345 "The question is not whether petitioner holds a 'right' to violate state law, but
whether, having done so, he may be compelled to give evidence against himself. The con-
stitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent
and foresighted .... Id. at 51.
346 "[T]hose liable for payment of the excise tax reasonably may expect that informa-
tion obtainable from its payment .. .will ultimately be proffered to state and federal
prosecuting officers." 390 U.S. at 66. Thus Grosso extended Marchetti to a situation in which
the statute did not require reporting. Even though no reporting of tax information was
required, the question of its confidentiality and use in subsequent prosecution remained.
347 The Court refused to apply judicial restrictions on the use by enforcement au-
thorities of information obtained in connection with the payment of wagering taxes, stating
that such restrictions might be difficult to design and were, in any event, the responsibility
of Congress. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. at 69. In Marchetti, the Court noted the
difficulty of showing that evidence in subsequent prosecutions was not obtained by the
exploitation of wagering tax information:
Moreover, the imposition of such restrictions would necessarily oblige state prose-
cuting authorities to establish in each case that their evidence was untainted by any
connection with information obtained as a consequence of the wagering taxes; the
federal requirements would thus be protected only at the cost of hampering,
perhaps seriously, enforcement of state prohibitions against gambling. We cannot
know how Congress would assess the competing demands of the federal treasury
and of state gambling prohibitions; we are, however, entirely certain that the Con-
stitution has entrusted to Congress, and not to this Court, the task of striking an
appropriate balance among such values. We therefore must decide that it would
be improper for the Court to impose restrictions of the kind urged by the United
States.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. at 59-60 (footnotes omitted).
348 See Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 203, 82 Stat. 1213 (repealing I.R.C.
1000
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quiring posting of occupational tax stamps.3 49 These changes failed
to achieve their purpose, however, because information used in tax
prosecutions could still be volunteered to state and local officials.3 50
Moreover, aftersome dispute within the courts of appeals,35' the
Supreme Court, in United States v. United States Coin and Currency,352
extended the Marchetti-Grosso rationale to the civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings used to enforce the wagering taxes.
Despite the emasculation of the 1951 gambling tax legislation
by the Supreme Court, Congress moved slowly to amend the tax
laws concerning gambling. One reason for this delay was the IRS's
continued lack of enthusiasm for the gambling tax provisions.353 A
§ 6107). Section 6107 had provided:
In the principal internal revenue office in each internal revenue district there
shall be kept, for public inspection, an alphabetical list of the names of all persons
who have paid special taxes . . . . Such list . .. shall contain the time, place, and
business for which such special taxes have been paid, and upon application of any
prosecuting officer of any State, county, or municipality there shall be furnished
to him a certified copy thereof ....
The Senate Report accompanying the legislation explained the reason for the repeal:
This section provides for the repeal of section 6107 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 relating to disclosure of the identity of persons paying special (oc-
cupational) tax which was subjected to criticism in the three cases handed down by
the Supreme Court on January 29, 1968. The repeal of this section should make it
completely clear that it is not the desire or intent of the Congress that the entire
system of Federal taxation be rendered impotent or ineffectual because a State or
local jurisdiction has a law rendering aspects of the activity illegal. The Federal
taxing power is of such fundamental importance that it is difficult to conceive that
it was the intent of the framers of the Constitution that the act of a State or local
government could thwart the effective operation of the internal revenue laws of
the United States. Since the section no longer serves any useful purpose, and since
it now jeopardizes the effective operation of the internal revenue laws, it should
be repealed.
S. REP. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1968). In addition to Marchetti and Grosso, the
Senate Report referred to Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), in which the Court
found that a gun registration requirement raised fifth amendment problems.
'
49 See Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 204, 82 Stat. 1213 (amending I.R.C.
§ 6806). This alteration exempts persons subject to wagering occupational taxes and taxes
on coin-operated gaming devices from the requirement that tax stamps be posted. See
I.R.C. § 6806.
350 In light of the reasoning in Grosso, the IRS halted its criminal investigations under
the wagering laws. See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, app. III, at 11 (summary of
testimony of Donald Alexander, Comm'r of IRS; John Olszewski, Director, Intelligence
Div., IRS; and Mervin D. Boyd, Program Analyst, Intelligence Div., IRS).
5 Compare United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 393 F.2d 499 (7th Cir.
1968) (extending Marchetti reasoning Yo civil forfeiture), aff'd, 401 U.S. 715 (1971), with
United States v. One 1965 Buick, 392 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1968) (Marchetti distinguished;
civil forfeiture upheld), vacated, 402 U.S. 937 (1971). See 33 ALBANY L. REV. 158 (1968).
352401 U.S. 715 (1971).
"
53 See IRS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 33 1, at 4-5.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:923
more important reason was the enactment of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. 354 The Act dealt specifically with local gam-
bling businesses having national repercussions and thus alleviated
the pressure for antigambling provisions in the tax code.355
3. The 1974 Amendments
In late 1974, Congress finally revised the wagering tax laws. 356
The new legislation lowered the excise tax from ten percent to two
percent,35 7 increased the occupational tax from $50 to $500,358
prohibited the disclosure of wagering tax information except to
enforce federal tax laws through civil or criminal proceedings,3 59
and prohibited the use of tax documents, such as stamps, returns,
or registration forms, against the taxpayer in criminal prosecutions
unrelated to the collection of taxes.3 60 The new prohibitions on
354 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
355 See notes 235-45 and accompanying text supra.
356 See Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-499, § 3, 88 Stat. 1549.
357 See I.R.C. § 4401.
358 See id. § 4441.
359 I.R.C. § 4424 (amended 1976) provides in part:
(a) General Rule
Except as otherwise provided in this section, neither the Secretary nor any
other officer or employee of the Treasury Department may divulge or make
known in any manner whatever to any person-
(1) any original, copy, or abstract of any return, payment, or registration
made pursuant to this chapter,
(2) any record required for making such return, payment, or registra-
tion, which the Secretary is permitted by the taxpayer to examine or which is
produced pursuant to section 7602, or
(3) any information come at by the exploitation of any such return, pay-
ment, registration, or record.
(b) Permissible Disclosure
A disclosure otherwise prohibited by subsection (a) may be made in connec-
tion with the administration or civil or criminal enforcement of any tax imposed by
this title. However, any document or information so disclosed may not be-
(1) divulged or made known in any manner whatever by any officer or
employee of the United States to any person except in connection with the
administration or civil or criminal enforcement of this title, nor
(2) used, directly or indirectly, in any criminal prosecution for any of-
fense occurring before the date of enactment of this section.
360 1.R.C. § 4 4 24(c) provides:
(c) Use of Documents Possessed by Taxpayer
Except in connection with the administration or civil or criminal enforcement
of any tax imposed by this title-
(1) any stamp denoting payment of the special tax under this chapter,
(2) any original, copy, or abstract possessed by a taxpayer of any return,
payment, or registration made by such taxpayer pursuant to this chapter, and
(3) any information come at by the exploitation of any such document,
shall not be used against such taxpayer in any criminal proceeding.
1002
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disclosure of tax-related information cured the self-incrimination
problems identified in Marchetti and Grosso .361 In addition, en-
forcement responsibility for the provisions shifted from the Intelli-
gence Division of the IRS to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, indicating a renewed interest in enforcing the law and a
recognition that the wagering taxes are more important in fighting
crime than in raising revenue.
36 2
One remaining problem concerns local criminal prosecutions
of individuals who have paid federal wagering taxes. In such cases,
the local authorities must show that their proof is "untainted by any
connection with information obtained as a consequence of the wa-
gering taxes. ' 363 The difficulty of disproving this taint could lead
illicit gamblers to pay federal wagering taxes in order to benefit
361 See H.R. REP. No. 1401, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6232, 6233. Congress cured a similar deficiency in federal
firearms registration legislation. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 201,
82 Stat. 1213 (codified at I.R.C. § 5848). In United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971),
the Court held that by restricting the use of firearms registration information in unrelated
criminal prosecutions, Congress had alleviated self-incrimination problems:
[T]he claimant is not confronted by "substantial and 'real'" but merely "trifling or
imaginary hazards of incrimination"--first by reason of the statutory barrier
against use in a prosecution for prior or concurrent offenses, and second by reason
of the unavailability of the registration data, as a matter of administration, to local,
state, and other federal agencies.
Id. at 606. Thus, the Conference Committee on the proposed § 4424 observed that in
order to
resolve any remaining doubts which may exist under the rationale of the Mar-
chetti v. U.S. (390 U.S. 39 (1968)), and Grosso v. U.S. (390 U.S. 62 (1968)) cases,
the amendment provides that no Treasury Department official or employee may
disclose, except in connection with the administration or enforcement of internal
revenue taxes, any document or record supplied by a taxpayer in connection with
such taxes, or any information obtained through any such documents or records.
Additionally, the amendment provides that certain documents related to the wa-
gering taxes, and information obtained through such documents, may not be used
against the taxpayer in any criminal proceeding, except in connection with the
administration or enforcement of internal revenue taxes.
It is expected that these changes in the law will remove any constitutional
problems regarding enforcement of the wagering taxes.
H.R. REP. No. 1401, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6232, 6233. The 1974 revisions of the wagering tax laws have been
held constitutional. See United States v. Sahadi, 555 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1977).
Income tax returns have been used in wagering tax prosecutions. See United States v.
O'Brien, 420 F. Supp. 834 (D. Conn. 1976), aff d, 555 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1977). In Garner
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), the Supreme Court held that an income tax return is
admissible in a criminal gambling prosecution where defendant did not assert his fifth
amendment privilege at the time of filing.
36 See Treas. Order 221-3, 1975-1 C.B. 758. See also Scott, Enforcing Gambling Tax
Pushed, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1975, at A24, col. 1.
363 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. at 59.
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from their immunizing effect in subsequent state prosecutions.3 64
4. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
Two provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1976365 directly
affect the federal law of gambling. The Act amends section 3402
to require a twenty-percent withholding of winnings of (1) "more
than $1,000 from a wagering transaction, if the amount of such
proceeds is at least 300 times as large as the amount wagered"; 366
(2) more than $5,000 from a state-operated lottery;3 67 and (3) more
than $1,000 from privately-conducted lotteries or wagering pools. 3 68
Previously, such winnings were taxable, but not subject to withhold-
ing requirements. The new law also expands the exemption for
state-operated lotteries from the wagering excise tax imposed by
section 4401 ,369 and from the section 4461 occupational tax on
coin-operated devices.
Although Congress enacted the new withholding provisions to
stop the nonreporting of gambling income 370 and to raise reve-
364 Absent a clear showing that the subsequent criminal prosecution rests entirely on
independent evidence, the defendant may assert that I.R.C. § 4424 has been violated, that
proof related to the federal tax registration or payment is inadmissible, and that the sub-
sequent criminal prosecution must be dismissed. Cf. United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp.
43, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (illegal electronic surveillance). "Once it becomes apparent that the
issue [of tainted evidence] is in the case .... the government bears the burden of convinc-
ing the Court that evidence it seeks to introduce at a criminal trial was not obtained by it in
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights." Id. at 54.
365 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
366 I.R.C. § 3402(q)(3)(A).
367 See id. § 3402(q)(3)(B).
'
6 1 See id. § 3402(q)(3)(C) (amended 1977). In 1977, Congress subjected to withholding
"[p]roceeds of more than $1000 from ... a wagering transaction in a parimutuel pool with
respect to horse races, dog races, or jai alai if the amount of such proceeds is at least 300
times as large as the amount wagered." Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 405, 91 Stat. 126 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 3402(q)(3)(C)(ii)). The
withholding on wagering proceeds applies to winnings in excess of the ticket price. See
I.R.C. § 3 4 02(q)(4). In addition, as a result of a floor amendment proposed by Senator
Cannon of Nevada (see 122 CONG. REc. 12598 (1976)), winnings from bingo, keno, and slot
machines are exempt from the withholding provision (see I.R.C. § 3402(q)(5)).
69 See I.R.C. § 4402(3). In 1965, with the New Hampshire Sweepstakes in mind, Con-
gress enacted an exemption for state-conducted sweepstakes where winners were deter-
mined by the results of a horserace. See Act of June 21, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 813, 79
Stat. 149. The exemption was retroactive to March 10, 1964, the effective date of the New
Hampshire Sweepstakes. Id. It proved too narrow, however, because subsequent lotteries
did not follow the sweepstakes formula. The 1976 amendment sought to modernize the
law and avoid confusion. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 386-88, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3816-17.
370 Although most wagering transactions have no tax significance since the
majority of bettors end up the year with no net wagering gains, the special types
of wagers mentioned above represent unique and occasional windfalls that gener-
1004
1978] FEDERAL LAW OF GAMBLING 1005
nues,3 71 they may instead have heightened the competitive advan-
tage of illegal games by discouraging participation in legal games
and placing an administrative burden on legal gambling busi-
nesses.3 7 2 Further, any additional revenues that the withholding
provisions generate are ephemeral. Because most gamblers lose
more at gambling during a tax year than they gain, the amount of
gambling income withheld will probably be returned to the tax-
payer.37 3
B. Income Taxation and Gambling
As a general rule income derived from gambling is taxed like
any other form of income. Section 165(d) of the Code, how-
ever, allows deduction of gambling losses only from gambling win-
nings.374 This provision reflects the fear that by allowing the de-
duction of wagering losses from any type of income, the tax laws
would encourage fraudulently or intentionally incurred gambling
losses to reduce personal taxes. Still, the limitation does allow tax-
payers to offset losses from one form of gambling against winnings
from another form of gambling.37 5 Further, a gambling enterprise
ally produce a significant tax liability. Even with the information reporting re-
quirements, many taxpayers do not report these winnings on their income tax
returns. One source of this nonreporting of income is, for example, the use of the
so-called "10 percenters" at the racetrack. A 10 percenter is a person hired by the
winner to cash his ticket for 10 percent of the winnings and provide fictitious
identification so that the reporting on Form 1099 is provided in a name other
than that of the actual winner. These 10 percenters themselves seldom pay any
income tax either by filing no tax return or claiming sufficient offsetting losses.
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 383-84, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3439, 3813. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., TAX REVISION ISSUES, No. 6, ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS 13-14 (Comm.
Print 1976).
371 See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 384, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3814 (predicting increase in revenues of $124 million in
fiscal year 1977, and of $78 million in both 1978 and 1981).
372 See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 16; Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on
H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2358-59 (1976) (state-
ment of Dr. William Perrault, President, Nat'l Ass'n of State Lotteries).
37
' See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 16.
374 I.R.C. § 165 provides:
(a) General Rule
There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable
year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(d) Wagering Losses
Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent (f the
gains from such transactions.
'7' See Drews v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1354 (1956). Although the burden of proof
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may deduct expenses not directly related to gambling, such as lease
or payroll payments. 3 76
To promote the reporting of income, including gambling win-
nings, the IRS requires the payor not only to withhold a percentage
of winnings, 37 7 but also to submit an information form-Form
1099-for all payments over $600.'7" The IRS has conceded that
strict enforcement of the Form 1099 requirement would "create
recordkeeping burdens of staggering proportions. 3 79 The form is,
in fact, easily subverted and, in many of the most egregious cases, is
not even filed. °
Until 1969, the income averaging provisions of the Code
excluded gambling income.3 8' Income averaging allows a taxpayer
to reduce the rate at which a surge of income is taxed if such
income significantly exceeds his average income for the previous
four years. The exclusion of gambling income from income averag-
ing exacerbates the tax burden of a "good" year-one in which
gambling income caused a significant increase in taxable income.
Because gambling winnings are no less cyclical or sporadic than the
forms of income for which income averaging was designed, such as
that a loss is properly deductible rests on the taxpayer (Mack v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d
182 (6th Cir. 1970); Donovan v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1966)), the requisite
standard is unclear (see, e.g., Manzo v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 714, 717-18 (1972)
(losing parimutuel tickets not conclusive of gambling losses); Gallagher v. Commissioner,
27 T.C.M. (CCH) 124, 125 (1968) (partial losses allowed on theory that racetrack bettor
could not win consistently over 5 month period without also suffering heavy losses); Green-
feld v. Petitioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 471, 472-73 (1966) (deduction supported by taxpayer's
accounting records)). Nevertheless, possession of losing parimutuel tickets is still frequently
enough to establish losses sufficient to offset any gambling income for the taxable year. See
IRS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 331, at 485.
376 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). See also Commissioner v. Heininger,
320 U.S. 467 (1943) (legal expenses incurred in losing defense of fraudulent practices
claim deductible).
17 See notes 365-68 and accompanying text supa.
378 (a) Payments of $600 or More
All persons engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course
of such trade of business to another person, of. . . $600 or more in any taxable
year . . . shall render a true and accurate return to the Secretary, under such
regulations and in such form and manner and to such extent as may be prescribed
by the Secretary ....
I.R.C. § 6041(a).
3179 IRS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 331, at 25.
380 A common abuse involves the "ten percenters," described in note 370 supra. See IRS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 331, at 27-28. Further, the IRS has not enforced the
information return requirement against legal gambling enterprises in Nevada. See EASY
MONEY, supra note 116, at 83.
381 I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305 (amended 1969).
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royalties or breach-of-contract damages, the exclusion reflected a
bias against gambling winnings. 3812 In 1969, the provision suc-
cumbed to a comprehensive redrafting of the income averaging
sections.383
C. Gambling and Taxation: Policy Alternatives
Both the 1951 wagering tax legislation and the income tax
treatment of gambling have received sharp criticism in recent
years.3 4 In light of state-operated lotteries, off-track betting, and
increased discussion of decriminalizing other forms of gambling,
the existing tax law has been criticized for interfering with state
policies toward gambling and for tightening the hold of organized
crime on gambling dollars.
Before Congress repaired the Marchetti-Grosso damages, 38 5 the
federal tax laws were, as a practical matter, enforceable only
against legal gambling ventures. Consequently, the tax laws pro-
vided an advantage to illegal gambling. With minor exceptions,
386
the law required legal gambling ventures to pay a ten-percent tax
on gross wagers in their establishments, 387 an amount sufficient to
foreclose competition with illegal games. 38 8 Although Congress has
lowered this tax to two percent and seems to have alleviated the
self-incrimination problem, substantial difficulties remain. Despite
the glowing predictions about the amount of revenue likely to be
raised,389 illegal gambling enterprises have no greater incentive to
382 Prior to 1964, the income averaging provisions applied only to certain sources of
income, which did not include gambling. See id. §§ 1301-1306 (amended 1964). In 1964,
Congress discarded this approach in favor of general provisions. See Act of Feb. 26, 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232, 78 Stat. 19. The new scheme defined "averagable income" as
the amount by which adjusted taxable income from any source exceeded 133y% of "aver-
age base period income," (defined as average income over the previous four years, with
some qualifications) with certain specified exclusions. See I.R.C. § 1302 (amended 1969).
One exclusion was for wagering income. Id. § 1302(b)(3) (amended 1969).
3 3 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311, 83 Stat. 487 (current
version at I.R.C. §§ 1301-1304). The result is that the taxpayer may include wagering
income in averagable income for tax years after 1969.
U84 See generally EASY MONEY, supra note 116, at 84; GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note
2, at 14-15.3
'" See note 361 and accompanying text supra.
386 I.R.C. § 4402. In 1976, Congress expanded the state-conducted sweepstakes exemp-
tion to include all state-operated lotteries. See note 369 and accompanying text supra.
387 I.R.C. § 4401 (amended 1974).
388 Cf. note 390 and accompanying text infra (2% excise tax and $500 occupational tax
would not necessarily foreclose competition). For discussion of the profit margin in various
forms of illegal gambling, see EASY MONEY, supra note 116, at 53-60.
389 Figures based on Treasury Department estimates given in conjunction with a 1970
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pay the two-percent tax than they did to pay their pre-1968 tax
bills. Nor is there indication that the new tax will be enforced more
vigorously than in the past. Moreover, the original rationale behind
the tax legislation-to supply a basis for federal jurisdiction-
collapsed when Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970. At best now, it only supplements, not supplies.
The reduction of the tax rate to two percent has weakened
arguments that federal wagering excise taxes preclude effec-
tive competition between legal and illegal gambling enterprises. 390
Similarly, the $500 occupational tax is insignificant to any large
enterprise. Nevertheless, it can be persuasively argued that Con-
gress should repeal the federal wagering taxes entirely. Absent a
dramatic increase in enforcement effort by the IRS, the only func-
tion such taxes serve is to impose a special "sin tax" on legal gam-
bling condoned, and often encouraged, by state policy. This result is
effort to enact a provision similar to I.R.C. § 4424 (S. 1624, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970))





Occupational tax $ 360,000 $6,757,500
Voluntary (percent) 60 53
Occupational tax 240,000 6,150,000
Enforced (percent) 40 47
Excise 3,300,000 6,969,000
Voluntary (percent) 59 65
Excise 2,300,000 3,562,500
Enforced (percent) 41 35
S. REP. No. 764, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., table 2, at 12 (1972).
390 A number of noneconomic factors, such as community confidence in the local
numbers runner, availability of credit, and convenience make it difficult for a legal game to
compete with organized crime. See also EASY MONEY, supra note 116, at 57-59. Considering
only economic factors, however, to be competitive, the legal game would have to offer odds
at least equal to those offered by the illegal game. In a typical numbers game, the odds
against a particular number paying off are 999:1. The game operators pay most winners at
600:1, but cut the payoff on heavily wagered numbers to produce a long-term payout
equalling 58% of the amount wagered. Of the remaining 42%, runners take 25%, control-
lers and police protection command 5% each, and office costs absorb 2%. Thus, the
operator's normal profit is approximately 5% of the game's handle. Id. at 56. Because its
fixed overhead exceeds that of most other forms of illegal gambling (id. at 53-57), "the
numbers game is a vulnerable ... target for legal competition" (id. at 59). The 2% wagering
tax and the $500 occupational tax are insignificant expenses of a legal game, especially in
light of typical advertising expenditures. See generally DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 730-
33; FUND FOR THE CITY OF NEW YoRK, LEGAL GAMBLING IN NEW YoR (1972).
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inconsistent with any purpose originally advanced in favor of the
legislation. Further, the federal wagering taxes encroach on state
policy choices with respect to gambling. The general federal ap-
proach has been to avoid interference with state gambling policies
where no federal interest is implicated. Given the absence of a
significant federal interest in the current wagering tax statutes,
they should be repealed.3 91
The policy considerations underlying the application of fed-
eral income taxes to gambling differ significantly from those affect-
ing the excise and occupational taxes. Unlike the general income
tax, wagering taxes reflect a specific policy choice to impose a spe-
cial tax on wagering. The theoretical basis of income taxation is to
tax all income, "from whatever source derived. ' '392 A repeal of the
special taxes, therefore, would not mandate exclusion of gambling
income from the general income tax.
Apart from the new withholding provisions,393 gambling in-
come receives special federal income tax treatment in only one
respect-the limitation on the deductibility of gambling losses.
The underlying policy-to avoid encouraging fraud or reckless
gambling 394 -seems relatively uncontroversial. The income tax
otherwise neither favors nor discriminates against gambling. Some
have argued, however, that gambling winnings should not be taxed
at all. 95 The premise of this position is that few gamblers win over
time-this week's gain is next week's loss, and only a rare gambler
derives real income from gambling. Taxation of gambling income
is essentially confiscatory, because occasional winnings are fully
taxed but losses are not fully deductible. Moreover, because the
IRS cannot enforce an income tax on illegal gambling winnings,
391 Taken together, the existence of alternative means of obtaining federal jurisdiction
over moderate-scale local gambling operations, the lack of sufficient manpower to enforce
the wagering taxes, and shifting state gambling policies mandate federal abstention. As to
the ostensible revenue function, the tax redution from 10% to 2% indicates that Congress
did not contemplate a significant income from this provision.
392 I.R.C. § 61.
"'See notes 365-68 and accompanying text supra.
394 The limitation on the deduction of wagering losses also fits the logic of the Internal
Revenue Code. Without the offset provision (I.R.C. § 165(d)), gambling losses would fall
under the general rule permitting deduction against ordinary income (id. § 165(a); see also
§ 165(c) (general rule limited for losses by individuals)). Gambling activity, however, closely
resembles investment activity-the bettor makes an initial investment on which he hopes to
gain but may lose. A losing wager is the analog of a worthless security which is separately
treated in § 165. See id. § 165(g). Losses on such capital assets must be offset against capital
gains, so by analogy, wagering losses are properly offset against winnings.
391 See, e.g., EASY MONEY, supra note 116, at 84-85.
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an income tax on all gambling winnings encourages illegal gam-
bling.396
Despite its initial appeal, this analysis has serious flaws. Ex-
cluding gambling winnings from taxation would discriminate in-
vidiously in favor of gambling as an income-producing activity.
Gambling is not the only form of investment that is cyclical and
uncertain. To the extent that net winnings would escape taxation,
gambling would be favored over almost all other income-producing
activities. 397 A viable gambling business, for example, may be a
profitable enterprise. Any exclusion of gambling income from the
income tax, therefore, ought to distinguish personal from profes-
sional gambling profits, and then impose normal taxes on income
realized from the profession or business of gambling. Nevertheless,
the major reason to exclude any form of gambling income from
taxation-to avoid putting legal gambling enterprises at a competi-
tive disadvantage-is at best speculative. In light of the many unde-
termined variables, it is probably unwise, as well as impolitic, to
exclude gambling income from taxation.39 8
A more equitable scheme would be to allow generous gam-
bling loss carryovers. Rather than permitting gamblers to deduct
wagering losses only from winnings for the current tax year and to
income average over only a short period of time, a provision simi-
lar to that in effect for carryback and carryforward of capital
losses3 99 would allow the taxpayer to neutralize any net wagering
income in a given year with wagering losses from a prior or sub-
sequent year. Such a provision would tax only sustained gambling
winnings. The rare individual bettor who managed to preserve a
winning streak would have to pay income taxes on his winnings,
396 This assumes that Form 1099 would be required to be filed by the legal gam-
bling business. The government does not generally enforce this requirement against legal
gambling casinos in Nevada. See id. at 83.
'97 Although I.R.C. § 61 purports to tax all income, the Code contains exceptions. For
example, the receipt of gifts does not increase taxable income. See I.R.C. § 102.
398 The Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling recom-
mended that Congress repeal all federal income (GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at
15), excise (id. at 18), and occupational stamp taxes (id.) on gambling and gamblers. The
Commission found that federal taxation inhibited legal gambling operations from effec-
tively competing with illegal gambling. Id. at 15, 18. The Commission recommended that
only state governments levy gambling taxes. Id. They would not, however, exempt the
professional gambler from federal income taxation. Id. at 15.
399 I.R.C. § 1212. This section generally allows the "net capital loss" of a corporation to
be treated as a "short-term capital loss" in each of three preceding years and five sub-
sequent years. Individuals may also carry capital losses forward one year under I.R.C. §
1212(b).
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but those suffering counterbalancing losses over time would pay
no tax.
V
AN EFFORT AT CODIFICATION AND REFORM-S. 1437
The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, better known as S.
1437,400 is now under consideration in Congress.401 The bill rep-
resents a comprehensive effort to codify, revise, and reform the
federal criminal law.402 It is a true recodification, pulling together
criminal offenses from all fifty tides of the United States Code,
and, as such, is a unique contribution to federal jurisprudence.
Although the changes that S. 1437 proposes for many areas of
federal law are beyond the purview of these materials, the treat-
ment of gambling under the proposed Code merits consideration.
S. 1437 is an intellectual descendant of the Model Penal Code,
403
and owes much to the 1971 draft code of the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.40 4 The greatest strength
of the proposed new Code is its combination of simplicity and
comprehensiveness. S. 1437 uses straightforward language and
uniform vocabulary and definitions. It articulates state of mind re-
quirements, 40 5 defenses, 40 6 jurisdictional bases, 407 and sentences408
expressly and uniformly for each substantive provision.
With respect to gambling, S. 1437 largely succeeds in its effort
400 See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
401 The bill passed the Senate on January 30, 1978 by a vote of 72 to 15. See 124
CONG. REc. S. 860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978).
402 S. 1437 replaces an earlier version of the bill, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For
a brief history of significant codification efforts leading up to S. 1, see The Challenge of a
Modern Federal Criminal Code, 117 CONG. Rc. 6120-71 (1971).
403 See the epochal article by Professor Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model
Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097 (1952). See 2 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13
(Comm. Print 1974).40 4 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT
(1971), reprinted in Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at
129-514 (1971). Previously, the Commission had produced a draft of its proposed code and
extensive working papers. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LA ,s, STUDY DRAFT (1970); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS, WORKING PAPERS (1970).
405 See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978) (proposed 18 U.S.C. §§ 301-303).
°0See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502, 511, 512).
""See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-203).
408 See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2008, 2201-2204, 2301-2306).
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to restate current law in simplified form. The bill recodifies almost
all of the current federal gambling law, with notable improvements
in organization and clarity. Further, the federal law of gambling as
recodified in S. 1437 clearly conforms to the two traditional con-
gressional tenets underlying the federal system of criminal justice:
(1) S. 1437 maintains a clear federalist policy with respect to gam-
bling, leaving substantive choices largely to the several states; 40 9
and (2) S. 1437 carries forward and expands the notion that the
federal law should focus primarily on institutional forms of gam-
bling, particularly those aspects of gambling susceptible to exploi-
tation by organized crime,410 leaving the individual bettor alone as
much as possible. Because the statute as originally drafted omitted
"government" from its definitions of operations subject to its
gambling provisions, the applicability of S. 1437 to state-run lot-
teries or other publicly-owned or controlled legal forms of gam-
bling was unclear. 41' The draft of the bill that recently passed the
Senate rectifies this omission by including "government" in its de-
finition of "enterprise. 41 2
In contrast to the multiplicity of gambling provisions scattered
throughout current law, S. 1437 contains only one basic section
concerning gambling.41 3 This provision integrates the essential as-
409 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that "a common theme applicable to
section 1841 [the proposed basic gambling provision] . . . is that [it is], in whole or in part,
linked to a violation of the applicable State law, the Committee viewing the Federal role
... as primarily one of assisting the States in the enforcement of their laws and policies." S.
REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 836 (1977). Congress had drafted the following federal
antigambling statutes, inter alia, with specific exemptions for differing state law: 15 U.S.C. §
1172 (1976); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1307, 1511, 1952, 1953, 1955 (1976); and I.R.C. §
4402(3). Nevertheless, Congress, on at least one occasion, acted directly contrary to the pro-
fessed interests of some states. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25a, 339, 17 30c, 1829 (1976); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1306 (1976).
410 For an example of such focus in current law see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
411 [T]he definition of "enterprise"-sec. 111-does not include a government.
Similarly, "person" and "organization" do not include a "government"-sec. 111.
If the definitions of "enterprise," "person" and "organization" do not include a
"government," it might not be possible to enforce federal gambling policy against
government corporations that will appear and are now in operation engaged in
various forms of legal gambling.
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 13, at 8615 (1977) (state-
ment of G. Robert Blakey) [hereinafter cited as Senate S. 1437 Hearings].
412 See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 111). In
addition, the redrafted bill would permit the federal government to secure civil injunctions
against state-operated gambling activities that violate federal law. See id. (proposed 18
U.S.C. § 4011 (a)). This technique was suggested during Senate hearings. See Senate S. 1437
Hearings, supra note 411, pt. 13, at 8616 (statement of G. Robert Blakey).
413 S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1841).
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pects of many existing statutes, eliminating some completely.4 14 Re-
lying to a significant degree on the approach of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, 415 the section prohibits the business
enterprise of gambling, the transportation of gambling parapher-
nalia, and the receipt of pay-offs. 4 16 The section also incorporates
several absolute exemptions including: (1) conduct legal in all rele-
vant jurisdictions; 417 (2) information transmitted "solely in connec-
414 The proposed § 1841 effectively replaces 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1301-1302, 1307,
1952, 1953, and 1955 (1976).
"15 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. For example, the proposed § 1841(b)(1) defines
"gambling business" as:
[A] business involving gambling of any kind that, in fact:
"(A) has five or more persons engaged in the business; and
"(B) has been in substantially continuous operation for a period of thirty
days or more, or has taken in $2,000 or more in any single day.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978).
Although "gambling device" and "gambling information" are defined, the drafters in-
tentionally left "gambling" itself undefined. They apparently were unwilling to risk the
possibility of excluding ingenious schemes. The Senate Report accompanying S. 1437 states
that "gambling" is to "be broadly construed." S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 843
(1977).
416 The proposed § 1841(a) provides as follows:
"(a) OFFENSE.-A person is guilty of an offense if he:
"(1) owns, controls, manages, supervises, directs, conducts, finances, or
otherwise engages in a gambling business;
"(2) receives lay-off wagers or otherwise provides reinsurance in relation
to persons engaged in gambling;
"(3) carries or sends:
"(A) a gambling device;
"(B) gambling information; or
"(C) gambling proceeds;
from within a state to any place outside the state; or
"(4) otherwise establishes, promotes, manages, or carries on an enterprise
involving gambling.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978).
4'7 The proposed § 1841(c) provides in pertinent part:
"(c) DEFENSE.-It is a defense to a prosecution:
"(1) under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(4) that the kind of gambling busi-
ness or enterprise, the manner in which the business or enterprise was operated,
and the defendant's participation therein, were legal in all states and localities in
which it was carried on, including any state and locality from which a customer
placed a wager with, or otherwise patronized, the gambling business or enterprise,
and any state and locality in which the wager was received or to which it was
transmitted.
"(2) under subsection (a)(3) that:
"(A) the gambling device was carried or sent into, or was en route to,
solely a state and locality or foreign country in which the use of such a device
was legal;
"(B) the defendant was a common or public contract carrier, or ah em-
ployee thereof, and was carrying the device in the usual course of business;
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tion with news reporting";41 8 and (3) paraphernalia transported by
an individual bettor.
41 9
In addition to the principal gambling section, S. 1437 redrafts
other existing gambling-related provisions, such as those dealing
with sports bribery420 and civil restraints on racketeering activi-
ties.42' The bill transfers several provisions to other titles of the
United States Code, including the provisions dealing with gambling
ships,422 the mailing of lottery information, postal authorities act-
ing as lottery agents, 42 3 and the broadcasting of lottery informa-
tion. 424 Gambling-related bribery is treated in a general section
concerning bribery.4 25 Finally, S. 1437 affects several provisions
relating to gambling but not contained in the current title 18.426
"(E) the transmission of the gambling information was solely from a state
and locality in which such gambling was legal into a state and locality in which
such gambling was legal; or
"(F) the gambling proceeds were obtained by the defendant as a result of
his lawful participation in gambling which was legal in all states and localities
in which it was carried on, including any state and locality from which the
defendant placed a wager or otherwise participated in gambling activity, and
any state and locality in which his wager was received or to which it was
transmitted.
Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c)).
418 Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D)). This definition differs from that in prior
law, and would perhaps cure the first amendment problems inherent in previous defi-
nitions. See notes 181 & 217 supra.
419 Proposed § 1841(c)(2)(C) provides that it is a defense to § 1841(a)(3) that "the de-
fendant was a player or bettor and the gambling device he was carrying or sending was
solely a ticket or other embodiment of his claim." S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101
(1978) (proposed § 1841(c)(2)(C)).
42' See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1753) (to replace 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1976)).
421 See id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4013, 4101) (to replace 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964-1968
(1976)).
422 See id. §§ 973-974 (proposed addition to 46 U.S.C.) (to replace 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-
1083 (1976)).
423 See id. § 878(b) (proposed 39 U.S.C..§ 6003) (to replace 18 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303
(1976)). This provision also carries over the exemption of 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1976) relating
to state-conducted lotteries, but does not amend 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976). See S. 1437, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 878(b) (proposed 39 U.S.C. § 6003).
424 See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1087(s) (1978) (proposed 47 U.S.C. § 512) (to
replace 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976)). Proposed § 512 carries forward an exemption for state-
operated lotteries similar to that now contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1976).
Proposed § 511 prohibits common carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the FCC from
broadcasting gambling information. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1087(s) (1978).
421See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1351) (to
replace 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1976)).
426 The bill incorporates a penalty subsection into each of the provisions that prohibits
financial institutions from engaging in lottery-related activities. See id. §§ 331 (to amend 12
U.S.C. § 25a (1976)), 339(c) (to amend 12 U.S.C. § 339 (1976)), 349(f) (to amend 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730c (1976)), 351(d) (to amend 12 U.S.C. § 1829a (1976)). Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1306
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The provisions of S. 1437 that relate to gambling, therefore,
simplify, harmonize, and improve existing law, without making
radical changes in scope or policy.
CONCLUSION
The development of the federal law of gambling traced in this
Article must now be placed in a larger historical and policy context.
The role of chance in the culture of man has been strikingly varied.
Sometimes it has played an essentially religious role. The first King
of Israel was chosen by lot.427 Other times it has been a secular
issue. For example, governments have seen games of chance as a
boon 428 or a bane429 to military preparedness. During the early
history of the United States, our Puritan forefathers eschewed
gaming out of distaste for the perceived corrupt lifestyle of the
English upperclasses and respect for the harsh necessities of
pioneer society.430 Following the lead of England, 43 ' aristocratic
(1976) would become unnecessary. The bill also redefines the criteria for certification of
farm labor contractors (see notes 296-98 and accompanying text supra), but it continues to
include a gambling conviction as a ground for denial, suspension or revocation (see S. 1437,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 280(a) (1978) (to amend 7 U.S.C. § 2044(b)(7) (1976)). Further, the
bill makes technical amendments to the Johnson Act. See id. § 425 (to amend 15 U.S.C. §§
1172, 1173, 1175, 1176 (1976)).
427 1 Samuel 10:20-2 1. The hand of God was seen in the working of chance. "The lot is
cast into the lap, but the decision is wholly from the Lord." Prov. 16:33 (Rev. Standard).
428 Louisiana, like France, enforces gambling contracts that promote "skill in the use of
arms" such as wagers on horseracing, shooting matches, and foot races. LA. Cxv. CODE
ANN. art. 2983 (West 1952).
429 In 1388, Richard II secured the passage of a statute that directed all laborers and
serving men to secure bows and arrows and to abandon the pursuit of "tennis, football....
dice .... and other such importune games." 12 Rich. II, c. 6 (1388). The problem ap-
parently persisted; in 1541, Henry VIII secured the passage of similar legislation. See
33 Hen. VIII, c. 9 (1541).
430 See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 39-49. In 1633, an enactment ot the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony struck at "time idely or unpffitably" spent. 2 RECORDS OF THE COURTS OF
ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 37 (1904). In 1646, the Colony also
promulgated the first law in America directly attacking gambling. COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETrS 57 (1890). Despite contrary current opinion, these laws were not reli-
giously motivated. Earthly necessities dictated public policy-those distracted from work
could not hope to survive in the new country. See F. DULLES, A HISTORY OF RECREATION 5
(2d ed. 1965). Indeed, only after the Puritan Devines lost their political power did a biblical
justification for antigambling legislation develop. Some suggested that appeals to chance
were a form of blasphemy. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 49-52 (sermons of Cotton
and Increase Mather). Nevertheless, the early gambling laws-unlike the blasphemy
laws-survived the decline of the Devines and the rise of the merchant class, arguably
demonstrating that their justification transcended religion. For a detailed description of the
gradual transformation of the Massachusetts criminal law from the hand of the Lord
punishing sin to an agent of the State maintaining public order, see Nelson, Emerging No-
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Tidewater Virginia regulated gambling to promote the public or-
der, but more importantly, to preserve the stability and economic
viability of a land-based social and economic system. 432 Jacksonian
democrats, on the other hand, fought the state-chartered lotteries
in an effort to end privilege and corruption as well as to uphold the
symbolic relationship between effort and profit in the young Re-
public. 43 3 The small-town casino, bordello, and saloon, fitting for
the male-dominated cattle and mining community of the American
frontier, had to bow to the demands of family life in a developing
farming society. 434 Modern society has accepted the federal gov-
tions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era, in A. GOLDSTEIN & J. GOLDSTEIN,
CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY 72-86 (1971).
431 In 1710, Parliament, reflecting the policy perspective of the aristocracy, com-
prehensively regulated gambling by, inter alia, voiding securities and conveyances given in
satisfaction of gambling debts, providing for actions to recover losses and prohibiting
fraudulent play. See Statute of Anne, 9 Anne, c. 14 (1710). For discussion of the social
attitudes reflected in the Statute, see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARY ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 171-72 (1st ed. 1769); 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 32, § 5, at 720
(8th ed. 1824).
"I In 1727, Virginia adopted the Statute of Anne. See Act of Feb. 1, 1727, ch. 8, 4 VA.
STAT. 214 (Hening 1814). Virginia later prohibited gambling and betting in public places in
an effort to control the grosser incidents of tavern life. See Act of May 6, 1744, ch. 5, 5 VA.
STAT. 229 (Hening 1819). South Carolina, in contrast, was more discriminating; it prohib-
ited only gambling for high stakes in taverns. See Act of May 19, 1762, no. 911, 4 S.C.
STAT. 158-62 (1838).
4 3 3 See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 81-88. A connection between freedom and
virtue was widely seen in colonial society. See PA. CONST. OF 1776, Plan or Frame of Gov-
ernment, c. 2, § 36, reprinted in 2 B. POORE, supra note 16, at 1540 (possession of honest
trade necessary to preserve man's independence); VT. CONST. OF 1777, Plan or Frame of
Government, c. II, § 33, reprinted in 2 B. POORE, supra note 16, at 1857. These early con-
stitutional ideas found subsequent judicial expression in the opinions of Justice Catron, a
Jacksonian appointee to the Supreme Court, when he was still a judge in Tennessee. In
State v. Smith & Lane, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 272 (1829), he argued that society must promote
a system where one acquires property through work and not by the manipulation of
chance:
Reduce a man to want by gaming or otherwise, and he is no longer free to exer-
cise the elective franchise, but dependent upon the hand that furnishes himself
and family with bread .... Destroy freedom of thought, and independence of
action ... and the idea of governing by majorities is a farce, the popular will a
delusion, bowing to the dictation of the wealthy minority.
Id. at 274.
434 See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 373-85. As one author crudely put it: "Four
things indicate prosperity in a mining town-Hebrews, gamblers, common women and
fleas." T. DONALDSON, IDAHO OF YESTERDAY 41 (1941). In advocating the end to the licens-
ing of gambling in 1907, the Governor of Arizona recognized that circumstances had
changed:
The rule that prevails among men in new communities, that each must stand or
fall upon his own merits-that only the strong deserve to stand and that to fall is
the natural and deserved fate of the weak-might have much to commend it if the
rule concerned men alone. But . . . the fate of women and children has become
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ernment as the arbiter of disputes among its several sectors. The
potential of organized crime to undermine the arbiter's decision
has provoked retaliation against the financial power and official
corruption rooted in syndicated gambling. Each of these policy
perspectives has helped to mold the current state and federal law
of gambling.
If this historical development teaches any lesson, it is that each
form of gambling must be examined on its own terms. The law has
taken few "gambling positions." Gambling regulation has most
often been society's reaction to perceived antisocial consequences.
Where little or no harm is evident, gambling is left alone. Gener-
ally, the question is one of degree.435 Public or private lotteries,
wagering on sporting events or otherwise, machine gambling,
and casino-type operations each raise different policy questions.
Modern reformers must be sensitive to these distinctions. When
evaluating a particular gambling form, they must ask who operates
it, who and how many participate in it, where the activity centers,
how it is promoted, and what is the degree of expected regulation.
A state-operated lottery, promoted through limited public adver-
tisement, selling relatively high-priced tickets to the middle and
upper classes, and seeking to finance needed social improvements
is gambling in its most benign form. In contrast, a private lottery
that fraudulently milks the lower classes for the benefit of orga-
nized crime, capitalizes other criminal endeavors and engenders
public corruption is gambling in its most malignant form. Reform-
ers should also recognize the limitations of the law in achieving so-
cially desirable ends.436 In short, sweeping generalizations must be
involved ... [as the territory has developed].
G. KELLY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARIZONA, 1864-1912, at 248-49 (1926).
"" The Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming aptly put it:
It is in immoderate gambling that the dangers lie; an individual or a community
in whose life gambling plays too prominent a part betrays a false sense of values
which cannot but impair the full development to the personality of the society. It
is the concern of the State that gambling, like other indulgences such as the drink-
ing of alcoholic liquor, should be kept within reasonable bounds ....
REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON BETTING, LOTTERIES AND GAMING 1959-51, Cmd. No.
8190, at 45 (1951).
436 The history of English gambling law in the years after the American Revolution is
instructive for reformers. The old common law tolerance of gaming had sharply shifted
with the rise of Puritanism and Cromwell in the 17th Century. The restoration of the
Stuart monarch in 1660, however, turned English society back toward a taste for high life
and luxury. Hanover England did not change that basic direction. Queen Victoria, how-
ever, ascended to the throne of England in 1837. Unlike some of her predecessors, she
abhorred the luxury and idleness that had become typical of the royal court; she believed
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swept away; particularized judgments are the hallmark of wise re-
form.
4 3 7
in the values of hard work, earnestness, morality, propriety and temperance. In a sense,
her ascendance to the throne was akin to a Puritan restoration. The idle occupation of
gambling, with its indiscriminate bestowal of riches based not on merit, but chance,
shocked and affronted Victorian sensibilities, and it was attacked on a wide front. See, e.g.,
Act to amend the Law concerning Games and Wagers, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109, § 18
(gaming contracts void; no suits allowed to collect wagers or money held by third parties in
furtherance of wagers); Act for the Suppression of Betting Houses, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., c.
119, §§ 1-20 (increasing investigative powers; providing penalties). The basic design of
these policies was not rethought until the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and
Gaming sat in 1949-1951 "to enquire into the existing law and practice . . . relating to
lotteries', betting and gaming." ROYAL CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 435, at iii. Largely
adopting a moderate version of John Stuart Mill's philosophy of liberty, the Commission
recommended "that the object of gambling legislation should be to interfere as little as
possible with individual liberty . . . but to impose such restrictions as are desirable and
practicable to discourage or prevent excess." Id. at 55. Nevertheless, the Commission's rec-
ommendations lay dormant for a decade until Parliament adopted the Betting and Gaming
Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 60. The 1960 Act reflected three fundamental policy positions:
gambling was an activity that was unseemly if run by the state; it ought not to be encour-
aged through advertising; and it ought to be largely confined to adults acting in private, and
standing on an equal footing, i.e., there should not be any edge for the house. Experience
under the 1960 Act, however, was not happy. Gambling activity grew by leaps and bounds;
between 1960 and 1961, some 1,000 clubs sprang up in Great Britain. GAMING BOARD FOR
GREAT BRITAIN, REPORT OF THE GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, 1969, at 13 (1970).
Organized crime elements began to take over the management of the clubs violently. 0.
NEWMAN, GAMBLING: HAZARD AND REWARD 51 (1972). Enforcement of the licensing pro-
visions fell short of the expected goals. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 922-25; EASY
MONEY, supra note 116, at 68-69; GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, REPORT OF THE GAM-
ING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, 1969, at 13-14 (1969). The result was the Gaming Act,
1968, c. 65, which tightened the regulatory provisions of the 1960 legislation. By 1977, the
number of licensed casinos dropped from 1,000 to 125 (GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRIT-
AIN, REPORT OF THE GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, 1977, at 11 (1978)); the number
of bingo clubs dropped from 3,000 to 1,740 (id. at 7). Today, the system seems to be
running fairly well, offering a "highly regulated" alternative to the "relatively wide open"
operation of Nevada. EASY MONEY, supra, note 116 at 69. See generally DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 9, at 925-29; GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 101-04. For a comprehensive
survey of the literature on gambling in England today, see D. CORNISH, GAMBLING: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO POLICY AND RESEARCH, Home Office
Research Study No. 42 (1978).
437 It is, of course, commonplace to observe that the law always falls short of realizing its
goals. Shortfalls are normally to be expected in such areas as personnel, organization, and
ultimate product in any human enforcement machinery. And still more is involved in any
society that characterizes itself as free because of constitutional limitations.
In 1974, a referendum in New Jersey defeated, by a three to two margin, a proposal
for statewide casino gambling. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1974, at 38, col. 1. The major objection
was fear of mob control. Two years later, a proposal limited to Atlantic City was adopted
after an intensive publicity campaign. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1976, at 43, col. 1. Governor
Byrne observed on signing the statute implementing the referendum (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
5:12-1 to -152 (West Supp. 1978)) that it would prove successful "if we can keep undesir-
able elements out of the City." N.Y. Times, June 3, 1977, at B3, col. 1. "Organized Crime,"
he said, "is not welcome in Atlantic City. I warn them, keep your filthy hands out." Id.
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Many have observed that the enforcement of criminal pro-
visions in the gambling area is ineffective in comparison with the
enforcement of other types of criminal prohibitions.438 This con-
Traditionally, elements of organized crime have been attracted to such gambling activity,
largely because of its high cash flow. Violence typically characterizes organized crime's ef-
fort to monopolize and control gambling operations. Once in control, elements of or-
ganized crime skim profits, thus cheating owners and taxing authorities; manipulate
games; and collect debts through extortion. At various times Nevada was beset with each of
these incidents of organized crime. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 402-67; EASY
MONEY, supra note 116, at 66-69; GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 78-80. Such
incidents of organized-crime involvement can, of course, be attacked directly by criminal
laws aimed at violence, theft, tax evasion, cheating, or extortion. In addition, they may be
attacked indirectly by "keeping the mob out," that is, by government regulation of owner-
ship, employment, and patronage in a casino industry. Crime control measures are, of
course, constitutionally limited in a free society. These limits are widely perceived, if not
widely applauded. Less well known are the constitutional limits on civil measures in this
area. Traditionally, for example, courts have accorded race tracks wide discretion in deal-
ing with undesirable elements. See Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633
(1913) (purchaser of ticket to race track excluded with no recourse); Fink v. Cole, I N.Y.2d
48, 133 N.E.2d 691, 150 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1956) (past associations with undesirables grounds
for denial of horseracing license). Cf Marshall v. Sawyer, 365 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1966)
(exclusion of plaintiff from Nevada casino because of blacklisting as unsuitable by regu-
latory agency not violative of due process), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). In Nevada
Tax Comm. v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 310 P.2d 852 (1957), the court expressed a concern
similar to that of Governor Byrne:
For gambling to take its place as a lawful enterprise in Nevada it is not enough
that this State has named it lawful. We have but offered it the opportunity for
lawful existence. The offer is a risky one, not only for the people of this state, but
for the entire nation. Organized crime must not be given refuge here.... [N]ot
only must the operation of gambling be carefully controlled, but the character and
background of those who would engage in gambling in this state must be carefully
scrutinized.
Id. at 119, 310 P.2d at 854. These judicial attitudes may not survive modern, broader
constitutional interpretations. Compare Colorado Racing Comm. v. Smaldone, 177 Colo. 33,
492 P.2d 619 (1972) (exclusion of willful violator of any law violates due process) with State
v. Rosenthal, __ Nev .... 559 P.2d 830, 836, appeal dismissed for want of federal question,
434 U.S. 803 (1977) ("no room for federally protected constitutional rights" in gaming
regulation). Careful reformers will take these nascent limitations into account in framing
gambling reforms.
438 See generally Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 697
(1972); Kadish, More on Overcriminalization: A Reply to Professor Junker, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
719 (1972); Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967), reprinted in 7
Am. CRIM. L.Q. 17 (1968). For a recent empirical study of gambling enforcement, see F.
FOWLER, T. MAGIONE & F. PRATTER, GAMBLING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR AMERICAN
CITIES (1978), which concludes, inter alia:
(1) Laws against private social gambling are primarily symbolic; they are neither
enforced nor enforceable;
(2) Laws against public social gambling and commercial gambling are enforceable
to the extent that other comparable laws are; modest resources (less than 1%) are
devoted to the task with modest results;
(3) Because of the nature of gambling offenses, prosecutors and police, not legis-
lative draftsmen, have the major impact in the area;
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clusion demonstrates a pitfall of generalities-usually the speaker
will have one form of gambling in mind but neglects to qualify his
statement. History shows that in certain cases gambling regulation
has succeeded with the commitment of few resources. Federal
gambling ship legislation, for example, achieved its goal upon pas-
sage. 439 The risk of capture and the cost of forfeiture made efforts
to evade the law unattractive. Similarly, the government can largely
eliminate casino operations and the use of gambling devices at an
acceptable cost. It is only when efforts have been made to control
clandestine lotteries or sports wagering that the current level of
enforcement has not achieved a similar level of success. 4 4 0
Comprehensive reform of the law of gambling must take into
account the complexity of evolving legal policies. Seldom can any
issue be considered by examining only one body of law. Although
the criminal law and its traditional policy of prohibition lies at the
heart of the law of gambling, it draws support from a complex
network of parallel, and often uncodified, civil rules.441 Gambling,
too, is not governed solely by the will of the sovereign. The calculus
of competition and profit, often affected by tax provisions, pro-
vides important input. And economic laws draw no distinction be-
tween legal and illegal gambling endeavors. Reform of the heart, in
short, may not produce the intended effect on the body of gambl-
ing policy.
(4) Decriminalization has not made the task of the police harder or easier; and
(5) Police, prosecutor and judicial attitudes that give a low priority to gambling
enforcement are not supported by general social attitudes that want effective en-
forcement, including imprisonment of offenders.
For a discussion of the current societal attitude toward gambling, see GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 48-49 (42% of sample survey respond that gambling enforcement
"very important"; 55% respond jail appropriate). For recommendations on gambling en-
forcement organization for police, see id. at 42-44, and for prosecutors, see G. BLAKEY, R.
GOLDSTOCK & C. RoGOVIN, TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF OR-
GANIZED CRIME: THE RACKETS BUREAU CONCEPT (1977).
439 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1083 (1976), discussed in note 139 supra.
440 See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 169-76.
441 Gambling contracts based on illegal games or legal games found immoral or against
public policy were unenforceable at English common law. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9,
at 829-32. After the Revolution, American courts had to remake English law. See R. POUND,
THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 96-97 (1938). Many American jurisdictions rejected
this rule. See, e.g., Perkins v. Eaton, 3 N.H. 152, 155 (1825) (Richardson, C. J. ). Nevada
has consistently refused to enforce gambling contracts. See Scott v. Courtney, 7 Nev. 419
(1872). For the current reasons behind the rule, see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 877-
80. Changing attitudes in criminal law, however, can spill over into the civil law. See, e.g.,
Caribe Hilton Hotel v. Toland, 63 NJ. 301, 307 A.2d 85 (1973) (valid gambling debt
enforced despite law of forum). Reformers should consider gambling policies of the crimi-
nal and civil law of gambling together. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 9, at 873-82.
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Finally, reformers must be sensitive to the laws of all jurisdic-
tions in their reexamination of gambling policy. The law of any
jurisdiction is a chemistry of criminal, civil, and tax policies. The
federal law of gambling, historically, has attempted to balance the
policies of all jurisdictions, only rarely assuming the policy initia-
tive. And so it should be. Our pluralistic society has adopted a
federal system that accords wide latitude to people and states to act
wisely or foolishly. Ours has been a nation of many faiths, of skep-
ticism, experiments, accommodations, self-criticism, and piecemeal
but constant reform. Reform of the federal law of gambling ought
not to undermine this history.
This Article began with a reference to Santayana. It is appro-
priate that it end with a reference to Shaw, 442 who suggested, with
Hegel,443 that the only thing history teaches is that history does not
teach. The development of the federal law of gambling seems to
have about it a sense of d6ji vu. A historian can only comment that
it need not be so.
442 G. SHAW, HEARTBREAK HOUSE 45 (6th ed. 1927).
443 "What experience and history teach is this-that people and governments never
have learned anything from history . G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 6 (rev. ed.
1900).
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